CWE-190
AllowedInteger Overflow or Wraparound
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.
4393 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9QVR-P35Q-RV6H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:01 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:01An exploitable integer overflow vulnerability exists in the xls_preparseWorkSheet function of libxls 1.4 when handling a MULRK record. A specially crafted XLS file can cause a memory corruption resulting in remote code execution. An attacker can send malicious XLS file to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-24T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An exploitable integer overflow vulnerability exists in the xls_preparseWorkSheet function of libxls 1.4 when handling a MULRK record. A specially crafted XLS file can cause a memory corruption resulting in remote code execution. An attacker can send malicious XLS file to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-9qvr-p35q-rv6h",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:01:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:01:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0461"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R36-PH2G-374V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-03-10 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: gpio-xilinx: Fix integer overflow
Current implementation is not able to configure more than 32 pins due to incorrect data type. So type casting with unsigned long to avoid it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49570"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngpio: gpio-xilinx: Fix integer overflow\n\nCurrent implementation is not able to configure more than 32 pins\ndue to incorrect data type. So type casting with unsigned long\nto avoid it.",
"id": "GHSA-9r36-ph2g-374v",
"modified": "2025-03-10T21:31:10Z",
"published": "2025-03-10T21:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32c094a09d5829ad9b02cdf667569aefa8de0ea6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f16a5390640807dde420ee5ccbc4c95577aea6a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e129e5486b981d324057e6986059f852658b0d00"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R5J-HRX8-Q34W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-04 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-13 00:01In subtitle service, there is a possible application crash due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local denial of service with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: DTV03330673; Issue ID: DTV03330673.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20107"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-03T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In subtitle service, there is a possible application crash due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local denial of service with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: DTV03330673; Issue ID: DTV03330673.",
"id": "GHSA-9r5j-hrx8-q34w",
"modified": "2022-05-13T00:01:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-04T00:00:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20107"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/May-2022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R75-HH5F-2VJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-02 03:31Integer overflow in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14430"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-472"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T23:16:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Integer overflow in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-9r75-hh5f-2vjg",
"modified": "2026-07-02T03:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T00:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14430"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0175352312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/522126182"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R7R-57FG-WQ6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:27 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:27u'Lack of check that the current received data fragment size of a particular packet that are read from shared memory are less than the actual packet size can lead to memory corruption and potential information leakage' in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in APQ8009, APQ8017, APQ8053, APQ8096AU, APQ8098, Bitra, IPQ6018, IPQ8074, Kamorta, MDM9150, MDM9205, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9645, MDM9650, MDM9655, MSM8905, MSM8909, MSM8917, MSM8920, MSM8937, MSM8940, MSM8953, MSM8996, MSM8996AU, MSM8998, Nicobar, QCA8081, QCM2150, QCN7605, QCS404, QCS405, QCS605, QCS610, QM215, Rennell, SA415M, SA6155P, Saipan, SC7180, SC8180X, SDA660, SDA845, SDM429, SDM429W, SDM439, SDM450, SDM630, SDM632, SDM636, SDM660, SDM670, SDM710, SDM845, SDM850, SDX20, SDX24, SDX55, SM6150, SM7150, SM8150, SM8250, SXR1130, SXR2130
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13994"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-08T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "u\u0027Lack of check that the current received data fragment size of a particular packet that are read from shared memory are less than the actual packet size can lead to memory corruption and potential information leakage\u0027 in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice \u0026 Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in APQ8009, APQ8017, APQ8053, APQ8096AU, APQ8098, Bitra, IPQ6018, IPQ8074, Kamorta, MDM9150, MDM9205, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9645, MDM9650, MDM9655, MSM8905, MSM8909, MSM8917, MSM8920, MSM8937, MSM8940, MSM8953, MSM8996, MSM8996AU, MSM8998, Nicobar, QCA8081, QCM2150, QCN7605, QCS404, QCS405, QCS605, QCS610, QM215, Rennell, SA415M, SA6155P, Saipan, SC7180, SC8180X, SDA660, SDA845, SDM429, SDM429W, SDM439, SDM450, SDM630, SDM632, SDM636, SDM660, SDM670, SDM710, SDM845, SDM850, SDX20, SDX24, SDX55, SM6150, SM7150, SM8150, SM8250, SXR1130, SXR2130",
"id": "GHSA-9r7r-57fg-wq6g",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:27:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:27:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/august-2020-bulletin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/august-2020-security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9RHJ-8Q3F-7X84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:28 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:28An exploitable integer overflow vulnerability exists in the PlanMaker document parsing functionality of SoftMaker Office 2021’s PlanMaker application. A specially crafted document can cause the document parser perform arithmetic that may overflow which can result in an undersized heap allocation. Later when copying data from the file into this allocation, a heap-based buffer overflow will occur which can corrupt memory. These types of memory corruptions can allow for code execution under the context of the application. An attacker can entice the victim to open a document to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-13579"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-04T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An exploitable integer overflow vulnerability exists in the PlanMaker document parsing functionality of SoftMaker Office 2021\u2019s PlanMaker application. A specially crafted document can cause the document parser perform arithmetic that may overflow which can result in an undersized heap allocation. Later when copying data from the file into this allocation, a heap-based buffer overflow will occur which can corrupt memory. These types of memory corruptions can allow for code execution under the context of the application. An attacker can entice the victim to open a document to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-9rhj-8q3f-7x84",
"modified": "2022-05-24T22:28:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T22:28:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13579"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1190"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9RM7-3QHH-H2MC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 14:52 – Updated: 2026-09-17 14:52Wire's protobuf decoders did not consistently validate attacker-controlled length-delimited sizes against the current reader bounds before computing cursor, limit, or pointer positions.
In the Kotlin runtime, ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray) and ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString) use the ProtoReader32 fast path implemented by ByteArrayProtoReader32. In ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited(), Wire read an untrusted varint length into an Int and rejected only negative values. A length such as 2147483647 is non-negative, so it passed that check, but pos + length overflowed the signed 32-bit cursor and produced a negative limit. The following if (limit > pushedLimit) guard did not catch this because the overflowed value was negative.
That invalid limit then reached string, bytes, skip, and scalar-reading paths as an invalid byte count or invalid range. Instead of failing as a checked decode error such as IOException, malformed input could throw unchecked runtime exceptions including IllegalArgumentException and ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException. Applications commonly treat malformed protobuf input as an expected decode failure; unchecked runtime exceptions escaping that boundary can crash request handling or the process.
The original report is a sibling of the negative-length skipped-group bug fixed as CVE-2026-45799. It is not the same bug. The length in this advisory is positive, and the overflow occurs when setting a length-delimited message limit, not only when skipping a group.
While auditing for the same bug class, related boundary flaws were also found and fixed:
- Kotlin
ProtoReadernow validates logical message limits before varint, fixed32, fixed64, and skip operations. The originally reported byte-array overflow payload did not reproduce as the same signed overflow inProtoReader, because that reader tracks positions asLong, but the streaming reader still needed consistent current-message-limit enforcement. - Swift
ReadBuffer.readVarint()readpointer.pointeebefore checking that one byte remained. A tag-only varint field could read past the end of the buffer. - Swift
ReadBuffer.verifyAdditional(count:)formedpointer.advanced(by: count)before proving the requestedcountfit within the remaining buffer, so pointer arithmetic ran before the bounds were established. (The distinct Swift negative-lengthskipGroup()crash is tracked separately as GHSA-86wm-r4c5-2rc9 / CVE-2026-61695; this advisory covers the positive/oversized-length boundary failures.) - Swift nested-message decoding and packed-repeated decoding computed end pointers from untrusted lengths before validating that the bytes were present.
- Swift packed-repeated decoding reserved array capacity from an untrusted length before validating that the length existed in the current buffer.
- Swift size-delimited decoding converted an untrusted
UInt64varint size toIntwithout exactness or availability checks. On platforms where the value is not representable, this could trap.
The fix enforces a single invariant across the hardened readers: every decoded or skipped byte count must be non-negative and no larger than the remaining bytes in the current logical message limit before any cursor, pointer, limit, allocation, or slice is advanced.
Impact
An attacker who can supply protobuf bytes to an application using affected Wire decoders can trigger a denial of service by causing decode to fail with unchecked runtime failures or traps rather than normal malformed-input decode errors.
Known impact:
- Availability impact only.
- No known confidentiality impact.
- No known integrity impact.
- No known code execution.
Attack requirements:
- The application decodes attacker-controlled protobuf bytes with Wire.
- No authentication is required if the decoding endpoint is reachable without authentication.
- A single short malformed protobuf payload is sufficient for the Kotlin byte-array fast path.
Most directly affected Kotlin entry points:
ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString)
Adjacent Kotlin path hardened by this fix:
ProtoAdapter.decode(BufferedSource)- direct use of
ProtoReader
Affected Swift entry points:
- Swift
ProtoDecoderandProtoReaderAPIs when decoding attacker-controlledDataor buffers.
Proof of concept and regression payloads
These payloads are intentionally small and should be treated as malformed protobuf input. After the fix, they must fail with normal decode errors such as IOException, EOFException, or ProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData, not unchecked runtime exceptions, traps, out-of-bounds reads, or large allocations.
Kotlin byte-array known length-delimited field
Hex:
0A FF FF FF FF 07
Meaning:
0A: field 1, length-delimitedFF FF FF FF 07: varint length2147483647
Pre-fix behavior observed through Person.ADAPTER.decode(byteArray):
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: startIndex: 6 > endIndex: -2147483643
Expected fixed behavior:
IOException / EOFException
Kotlin byte-array unknown length-delimited field
Hex:
1A FF FF FF FF 07
Meaning:
1A: field 3, length-delimitedFF FF FF FF 07: varint length2147483647
Pre-fix behavior observed:
ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
Expected fixed behavior:
IOException / EOFException
Kotlin byte-array skipped group containing oversized positive length
Hex:
0B 0A FF FF FF FF 07 0C
Meaning:
0B: start group, field 10A: nested field 1, length-delimitedFF FF FF FF 07: varint length21474836470C: end group, field 1
Expected fixed behavior:
IOException / EOFException
Kotlin current-message-limit fixed32 boundary
Hex:
02 0D 05 00 00 00
Meaning:
02: outer length-delimited message length is 2 bytes0D: nested field 1, fixed3205 00 00 00: enough bytes remain in the underlying source, but not inside the current logical message limit
Expected fixed behavior:
EOFException
This covers the invariant that scalar reads must not cross the current length-delimited message boundary even when the underlying source has more bytes available.
Swift tag-only varint value
Hex:
08
Meaning:
08: field 1, varint- Missing varint value byte
Pre-fix risk:
ReadBuffer.readVarint()could dereferencepointer.pointeebefore verifying that a byte remained.
Expected fixed behavior:
ProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData
Swift nested message with oversized positive length
Hex:
12 FF FF FF FF 07
Meaning:
12: field 2, length-delimitedFF FF FF FF 07: varint length2147483647
Pre-fix risk:
- Nested message decoding computed an end pointer from an untrusted length before proving that the buffer contained that many bytes.
Expected fixed behavior:
ProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData
Swift packed repeated field with oversized positive length
Hex:
0A FF FF FF FF 07
Meaning:
0A: field 1, length-delimited packed repeated fieldFF FF FF FF 07: varint length2147483647
Pre-fix risk:
- Packed repeated decoding could reserve capacity based on an untrusted length before proving the bytes were present.
Expected fixed behavior:
ProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData
Swift size-delimited stream with unrepresentable size
Hex:
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 01
Meaning:
- Size-delimited message length varint
UInt64.max
Pre-fix risk:
ProtoDecoder.decodeSizeDelimited(_:from:)converted the untrustedUInt64toIntwithout exactness checking.
Expected fixed behavior:
ProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData
Root cause
The vulnerable code mixed three operations that must remain separate:
- Decode an untrusted protobuf length.
- Validate that the length is non-negative and fits within the current logical message boundary.
- Advance the cursor, pointer, limit, slice, or allocation based on that length.
In the vulnerable paths, step 3 happened before step 2 was complete. For Kotlin ByteArrayProtoReader32, this caused signed integer wraparound in pos + length. For Swift, related pointer and allocation operations could be performed before proving the requested bytes existed.
Fix
The fix centralizes checked cursor and pointer advancement.
Kotlin changes:
ByteArrayProtoReader32now validates constructor invariants forposandlimit.ByteArrayProtoReader32now uses shared helpers to:- reject negative lengths,
- compute checked limits,
- compute remaining bytes in the current logical limit,
- validate before
skip, - validate before string and bytes reads,
- validate before fixed32 and fixed64 reads.
ProtoReadernow mirrors the same logical-boundary model for:- length-delimited limit calculation,
- skipped length-delimited fields,
- varint reads,
- fixed32 reads,
- fixed64 reads,
- current-message remaining-byte calculations.
Swift changes:
ReadBuffernow computes checked end pointers only after confirmingcount >= 0andcount <= remaining.ReadBuffer.readVarint()verifies one byte remains before each byte dereference.ReadBuffer.readBuffer(count:),readData(count:),readFixed32(), andreadFixed64()compute the checked new pointer before reading and advancing.ProtoReader.beginMessage()validates nested message lengths before storing a message-end pointer.- Packed repeated decoding validates the packed field length before preallocation and before constructing the loop boundary.
ProtoDecoder.decodeSizeDelimited(_:from:)converts sizes withInt(exactly:)and verifies that the full message bytes exist before constructing a child buffer.
Fixed in PR #3635:
- https://github.com/square/wire/pull/3635
- Fix commit
25ebcabb9ab7f12d1d77af75ecbc51726fddc015
Workarounds
The recommended remediation is to upgrade to a patched release.
Partial mitigations if an immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Reject or cap untrusted protobuf message sizes before passing bytes to Wire.
- Prefer decoding from a bounded source where possible rather than decoding unbounded attacker-controlled byte arrays.
- Treat unchecked runtime exceptions from protobuf decode as malformed-input failures at service trust boundaries so they cannot crash the process.
- For Swift, do not pass untrusted size-delimited streams or
Datadirectly to affected decoders without an outer size cap and exception/error boundary.
These mitigations reduce exposure but do not fully fix the parser bugs.
Detection
A crash or error may contain one of the following symptoms when processing malformed protobuf bytes:
IllegalArgumentException: startIndex: 6 > endIndex: -2147483643
ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
IndexOutOfBoundsException
unexpected unchecked RuntimeException during ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)
Swift trap during Int conversion from an untrusted protobuf size
Swift unexpected pointer/buffer failure while reading malformed varints or length-delimited values
The absence of these exact messages does not prove safety. Any unchecked exception, trap, or process crash while decoding malformed length-delimited protobuf input should be investigated.
Verification
Regression tests added:
ProtoReader32Test.lengthDelimitedRejectsPositiveLengthOverflowProtoReader32Test.fixed32CannotReadPastLengthDelimitedLimitProtoReaderTest.fixed32CannotReadPastLengthDelimitedLimitProtoReaderTests.testReadVarintRejectsMissingValueProtoReaderTests.testNestedMessageRejectsOversizedLengthProtoReaderTests.testPackedRepeatedRejectsOversizedLengthBeforePreallocationProtoDecoderTests.testDecodeSizeDelimitedRejectsUnrepresentableSize
Focused verification command:
./gradlew :wire-runtime:jvmTest :wire-runtime-swift:test
Expected result:
BUILD SUCCESSFUL
Relationship to related advisories
This is a distinct vulnerability from the negative-length issues. It is a
different bug class — a positive, non-negative length (for example
2147483647) that passes the existing length < 0 check but still overflows
the signed 32-bit cursor or crosses the current message boundary — and it has
a separate fix (PR #3635, not the negative-length PRs).
CVE-2026-45799/GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9fixed the original Kotlin/JVM negative-length skipped-group crash (Wire6.3.0). The non-negative overflow described here was not covered by that check and remained exploitable through6.4.4.GHSA-86wm-r4c5-2rc9/CVE-2026-61695covers the Swift negative-lengthskipGroup()crash (PR #3616). The Swift hardening in this advisory (PR #3635) instead addresses positive/oversized-length overflow, buffer over-read, and unrepresentable-size conversions in the Swift readers.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.4.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0-alpha01"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.0-alpha04"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T14:52:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T19:17:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Wire\u0027s protobuf decoders did not consistently validate attacker-controlled length-delimited sizes against the current reader bounds before computing cursor, limit, or pointer positions.\n\nIn the Kotlin runtime, `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)` and `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString)` use the `ProtoReader32` fast path implemented by `ByteArrayProtoReader32`. In `ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited()`, Wire read an untrusted varint length into an `Int` and rejected only negative values. A length such as `2147483647` is non-negative, so it passed that check, but `pos + length` overflowed the signed 32-bit cursor and produced a negative `limit`. The following `if (limit \u003e pushedLimit)` guard did not catch this because the overflowed value was negative.\n\nThat invalid limit then reached string, bytes, skip, and scalar-reading paths as an invalid byte count or invalid range. Instead of failing as a checked decode error such as `IOException`, malformed input could throw unchecked runtime exceptions including `IllegalArgumentException` and `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException`. Applications commonly treat malformed protobuf input as an expected decode failure; unchecked runtime exceptions escaping that boundary can crash request handling or the process.\n\nThe original report is a sibling of the negative-length skipped-group bug fixed as CVE-2026-45799. It is not the same bug. The length in this advisory is positive, and the overflow occurs when setting a length-delimited message limit, not only when skipping a group.\n\nWhile auditing for the same bug class, related boundary flaws were also found and fixed:\n\n- Kotlin `ProtoReader` now validates logical message limits before varint, fixed32, fixed64, and skip operations. The originally reported byte-array overflow payload did not reproduce as the same signed overflow in `ProtoReader`, because that reader tracks positions as `Long`, but the streaming reader still needed consistent current-message-limit enforcement.\n- Swift `ReadBuffer.readVarint()` read `pointer.pointee` before checking that one byte remained. A tag-only varint field could read past the end of the buffer.\n- Swift `ReadBuffer.verifyAdditional(count:)` formed `pointer.advanced(by: count)` before proving the requested `count` fit within the remaining buffer, so pointer arithmetic ran before the bounds were established. (The distinct Swift negative-length `skipGroup()` crash is tracked separately as GHSA-86wm-r4c5-2rc9 / CVE-2026-61695; this advisory covers the positive/oversized-length boundary failures.)\n- Swift nested-message decoding and packed-repeated decoding computed end pointers from untrusted lengths before validating that the bytes were present.\n- Swift packed-repeated decoding reserved array capacity from an untrusted length before validating that the length existed in the current buffer.\n- Swift size-delimited decoding converted an untrusted `UInt64` varint size to `Int` without exactness or availability checks. On platforms where the value is not representable, this could trap.\n\nThe fix enforces a single invariant across the hardened readers: every decoded or skipped byte count must be non-negative and no larger than the remaining bytes in the current logical message limit before any cursor, pointer, limit, allocation, or slice is advanced.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply protobuf bytes to an application using affected Wire decoders can trigger a denial of service by causing decode to fail with unchecked runtime failures or traps rather than normal malformed-input decode errors.\n\nKnown impact:\n\n- Availability impact only.\n- No known confidentiality impact.\n- No known integrity impact.\n- No known code execution.\n\nAttack requirements:\n\n- The application decodes attacker-controlled protobuf bytes with Wire.\n- No authentication is required if the decoding endpoint is reachable without authentication.\n- A single short malformed protobuf payload is sufficient for the Kotlin byte-array fast path.\n\nMost directly affected Kotlin entry points:\n\n- `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)`\n- `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString)`\n\nAdjacent Kotlin path hardened by this fix:\n\n- `ProtoAdapter.decode(BufferedSource)`\n- direct use of `ProtoReader`\n\nAffected Swift entry points:\n\n- Swift `ProtoDecoder` and `ProtoReader` APIs when decoding attacker-controlled `Data` or buffers.\n\n### Proof of concept and regression payloads\n\nThese payloads are intentionally small and should be treated as malformed protobuf input. After the fix, they must fail with normal decode errors such as `IOException`, `EOFException`, or `ProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData`, not unchecked runtime exceptions, traps, out-of-bounds reads, or large allocations.\n\n#### Kotlin byte-array known length-delimited field\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n0A FF FF FF FF 07\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `0A`: field 1, length-delimited\n- `FF FF FF FF 07`: varint length `2147483647`\n\nPre-fix behavior observed through `Person.ADAPTER.decode(byteArray)`:\n\n```text\njava.lang.IllegalArgumentException: startIndex: 6 \u003e endIndex: -2147483643\n```\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nIOException / EOFException\n```\n\n#### Kotlin byte-array unknown length-delimited field\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n1A FF FF FF FF 07\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `1A`: field 3, length-delimited\n- `FF FF FF FF 07`: varint length `2147483647`\n\nPre-fix behavior observed:\n\n```text\nArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException\n```\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nIOException / EOFException\n```\n\n#### Kotlin byte-array skipped group containing oversized positive length\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n0B 0A FF FF FF FF 07 0C\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `0B`: start group, field 1\n- `0A`: nested field 1, length-delimited\n- `FF FF FF FF 07`: varint length `2147483647`\n- `0C`: end group, field 1\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nIOException / EOFException\n```\n\n#### Kotlin current-message-limit fixed32 boundary\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n02 0D 05 00 00 00\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `02`: outer length-delimited message length is 2 bytes\n- `0D`: nested field 1, fixed32\n- `05 00 00 00`: enough bytes remain in the underlying source, but not inside the current logical message limit\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nEOFException\n```\n\nThis covers the invariant that scalar reads must not cross the current length-delimited message boundary even when the underlying source has more bytes available.\n\n#### Swift tag-only varint value\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n08\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `08`: field 1, varint\n- Missing varint value byte\n\nPre-fix risk:\n\n- `ReadBuffer.readVarint()` could dereference `pointer.pointee` before verifying that a byte remained.\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData\n```\n\n#### Swift nested message with oversized positive length\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n12 FF FF FF FF 07\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `12`: field 2, length-delimited\n- `FF FF FF FF 07`: varint length `2147483647`\n\nPre-fix risk:\n\n- Nested message decoding computed an end pointer from an untrusted length before proving that the buffer contained that many bytes.\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData\n```\n\n#### Swift packed repeated field with oversized positive length\n\nHex:\n\n```text\n0A FF FF FF FF 07\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- `0A`: field 1, length-delimited packed repeated field\n- `FF FF FF FF 07`: varint length `2147483647`\n\nPre-fix risk:\n\n- Packed repeated decoding could reserve capacity based on an untrusted length before proving the bytes were present.\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData\n```\n\n#### Swift size-delimited stream with unrepresentable size\n\nHex:\n\n```text\nFF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 01\n```\n\nMeaning:\n\n- Size-delimited message length varint `UInt64.max`\n\nPre-fix risk:\n\n- `ProtoDecoder.decodeSizeDelimited(_:from:)` converted the untrusted `UInt64` to `Int` without exactness checking.\n\nExpected fixed behavior:\n\n```text\nProtoDecoder.Error.unexpectedEndOfData\n```\n\n### Root cause\n\nThe vulnerable code mixed three operations that must remain separate:\n\n1. Decode an untrusted protobuf length.\n2. Validate that the length is non-negative and fits within the current logical message boundary.\n3. Advance the cursor, pointer, limit, slice, or allocation based on that length.\n\nIn the vulnerable paths, step 3 happened before step 2 was complete. For Kotlin `ByteArrayProtoReader32`, this caused signed integer wraparound in `pos + length`. For Swift, related pointer and allocation operations could be performed before proving the requested bytes existed.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix centralizes checked cursor and pointer advancement.\n\nKotlin changes:\n\n- `ByteArrayProtoReader32` now validates constructor invariants for `pos` and `limit`.\n- `ByteArrayProtoReader32` now uses shared helpers to:\n - reject negative lengths,\n - compute checked limits,\n - compute remaining bytes in the current logical limit,\n - validate before `skip`,\n - validate before string and bytes reads,\n - validate before fixed32 and fixed64 reads.\n- `ProtoReader` now mirrors the same logical-boundary model for:\n - length-delimited limit calculation,\n - skipped length-delimited fields,\n - varint reads,\n - fixed32 reads,\n - fixed64 reads,\n - current-message remaining-byte calculations.\n\nSwift changes:\n\n- `ReadBuffer` now computes checked end pointers only after confirming `count \u003e= 0` and `count \u003c= remaining`.\n- `ReadBuffer.readVarint()` verifies one byte remains before each byte dereference.\n- `ReadBuffer.readBuffer(count:)`, `readData(count:)`, `readFixed32()`, and `readFixed64()` compute the checked new pointer before reading and advancing.\n- `ProtoReader.beginMessage()` validates nested message lengths before storing a message-end pointer.\n- Packed repeated decoding validates the packed field length before preallocation and before constructing the loop boundary.\n- `ProtoDecoder.decodeSizeDelimited(_:from:)` converts sizes with `Int(exactly:)` and verifies that the full message bytes exist before constructing a child buffer.\n\nFixed in PR #3635:\n\n- https://github.com/square/wire/pull/3635\n- Fix commit `25ebcabb9ab7f12d1d77af75ecbc51726fddc015`\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe recommended remediation is to upgrade to a patched release.\n\nPartial mitigations if an immediate upgrade is not possible:\n\n- Reject or cap untrusted protobuf message sizes before passing bytes to Wire.\n- Prefer decoding from a bounded source where possible rather than decoding unbounded attacker-controlled byte arrays.\n- Treat unchecked runtime exceptions from protobuf decode as malformed-input failures at service trust boundaries so they cannot crash the process.\n- For Swift, do not pass untrusted size-delimited streams or `Data` directly to affected decoders without an outer size cap and exception/error boundary.\n\nThese mitigations reduce exposure but do not fully fix the parser bugs.\n\n### Detection\n\nA crash or error may contain one of the following symptoms when processing malformed protobuf bytes:\n\n```text\nIllegalArgumentException: startIndex: 6 \u003e endIndex: -2147483643\nArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException\nIndexOutOfBoundsException\nunexpected unchecked RuntimeException during ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)\nSwift trap during Int conversion from an untrusted protobuf size\nSwift unexpected pointer/buffer failure while reading malformed varints or length-delimited values\n```\n\nThe absence of these exact messages does not prove safety. Any unchecked exception, trap, or process crash while decoding malformed length-delimited protobuf input should be investigated.\n\n### Verification\n\nRegression tests added:\n\n- `ProtoReader32Test.lengthDelimitedRejectsPositiveLengthOverflow`\n- `ProtoReader32Test.fixed32CannotReadPastLengthDelimitedLimit`\n- `ProtoReaderTest.fixed32CannotReadPastLengthDelimitedLimit`\n- `ProtoReaderTests.testReadVarintRejectsMissingValue`\n- `ProtoReaderTests.testNestedMessageRejectsOversizedLength`\n- `ProtoReaderTests.testPackedRepeatedRejectsOversizedLengthBeforePreallocation`\n- `ProtoDecoderTests.testDecodeSizeDelimitedRejectsUnrepresentableSize`\n\nFocused verification command:\n\n```bash\n./gradlew :wire-runtime:jvmTest :wire-runtime-swift:test\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\nBUILD SUCCESSFUL\n```\n\n### Relationship to related advisories\n\nThis is a distinct vulnerability from the negative-length issues. It is a\ndifferent bug class \u2014 a positive, non-negative length (for example\n`2147483647`) that passes the existing `length \u003c 0` check but still overflows\nthe signed 32-bit cursor or crosses the current message boundary \u2014 and it has\na separate fix (PR #3635, not the negative-length PRs).\n\n- `CVE-2026-45799` / `GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9` fixed the original Kotlin/JVM\n negative-length skipped-group crash (Wire `6.3.0`). The non-negative\n overflow described here was not covered by that check and remained\n exploitable through `6.4.4`.\n- `GHSA-86wm-r4c5-2rc9` / `CVE-2026-61695` covers the Swift negative-length\n `skipGroup()` crash (PR #3616). The Swift hardening in this advisory\n (PR #3635) instead addresses positive/oversized-length overflow, buffer\n over-read, and unrepresentable-size conversions in the Swift readers.",
"id": "GHSA-9rm7-3qhh-h2mc",
"modified": "2026-09-17T14:52:52Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T14:52:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire/security/advisories/GHSA-9rm7-3qhh-h2mc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire/pull/3635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire/commit/082d5d83cec57ef68f1dd7d3e3d1d641c1fb670f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire/commit/25ebcabb9ab7f12d1d77af75ecbc51726fddc015"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire/releases/tag/6.4.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/square/wire/releases/tag/7.0.0-alpha04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Wire: Unauthenticated decoder crash via 32-bit length integer overflow in ByteArrayProtoReader32 (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-45799)"
}
GHSA-9RXH-WVVF-HH9J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:26 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:26Artifex jbig2dec 0.13 has a heap-based buffer over-read leading to denial of service (application crash) or disclosure of sensitive information from process memory, because of an integer overflow in the jbig2_decode_symbol_dict function in jbig2_symbol_dict.c in libjbig2dec.a during operation on a crafted .jb2 file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-7885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-17T00:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Artifex jbig2dec 0.13 has a heap-based buffer over-read leading to denial of service (application crash) or disclosure of sensitive information from process memory, because of an integer overflow in the jbig2_decode_symbol_dict function in jbig2_symbol_dict.c in libjbig2dec.a during operation on a crafted .jb2 file.",
"id": "GHSA-9rxh-wvvf-hh9j",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:26:46Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:26:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.ghostscript.com/show_bug.cgi?id=697703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201708-10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3855"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9V3H-3C2M-F2WV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:03 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:03The mintToken function of a smart contract implementation for WangWangToken, an Ethereum token, has an integer overflow that allows the owner of the contract to set the balance of an arbitrary user to any value.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-13526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-09T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The mintToken function of a smart contract implementation for WangWangToken, an Ethereum token, has an integer overflow that allows the owner of the contract to set the balance of an arbitrary user to any value.",
"id": "GHSA-9v3h-3c2m-f2wv",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:03:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:03:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BlockChainsSecurity/EtherTokens/blob/master/GEMCHAIN/mint%20integer%20overflow.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BlockChainsSecurity/EtherTokens/tree/master/WangWangToken"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9V48-2PRJ-RQC9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-13 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:33An integer overflow was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in watchOS 11.5, macOS Sonoma 14.7.6, tvOS 18.5, iPadOS 17.7.7, iOS 18.5 and iPadOS 18.5, macOS Sequoia 15.5, visionOS 2.5, macOS Ventura 13.7.6. A remote attacker may be able to leak memory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-31221"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-12T22:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An integer overflow was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in watchOS 11.5, macOS Sonoma 14.7.6, tvOS 18.5, iPadOS 17.7.7, iOS 18.5 and iPadOS 18.5, macOS Sequoia 15.5, visionOS 2.5, macOS Ventura 13.7.6. A remote attacker may be able to leak memory.",
"id": "GHSA-9v48-2prj-rqc9",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:51Z",
"published": "2025-05-13T00:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31221"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122404"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122405"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122717"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122718"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122720"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122721"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/May/9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
Mitigation MIT-3
Strategy: Language Selection
- Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.
- Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
Mitigation MIT-8
Strategy: Input Validation
- Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
- Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
Mitigation MIT-36
- Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
- Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-26
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
CAPEC-92: Forced Integer Overflow
This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.