CWE-208

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:zanata"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46660"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-697"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-30T14:50:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:40Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins Zanata Plugin 0.6 and earlier does not use a constant-time comparison when checking whether the provided and expected webhook token hashes are equal.\n\nThis could potentially allow attackers to use statistical methods to obtain a valid webhook token.\n\nAs of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-86j9-25m2-9w97",
  "modified": "2023-11-02T17:12:46Z",
  "published": "2023-10-25T18:32:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46660"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/zanata-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-10-25/#SECURITY-2879"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/25/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Non-constant time webhook token hash comparison in Jenkins Zanata Plugin"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "igalg.jenkins.plugins:multibranch-scan-webhook-trigger"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46656"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-697"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-30T14:58:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:40Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins Multibranch Scan Webhook Trigger Plugin 1.0.9 and earlier does not use a constant-time comparison when checking whether the provided and expected webhook token are equal.\n\nThis could potentially allow attackers to use statistical methods to obtain a valid webhook token.\n\nAs of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-8859-v9jp-cphf",
  "modified": "2023-11-02T16:55:44Z",
  "published": "2023-10-25T18:32:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46656"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/multibranch-scan-webhook-trigger-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-10-25/#SECURITY-2875"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/25/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jenkins Multibranch Scan Webhook Trigger Plugin uses non-constant time webhook token comparison"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:gogs-webhook"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.0.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46657"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-697"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-30T14:55:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:40Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins Gogs Plugin 1.0.15 and earlier does not use a constant-time comparison when checking whether the provided and expected webhook token are equal.\n\nThis could potentially allow attackers to use statistical methods to obtain a valid webhook token.\n\nAs of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-885r-hhpr-cc9p",
  "modified": "2023-11-02T16:56:29Z",
  "published": "2023-10-25T18:32:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46657"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/gogs-webhook-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-10-25/#SECURITY-2896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/25/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jenkins Gogs Plugin uses non-constant time webhook token comparison"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "websockets"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-33880"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-10T16:24:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-06T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The aaugustin websockets library before 9.1 for Python has an Observable Timing Discrepancy on servers when HTTP Basic Authentication is enabled with basic_auth_protocol_factory(credentials=...). An attacker may be able to guess a password via a timing attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-8ch4-58qp-g3mp",
  "modified": "2024-11-19T18:19:55Z",
  "published": "2021-06-11T17:43:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33880"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aaugustin/websockets/commit/547a26b685d08cac0aa64e5e65f7867ac0ea9bc0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aaugustin/websockets"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/websockets/PYSEC-2021-95.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Observable Timing Discrepancy in aaugustin websockets library"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "Traefik"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.6.11"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-88010"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T16:18:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s BasicAuth middleware coalesces concurrent credential checks through a `singleflight.Group` to avoid hashing the same password many times at once. Since v3.6.11 the deduplication key was built from the submitted password plus the stored secret, so it depended on server state: a non-existent username collapsed onto one shared key while each configured username produced its own. Under attacker-controlled concurrency, a probe request arriving inside a leader request\u0027s in-flight window is served the leader\u0027s fast coalesced result when the username does not exist, but computes its own hash (slow) when the username exists \u2014 reintroducing, only in the concurrent case, the unauthenticated username-enumeration timing oracle that GHSA-g3hg-j4jv-cwfr had hardened for sequential probing. The fix derives the singleflight key from the submitted credentials (username and password) only, so it no longer depends on whether the account exists or on any stored secret. Traefik v2 is not affected: the v2.11 BasicAuth middleware does not use singleflight coalescing, and Digest authentication is not affected. The impact is limited to username enumeration; no credential disclosure or authentication bypass is possible.\n\nThe vulnerability originates on the v3.6 line, which has reached end of life; users on v3.6 or earlier v3.x must upgrade to v3.7.13 to receive the fix.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n## Summary\n\nConfirmed. `checkPassword` derives the `singleflight` key from the *stored secret*, so the key encodes whether the submitted username exists:\n\n- username absent, `secret == \"\"`, key `= len(P) + \":\" + P`\n- username present, key `= len(P) + \":\" + P + secret_T`\n\nEvery non-existent username therefore lands on one shared key, while every configured username gets its own. `singleflight.Group.Do` makes a follower on an equal key block on the leader\u0027s in-flight computation and return the leader\u0027s result. So an attacker who sends a leader request with a junk username and password `P`, then sends the probe for target `T` with the same `P` late inside the leader\u0027s window, reads user existence directly off the probe\u0027s latency: coalesced (fast) means `T` does not exist, own hash (slow) means `T` does exist.\n\nThis is the exact information leak that the `notFoundSecret` dummy hash at line 127 exists to remove. Sequential probing is fully equalised (measured ratio 1.00x, so the fix for `cwfr` / `8j2h` does work); the leak reappears only under attacker-controlled concurrency. Confirmed on the current `v3.7` head, which already carries the `8mrf` singleflight fix, and on `master` (no later fix exists).\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:125` (`checkPassword`)\n\n## Code analysis\n\n`pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:119-131` matches the finding verbatim, including the cited line 125:\n\n```go\nfunc (b *basicAuth) checkPassword(user, password string) bool {   // :119\n\tsecret := b.auth.Secrets(user, b.auth.Realm)                   // \"\" when the user is absent\n\n\tkey := strconv.Itoa(len(password)) + \":\" + password + secret   // :124\n\tmatch, _, _ := b.singleflightGroup.Do(key, func() (any, error) {   // :125\n\t\tif secret == \"\" {\n\t\t\t_ = b.checkSecret(password, b.notFoundSecret)          // :127  dummy hash, equal cost\n\t\t\treturn false, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn b.checkSecret(password, secret), nil\n\t})\n\treturn match.(bool)\n}\n```\n\nTwo independent properties combine:\n\n1. **The dummy hash equalises the cost of one lookup.** `notFoundSecret` is a configured user\u0027s real hash (`slices.Collect(maps.Values(users))[0]`), so absent and present users each perform exactly one hash of the same algorithm and cost. That is why the sequential control below is flat.\n2. **The key partitions on existence, so coalescing is not equalised.** The dummy hash was placed *inside* the closure (commit `122175ac2`, PR #12803), which is what pulls absent users into `Do` at all. Before that refactor, `secret == \"\"` returned `false` before `Do` was ever called.\n\nGit archaeology of the whole sequence in this one function:\n\n| Commit | Date | Effect |\n|---|---|---|\n| `6f469ee1e` | 2024-10-10 | Introduces `singleflight` to dedupe concurrent hashes (`Only calculate basic auth hashes once for concurrent requests`). Absent users returned `false` before `Do`. |\n| `122175ac2` (PR #12803) | 2026-03-17 | Fix for `cwfr`. Moves the empty-secret branch inside the closure, which makes the key existence-dependent for the first time. |\n| `8c4fc8957` | 2026-04-13 | Fix for `8j2h`: `notFoundSecret` was resolving to `\"\"`, so the dummy hash was a no-op. |\n| `b5ace8eb5` (PR #13572) | 2026-07-28 | Fix for `8mrf`: adds the `len(password) + \":\"` prefix so distinct (password, secret) pairs cannot alias. Keeps the secret in the key and keeps the empty-secret branch inside the closure. |\n\nJ15 is the residue of that last fix. It does **not** depend on the key collision `8mrf` closed: the oracle works precisely *because* the keys differ. The prior analysis of `8mrf` recommended keeping \"the empty-secret (unconfigured) path out of any key that a configured user can share\"; the shipped patch only delimited the key, so the existence dependency survived.\n\nAffected range: `\u003e= v3.6.11` (the `122175ac2` refactor) through current `v3.7` head and `master`. Not the v2 line, and not earlier v3 releases, which returned early for absent users. Digest auth does not use `singleflight` and is unaffected.\n\nImpact scope: username enumeration only. No credential disclosure, no authentication bypass, no result sharing across identities.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nGo tests written directly in `package auth`, driving the real `NewBasic` handler over a real HTTP server (`httptest`), with real `bcrypt` / `apr1` hashes and no instrumentation of the vulnerable logic. Files: `pkg/middlewares/auth/zz_scanpoc_J15{,b,c}_test.go`, deleted after the run.\n\n**Commands**\n\n```\ncd /Users/emile/go/src/github.com/traefik/traefik\ngo test -count=1 -run TestZZScanPoCJ15      -v ./pkg/middlewares/auth/...\ngo test -count=1 -run TestZZScanPoCJ15Costs -v ./pkg/middlewares/auth/...\ngo test -count=1 -run TestZZScanPoCJ15H2    -v ./pkg/middlewares/auth/...\n```\n\nProbe shape, exactly the claimed scenario: calibrate `D` with one request, launch a leader with a junk username and password `P`, sleep `0.9 * D`, then send the probe with password `P` and either a configured (`alice`) or an absent (`bob`) username, and time the probe. `classify=OK` means `present \u003e 2 * absent`, i.e. the oracle answered correctly.\n\n**Observed, main PoC (test 1)**\n\n```\n[bcrypt-cost12] SEQUENTIAL control: absent=249.568275ms present=249.10215ms ratio=1.00x\n[bcrypt-cost12] CONCURRENT D=245.521625ms frac=0.90 round 0: absent=21.750833ms present=242.081792ms ratio=11.1x  classify=OK\n[bcrypt-cost12] CONCURRENT D=245.521625ms frac=0.90 round 1: absent=20.197667ms present=245.234958ms ratio=12.1x  classify=OK\n[bcrypt-cost12] CONCURRENT D=245.521625ms frac=0.90 round 2: absent=25.675958ms present=243.981375ms ratio=9.5x   classify=OK\n[bcrypt-cost10] SEQUENTIAL control: absent=61.4374ms present=61.049608ms ratio=0.99x\n[bcrypt-cost10] CONCURRENT D=60.54675ms frac=0.90 round 0: absent=5.572875ms present=60.8345ms   ratio=10.9x  classify=OK\n[bcrypt-cost10] CONCURRENT D=60.54675ms frac=0.90 round 1: absent=4.042292ms present=61.988792ms ratio=15.3x  classify=OK\n[bcrypt-cost10] CONCURRENT D=60.54675ms frac=0.90 round 2: absent=4.53825ms  present=61.557791ms ratio=13.6x  classify=OK\n[apr1-short-pw] SEQUENTIAL control: absent=360.7\u00b5s present=373.116\u00b5s ratio=1.03x\n[apr1-short-pw] CONCURRENT D=370.792\u00b5s frac=0.90 round 0: absent=378.167\u00b5s present=409.458\u00b5s ratio=1.1x  classify=FAIL\n[apr1-short-pw] CONCURRENT D=370.792\u00b5s frac=0.90 round 1: absent=352.416\u00b5s present=333.875\u00b5s ratio=0.9x  classify=FAIL\n[apr1-short-pw] CONCURRENT D=370.792\u00b5s frac=0.90 round 2: absent=374.209\u00b5s present=349.125\u00b5s ratio=0.9x  classify=FAIL\n[apr1-8000B-pw] SEQUENTIAL control: absent=22.159325ms present=21.999433ms ratio=0.99x\n[apr1-8000B-pw] CONCURRENT D=22.457583ms frac=0.90 round 0: absent=22.089458ms present=22.516708ms ratio=1.0x   classify=FAIL\n[apr1-8000B-pw] CONCURRENT D=22.457583ms frac=0.90 round 1: absent=698.042\u00b5s  present=21.877ms    ratio=31.3x  classify=OK\n[apr1-8000B-pw] CONCURRENT D=22.457583ms frac=0.90 round 2: absent=1.570875ms present=21.945417ms ratio=14.0x  classify=OK\n```\n\nThe **sequential control is the decisive part**: 1.00x / 0.99x / 1.03x / 0.99x on every algorithm. The constant-time countermeasure is intact for one-request-at-a-time probing, so the 10x to 15x concurrent separation is attributable to the coalescing and to nothing else. That rules out the alternative explanation that this is just `cwfr` / `8j2h` still unfixed.\n\n**Observed, per-algorithm hash cost (test 2)**\n\n```\nbcrypt cost10 / short pw        -\u003e 60.5919ms per hash\nbcrypt cost12 / short pw        -\u003e 242.384558ms per hash\napr1 / short pw                 -\u003e 128.333\u00b5s per hash\napr1 / 8000-byte pw             -\u003e 42.575816ms per hash\n```\n\n**Observed, single HTTP/2 connection (test 3)**\n\nBoth probes multiplexed as two streams over one TLS connection, which pins them to a single Traefik process even behind an L4 load balancer fronting several replicas:\n\n```\nh2 single-connection: D=63.048ms\nh2 round 0: absent=7.931459ms present=65.87375ms  ratio=8.3x  classify=OK\nh2 round 1: absent=4.255667ms present=64.193291ms ratio=15.1x classify=OK\nh2 round 2: absent=6.696417ms present=64.695208ms ratio=9.7x  classify=OK\n```\n\n**Conclusion: REPRODUCED**, 9/9 correct classifications on bcrypt, single-shot, no statistics.\n\nClaim-by-claim audit of the finding text:\n\n_(truncated ; full analysis in the linked internal report)_\n\n## Documentation grounding\n\n**Not working-as-intended. The governing project document puts this class explicitly in scope.**\n\n- `docs/content/security/` (header-underscores, request-path, content-length, http2-header-memory, multi-tenant-kubernetes) has no page covering BasicAuth, the timing posture or the singleflight dedup. Grep for `timing|basicauth|basic auth|enumerat|singleflight` across that directory: no match. No governing security doc, hence no WAI signal from there.\n- `docs/content/contributing/security-decisions.md`, section **Authentication Middleware Correctness**, is the settled public position and it is directly on point:\n\n  \u003e **Our position.** In scope: credential or identity handling that leaks across requests or users, **observable timing differences that disclose whether a principal exists**, and credentials forwarded to a destination the operator did not authorise.\n  \u003e\n  \u003e **Where the line is.** Choosing a weak authentication mechanism, or configuring it permissively, is the operator\u0027s decision. **The middleware failing to deliver what its documentation promises is ours.**\n\n_(truncated ; full analysis in the linked internal report)_\n\n## Precedent in comparable projects\n\nCorpus refreshed 2026-08-24 for nginx, ingress-nginx, kong, caddy, apisix, nginx-plus; envoy (2026-06-29), envoy-gateway (2026-06-15), haproxy (2026-07-16) and istio (2026-05-12) are staler.\n\nNo exact analogue of a request-deduplication timing oracle. Adjacent prior art:\n\n- **Envoy, CVE-2026-47775, medium**: \"OAuth2 Filter: Padding Oracle via AES-256-CBC Cookie Decryption\". A side-channel oracle inside an auth filter, published as a medium CVE. Framed on the observability of the discrepancy, not on the difficulty of measuring it.\n- **Envoy Gateway, CVE-2026-53715 / GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q, medium**: \"Wasm cache ServeHTTP reads mappingPath2Cache without lock\". A concurrency defect in a shared per-process cache in the request path, treated as a real medium CVE and fixed by correcting the shared-state handling.\n- **APISIX, CVE-2025-62232, high**: basic-auth credential exposure. Same component, unrelated mechanism (logging).\n\nTakeaway: the industry treats side-channel oracles in auth filters, and concurrency defects in shared per-process request-path caches, as genuine publishable CVEs of roughly this severity. Nothing in the corpus argues the class is by design. The strongest precedent, however, is not a competitor: it is Traefik\u0027s own two published CVEs on this exact guarantee.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nAssign for fix. No fix exists: `gh search prs --repo traefik/traefik \"singleflight\"` returns only PR #13572 (the merged `8mrf` key-collision fix) and `\"basic auth timing\"` only PR #12803 / #12796; `git log --all` on the checkout shows `b5ace8eb5` as the last change to `pkg/middlewares/auth/` and `master` (`174e5d811`, a merge of `v3.7`) carries nothing later.\n\n**Fix shape: remove the secret from the key and qualify it by username.** Something along the lines of\n\n```go\nkey := strconv.Itoa(len(user)) + \":\" + user + \":\" + password\n```\n\nwith the dummy-hash branch left inside the closure. This is strictly better than the current key on all four counts:\n\n- **It closes J15**: the key no longer encodes existence, so two absent users no longer share a bucket that a present user is excluded from. Coalescing then happens only for an identical `(user, password)` pair, which leaks nothing an attacker did not already supply.\n- **It closes `8mrf` structurally** rather than by delimiting: the stored hash never enters the key, so no choice of password can alias a configured user\u0027s key. The `len` prefix is still needed, now on `user`, to keep `(\"ab\", \"c\")` and `(\"a\", \"bc\")` apart.\n- **It preserves the purpose of `6f469ee1e`**: the case that commit exists for is a burst of concurrent requests carrying the *same* credentials, which is exactly what a username-qualified key still dedupes.\n- **It keeps the constant-time property**: one hash of `notFoundSecret` for absent users, one hash of `secret` for present ones, unchanged.\n\nDo not fix this by making the dummy branch share the leader\u0027s timing envelope; as the finding correctly notes, that only helps if the key stops depending on `secret == \"\"`.\n\nSecondary, low cost: restore the \"Timing attacks\" admonition that PR #12803 added to the BasicAuth page. It is the statement of the guarantee, it is the thing `security-decisions.md` holds the project to, and it is currently absent from the `v3.7` docs tree.\n\nIf filed: new cluster slug `basicauth-singleflight-existence-oracle`, sibling of `basicauth-singleflight-key-collision`, affected range `\u003e= v3.6.11` through the current `v3.6` / `v3.7` heads, v2 unaffected, digest auth unaffected. Correct the 40x claim and the `$apr1$` \"trivial\" claim in the published description per the audit table above.\n\n## Provenance\n\nFound by an external automated code scan (`CLAUDE-SECURITY-20260824-122205`) of `pkg/middlewares`, `pkg/proxy`, `pkg/server`, `pkg/muxer` and `pkg/tls` on branch `v3.7` at commit `d5072ce7b8765c9574246072e05dd81d84950da7`, then triaged with the `advisory-check` process : mechanism-level duplicate check against the existing advisory corpus, CVE-policy gate, security-documentation grounding, comparable-project precedent, and a mandatory reproduction attempt.\n\nTriage outcome : **Likely Valid**, confidence High, reproduced (yes). Expected publication likelihood at triage time : High.\n\nScanner finding id : F16. Internal report : `findings/scan-20260824/verdicts/J15.md` in the security-advisor repository.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-8fcf-v89g-xpg6",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:49Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:40:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-8fcf-v89g-xpg6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88010"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13816"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/ddc1bf4660b85fd61fafdd821eb8216fb1a0b130"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: BasicAuth singleflight coalescing reintroduces an unauthenticated username-enumeration timing oracle"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.14.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phalcon/cphalcon"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.14.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54736"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T16:01:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Phalcon\\Encryption\\Crypt` provides authenticated encryption: when `useSigning` is enabled (the default), `encrypt()` appends an HMAC tag and `decrypt()` verifies it before returning the plaintext. The verification compares the attacker-supplied tag against the freshly computed HMAC using PHP/Zephir identity comparison (`!==`), which the Zephir compiler lowers to `!ZEPHIR_IS_IDENTICAL(...)` \u2014 a byte-wise `memcmp` that returns early on the first differing byte. The comparison time therefore depends on how many leading bytes of the supplied tag are correct, a classic MAC-verification timing side-channel. Every other secret/MAC comparison in the framework uses the constant-time `hash_equals()` (`zephir_hash_equals`) \u2014 the CSRF token check (`Security::checkToken`) and the JWT signature check (`Signer\\Hmac::verify`); `Crypt::decrypt` is the lone deviation.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`phalcon/Encryption/Crypt.zep:246` (Zephir source):\n\n```zephir\nif true === this-\u003euseSigning {\n    // Checks on the decrypted message digest using the HMAC method.\n    if digest !== hash_hmac(hashAlgorithm, padded, decryptKey, true) {\n        throw new Mismatch(\"Hash does not match.\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\nGenerated C --\u003e `ext/phalcon/encryption/crypt.zep.c:364-367`:\n\n```c\nZEPHIR_CALL_FUNCTION(\u0026_8$$7, \"hash_hmac\", NULL, 245, \u0026hashAlgorithm, \u0026padded, \u0026decryptKey, \u0026__$true);\n...\nif (!ZEPHIR_IS_IDENTICAL(\u0026digest, \u0026_8$$7)) {                 // \u003c-- non-constant-time\n    ZEPHIR_THROW_EXCEPTION_DEBUG_STR(..., \"Hash does not match.\", \"phalcon/Encryption/Crypt.zep\", 247);\n```\n\n`ZEPHIR_IS_IDENTICAL` --\u003e `zephir_is_identical()` (`ext/kernel/operators.c:472`) --\u003e Zend `is_identical_function` --\u003e for equal-length strings a `memcmp` that exits on the first mismatching byte (data-dependent timing).\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nThe HMAC is the integrity/authentication tag of Phalcon\u0027s authenticated-encryption scheme. A successful timing attack (Keyczar/CVE-2009-0654-style: fix the IV+ciphertext so the target tag is constant, then recover it byte-by-byte from response timing) yields a tag the attacker can attach to a chosen IV+ciphertext so that `decrypt()` accepts it as authentic, defeating the integrity guarantee. Combined with CFB malleability (flipping a ciphertext byte flips the corresponding plaintext byte), an attacker who recovers the forging capability can tamper with the decrypted contents the application trusts (e.g. encrypted cookies carrying authorization/identity state). There is no confidentiality break by itself.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nReplace the identity comparison with the constant-time helper already used elsewhere in the framework. In `phalcon/Encryption/Crypt.zep:246`:\n\n```zephir\n// before\nif digest !== hash_hmac(hashAlgorithm, padded, decryptKey, true) {\n    throw new Mismatch(\"Hash does not match.\");\n}\n// after\nif true !== hash_equals(hash_hmac(hashAlgorithm, padded, decryptKey, true), digest) {\n    throw new Mismatch(\"Hash does not match.\");\n}\n```\n\n`hash_equals()` returns false for unequal-length inputs, so it also covers the truncated-tag case. Optional further hardening: verify the MAC before unpadding (functionally moot here because `cryptUnpadText` never throws) and consider migrating the default toward an AEAD mode such as `aes-256-gcm`.\n\nAddressed Issue: \n\n- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/issues/17090\n\nPatched Stream: \n\n- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/issues/17090",
  "id": "GHSA-8jqh-95g6-7jpj",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T16:01:05Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T16:01:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/security/advisories/GHSA-8jqh-95g6-7jpj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/issues/17090"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/pull/17091"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/commit/ad53ab1b2e7ec59b3af92b0b37b8aaa099011137"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/releases/tag/v5.14.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Phalcon: Non-constant-time HMAC verification in `Encryption\\Crypt::decrypt` (timing side-channel)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "totp-rs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29185"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-24T21:33:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-20T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nToken comparison was not constant time, and could theorically be used to guess value of an TOTP token, and thus reuse it in the same time window. The attacker would have to know the password beforehand nonetheless.\n\n### Patches\nLibrary now used constant-time comparison.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [totp-rs](https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs)\n* Email us at [cleo.rebert@gmail.com](mailto:cleo.rebert@gmail.com)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-8vxv-2g8p-2249",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T21:33:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T21:33:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-8vxv-2g8p-2249"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29185"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs/issues/13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs/commit/1f1e1a6fe722deb1656f483b1367ea4be978db5b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs/compare/v1.0...v1.1.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/constantoine/totp-rs/releases/tag/v1.1.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0018.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Observable Timing Discrepancy in totp-rs"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-36469"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-02T07:15:40Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Execution time for an unsuccessful login differs when using a non-existing username compared to using an existing one.",
  "id": "GHSA-8w6w-prh9-wr2j",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:27Z",
  "published": "2025-04-02T09:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36469"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00027.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.zabbix.com/browse/ZBX-26255"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-26314"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-09T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Potential floating point value injection in all supported CPU products, in conjunction with software vulnerabilities relating to speculative execution with incorrect floating point results, may cause the use of incorrect data from FPVI and may result in data leakage.",
  "id": "GHSA-92cv-8jc7-jrpm",
  "modified": "2022-06-04T00:00:52Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:04:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26314"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/H36U6CNREC436W6GYO7QUMJIVEA35SCV"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/SVA2NY26MMXOODUMYZN5DCU3FXMBMBOB"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1003"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/06/09/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/06/10/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ep_etherpad-lite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-235",
      "CWE-330"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T17:49:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Fix: PR #7906 (ether/etherpad). A set of medium/low hardening fixes:\n\n- **Weak RNG for tokens (CWE-330):** author/session/readonly IDs were generated with `Math.random()` (client and server). Now use `crypto.getRandomValues`.\n- **Login timing / no failure delay (CWE-208/CWE-307):** the OIDC interaction login used a non-constant-time password compare with no failure delay. Now uses `crypto.timingSafeEqual` plus a uniform failure delay; user lookup is own-property only.\n- **Plugin dependency path handling (CWE-22):** plugin dependency names from package.json were used to build filesystem paths without validation (admin-gated install). Now validated against the npm name grammar.\n- **API parameter pollution (CWE-235):** `/api/2` merged all request headers into the API field set. Now forwards only `authorization`, matching the openapi.ts handler.\n- **Pad-creation side effect:** `API.appendChatMessage` could create arbitrary pads (missing `getPadSafe`). Now requires the pad to exist.\n- **Error info disclosure (CWE-209):** the admin file server echoed filesystem error detail; now returns a generic message.",
  "id": "GHSA-92hr-gmr6-h8cp",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T17:49:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T17:49:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad/security/advisories/GHSA-92hr-gmr6-h8cp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad/pull/7906"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad/commit/7ea99706483443239bbbc0f2df9aff8ab5de4805"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ether/etherpad/releases/tag/3.3.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Etherpad addressed weak token RNG, login timing, plugin path handling, API request handling"
}