Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1188

Allowed

Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.

545 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RVXP-RC2J-V2H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-03-09 18:31
VLAI
Details

An unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in the SNMP service of International Datacasting Corporation (IDC) SFX Series SuperFlex SatelliteReceiver. The deployment insecurely provisions the private SNMP community string with read/write access by default. Because the SNMP agent runs as root, an unauthenticated remote attacker can utilize NET-SNMP-EXTEND-MIB directives, abusing the fact that the system runs a vulnerable version of net-snmp pre 5.8, to execute arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28775"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-04T08:16:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in the SNMP service of International Datacasting Corporation (IDC) SFX Series SuperFlex SatelliteReceiver. The deployment insecurely provisions the `private` SNMP community string with read/write access by default. Because the SNMP agent runs as root, an unauthenticated remote attacker can utilize `NET-SNMP-EXTEND-MIB` directives, abusing the fact that the system runs a vulnerable version of net-snmp pre 5.8, to execute arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-rvxp-rc2j-v2h6",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T18:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-03-04T09:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28775"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.abdulmhsblog.com/posts/sfx2100-vulns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.abdulmhsblog.com/posts/spfx-vulnrabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RWR4-QW9C-FJXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-19 00:31 – Updated: 2025-06-19 00:31
VLAI
Details

The Versa Director software exposes a number of services by default and allow attackers an easy foothold due to default credentials and multiple accounts (most with sudo access) that utilize the same default credentials. By default, Versa director exposes ssh and postgres to the internet, alongside a host of other services.

Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers.

Workarounds or Mitigation:

Versa recommends the following security controls:

1) Change default passwords to complex passwords 2) Passwords must be complex with at least 8 characters that comprise of upper case, and lower case alphabets, as well as at at least one digit, and one special character 3) Passwords must be changed at least every 90 days 4) Password change history is checked to ensure that the at least the last 5 passwords must be used when changing password. 5) Review and audit logs for all authentication attempts to check for unauthorized/suspicious login attempts and enforce remediation steps.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24288"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-19T00:15:22Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Versa Director software exposes a number of services by default and allow attackers an easy foothold due to default credentials and multiple accounts (most with sudo access) that utilize the same default credentials. By default, Versa director exposes ssh and postgres to the internet, alongside a host of other services.\n\nVersa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers.  \n\nWorkarounds or Mitigation: \n\nVersa recommends the following  security controls:\n\n1) Change default passwords to complex passwords\n2) Passwords must be complex with at least 8 characters that comprise of upper case, and lower case alphabets,  as well as at at least one digit, and one special character\n3) Passwords must be changed at least every 90 days\n4) Password change history is checked to ensure that the at least the last 5 passwords must be used when changing password.\n5) Review and audit logs for all authentication attempts to check for unauthorized/suspicious login attempts and enforce remediation steps.",
  "id": "GHSA-rwr4-qw9c-fjxm",
  "modified": "2025-06-19T00:31:07Z",
  "published": "2025-06-19T00:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24288"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-portal.versa-networks.com/emailbulletins/68526d12dc94d6b9f2faf719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.versa-networks.com/support/solutions/articles/23000026708-release-22-1-4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V26G-W7C2-RJJ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-11-19 00:00 – Updated: 2023-04-19 18:30
VLAI
Details

Insecure Boot Image vulnerability in Hitachi Energy Relion Relion 670/650/SAM600-IO series allows an attacker who manages to get access to the front network port and to cause a reboot sequences of the device may exploit the vulnerability, where there is a tiny time gap during the booting process where an older version of VxWorks is loaded prior to application firmware booting, could exploit the vulnerability in the older version of VxWorks and cause a denial-of-service on the product. This issue affects: Hitachi Energy Relion 670 Series 2.2.2 all revisions; 2.2.3 versions prior to 2.2.3.3. Hitachi Energy Relion 670/650 Series 2.2.0 all revisions; 2.2.4 all revisions. Hitachi Energy Relion 670/650/SAM600-IO 2.2.1 all revisions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-35535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-18T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insecure Boot Image vulnerability in Hitachi Energy Relion Relion 670/650/SAM600-IO series allows an attacker who manages to get access to the front network port and to cause a reboot sequences of the device may exploit the vulnerability, where there is a tiny time gap during the booting process where an older version of VxWorks is loaded prior to application firmware booting, could exploit the vulnerability in the older version of VxWorks and cause a denial-of-service on the product. This issue affects: Hitachi Energy Relion 670 Series 2.2.2 all revisions; 2.2.3 versions prior to 2.2.3.3. Hitachi Energy Relion 670/650 Series 2.2.0 all revisions; 2.2.4 all revisions. Hitachi Energy Relion 670/650/SAM600-IO 2.2.1 all revisions.",
  "id": "GHSA-v26g-w7c2-rjj3",
  "modified": "2023-04-19T18:30:51Z",
  "published": "2021-11-19T00:00:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=8DBD000061\u0026LanguageCode=en\u0026DocumentPartId=\u0026Action=Launch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V52W-28XH-V562

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 20:47 – Updated: 2026-06-19 20:47
VLAI
Summary
Kozou: Unauthenticated MCP HTTP server and bundled dev-stack hardening (DNS-rebinding, request-body limits, read-only reads, default network exposure)
Details

Kozou compiles a PostgreSQL schema into an Admin UI, a REST API, and an MCP server. Several hardening gaps in the bundled HTTP surfaces and the scaffolded dev stack are fixed in 1.8.1.

Issues

  1. MCP HTTP server lacked DNS-rebinding protection. The Streamable HTTP transport is unauthenticated and loopback by default. Without Host/Origin validation, a malicious web page in the operator's browser could rebind a hostname it controls to the loopback address and drive the MCP endpoint — reading schema metadata, or (when the opt-in call execution tool is enabled) executing exposed functions as the execution role.

  2. Unbounded request-body buffering (DoS). Both the MCP HTTP server and the in-house REST server read the entire request body into memory with no size limit, so a reachable client could drive the process toward memory exhaustion.

  3. Read requests ran in a read/write transaction. The shared role-transaction envelope opened every request with a plain BEGIN, so a GET ran read/write. A SELECT that reaches a volatile function or a writable / INSTEAD-triggered view could perform a write that then commits — the "a GET only reads" contract was left to the serving role's grants rather than enforced.

  4. No-auth dev surfaces published on all interfaces by default. The scaffolded docker-compose.yml (and the quickstart) published the unauthenticated Admin UI and MCP HTTP server — and the default-credential demo database — on every host interface, and the config defaulted those binds to 0.0.0.0.

What changed in 1.8.1

  • DNS-rebinding guard (MCP HTTP): the server validates the Host header (and a present Origin) against an allowlist before handling any request, on every route. Matching is on the hostname; loopback names are always accepted and an operator can add hosts via configuration. A browser cannot forge Host/Origin, so this closes the rebinding vector. (This is a browser-rebinding defence; network reachability of an unauthenticated server must still be constrained by the network — see workarounds.)
  • Request-body size cap: both HTTP servers reject an over-large declared Content-Length (413) and enforce the limit while streaming, so a chunked / Content-Length-less body cannot grow unbounded. A non-JSON Content-Type on a body is rejected with 415. The cap is configurable.
  • Read-only read transactions: read methods (GET) now run in a READ ONLY transaction, so the database refuses any write for the duration of the request regardless of the role's grants.
  • Loopback-by-default network posture: the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server now bind loopback by default; the bundled compose files publish every host port (Admin UI, MCP, database) on 127.0.0.1 only, while the container binds all interfaces internally so the loopback mapping still works. Operators opt into a broader bind explicitly.

Impact

The MCP HTTP server's exposure is greatest when the opt-in call execution tool is enabled and/or the server is reachable beyond loopback. The read/write-transaction issue has effect only when the schema exposes a read path that can write (a volatile-function-backed column or a writable/INSTEAD-triggered view) and the serving role holds write grants. The all-interface publish affected anyone who ran the scaffolded docker compose up on a host reachable from an untrusted network. Requests run under SET LOCAL ROLE, so PostgreSQL still enforces grants/RLS at runtime; these are defense-in-depth and read-contract hardening.

Affected / patched

  • npm packages kozou, @kozou/api, @kozou/mcp, @kozou/core (and the lockstep-versioned siblings): affected <= 1.8.0, patched 1.8.1.
  • Container image ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou: patched at tag v1.8.1.

Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade immediately)

  • Bind the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server to loopback and publish their host ports on 127.0.0.1 only; do not expose them to untrusted networks.
  • Do not enable the MCP call execution tool on a non-loopback / unauthenticated deployment.
  • Put an authenticating reverse proxy (with Host/Origin validation and a request-body limit) in front of any non-loopback deployment.
  • Change the demo database's default credentials and restrict its port.

Patches

Upgrade to Kozou 1.8.1 (all npm packages and the ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou image).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "kozou"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@kozou/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@kozou/mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@kozou/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-272",
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T20:47:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Kozou compiles a PostgreSQL schema into an Admin UI, a REST API, and an MCP server. Several hardening gaps in the bundled HTTP surfaces and the scaffolded dev stack are fixed in **1.8.1**.\n\n## Issues\n\n1. **MCP HTTP server lacked DNS-rebinding protection.** The Streamable HTTP transport is unauthenticated and loopback by default. Without `Host`/`Origin` validation, a malicious web page in the operator\u0027s browser could rebind a hostname it controls to the loopback address and drive the MCP endpoint \u2014 reading schema metadata, or (when the opt-in `call` execution tool is enabled) executing exposed functions as the execution role.\n\n2. **Unbounded request-body buffering (DoS).** Both the MCP HTTP server and the in-house REST server read the entire request body into memory with no size limit, so a reachable client could drive the process toward memory exhaustion.\n\n3. **Read requests ran in a read/write transaction.** The shared role-transaction envelope opened every request with a plain `BEGIN`, so a `GET` ran read/write. A `SELECT` that reaches a volatile function or a writable / `INSTEAD`-triggered view could perform a write that then commits \u2014 the \"a GET only reads\" contract was left to the serving role\u0027s grants rather than enforced.\n\n4. **No-auth dev surfaces published on all interfaces by default.** The scaffolded `docker-compose.yml` (and the quickstart) published the unauthenticated Admin UI and MCP HTTP server \u2014 and the default-credential demo database \u2014 on every host interface, and the config defaulted those binds to `0.0.0.0`.\n\n## What changed in 1.8.1\n\n- **DNS-rebinding guard (MCP HTTP):** the server validates the `Host` header (and a present `Origin`) against an allowlist before handling any request, on every route. Matching is on the hostname; loopback names are always accepted and an operator can add hosts via configuration. A browser cannot forge `Host`/`Origin`, so this closes the rebinding vector. (This is a browser-rebinding defence; network reachability of an unauthenticated server must still be constrained by the network \u2014 see workarounds.)\n- **Request-body size cap:** both HTTP servers reject an over-large declared `Content-Length` (413) and enforce the limit while streaming, so a chunked / `Content-Length`-less body cannot grow unbounded. A non-JSON `Content-Type` on a body is rejected with 415. The cap is configurable.\n- **Read-only read transactions:** read methods (`GET`) now run in a `READ ONLY` transaction, so the database refuses any write for the duration of the request regardless of the role\u0027s grants.\n- **Loopback-by-default network posture:** the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server now bind loopback by default; the bundled compose files publish every host port (Admin UI, MCP, database) on `127.0.0.1` only, while the container binds all interfaces internally so the loopback mapping still works. Operators opt into a broader bind explicitly.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe MCP HTTP server\u0027s exposure is greatest when the opt-in `call` execution tool is enabled and/or the server is reachable beyond loopback. The read/write-transaction issue has effect only when the schema exposes a read path that can write (a volatile-function-backed column or a writable/`INSTEAD`-triggered view) and the serving role holds write grants. The all-interface publish affected anyone who ran the scaffolded `docker compose up` on a host reachable from an untrusted network. Requests run under `SET LOCAL ROLE`, so PostgreSQL still enforces grants/RLS at runtime; these are defense-in-depth and read-contract hardening.\n\n## Affected / patched\n\n- npm packages `kozou`, `@kozou/api`, `@kozou/mcp`, `@kozou/core` (and the lockstep-versioned siblings): affected `\u003c= 1.8.0`, patched **1.8.1**.\n- Container image `ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou`: patched at tag `v1.8.1`.\n\n## Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade immediately)\n\n- Bind the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server to loopback and publish their host ports on `127.0.0.1` only; do not expose them to untrusted networks.\n- Do not enable the MCP `call` execution tool on a non-loopback / unauthenticated deployment.\n- Put an authenticating reverse proxy (with `Host`/`Origin` validation and a request-body limit) in front of any non-loopback deployment.\n- Change the demo database\u0027s default credentials and restrict its port.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to **Kozou 1.8.1** (all npm packages and the `ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou` image).",
  "id": "GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T20:47:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T20:47:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kozou-dev/kozou/security/advisories/GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kozou-dev/kozou"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kozou: Unauthenticated MCP HTTP server and bundled dev-stack hardening (DNS-rebinding, request-body limits, read-only reads, default network exposure)"
}

GHSA-V7XG-323F-V8P9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-19 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:57
VLAI
Details

Configuration defects in the secure OS module.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will affect availability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-19T17:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Configuration defects in the secure OS module.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will affect availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7xg-323f-v8p9",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:57:32Z",
  "published": "2023-06-19T18:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V84C-4FCP-8R85

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-17 21:32 – Updated: 2026-11-17 21:32
VLAI
Details

Flagr before 1.2.5 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access the flag management write API through an insecure default FLAGR_BASIC_AUTH_WHITELIST_PATHS including /api/v1/flags. Because basicAuth.whitelist() in pkg/config/middleware.go matches only path prefixes regardless of HTTP method, attackers can create, modify, enable, disable, and delete flags, variants, segments, constraints, and distributions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-130860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T20:17:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Flagr before 1.2.5 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access the flag management write API through an insecure default FLAGR_BASIC_AUTH_WHITELIST_PATHS including /api/v1/flags. Because basicAuth.whitelist() in pkg/config/middleware.go matches only path prefixes regardless of HTTP method, attackers can create, modify, enable, disable, and delete flags, variants, segments, constraints, and distributions.",
  "id": "GHSA-v84c-4fcp-8r85",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T21:32:03Z",
  "published": "2026-11-17T21:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openflagr/flagr/issues/813"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openflagr/flagr/commit/c7e995e3fa2d4d084cf1e722859aa00921626d53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openflagr/flagr/blob/1.2.4/pkg/config/env.go#L256"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openflagr/flagr/blob/1.2.4/pkg/config/middleware.go#L250-L262"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openflagr/flagr/releases/tag/1.2.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flagr-before-1.2.5-authentication-bypass-via-default-basic-auth-whitelist"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V8PM-QRJG-7Q78

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 21:33 – Updated: 2026-10-14 21:33
VLAI
Details

holaOS through 2026.822.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in channel-gateway connectors that allows any messaging-platform user to submit agent tasks because the #isAllowed check accepts all senders when the default allowFrom list is empty. Attackers who can message the operator's Telegram, Slack, Discord, or other bot can have ChannelIngress.handle pass turns to the workspace agent, running configured tools on the operator's machine.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-110769"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T19:17:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "holaOS through 2026.822.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in channel-gateway connectors that allows any messaging-platform user to submit agent tasks because the #isAllowed check accepts all senders when the default allowFrom list is empty. Attackers who can message the operator\u0027s Telegram, Slack, Discord, or other bot can have ChannelIngress.handle pass turns to the workspace agent, running configured tools on the operator\u0027s machine.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8pm-qrjg-7q78",
  "modified": "2026-10-14T21:33:44Z",
  "published": "2026-10-14T21:33:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/holaboss-ai/holaOS"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/holaboss-ai/holaOS/blob/4684714ee133794cdbb86630e42b7d93447fb2e2/runtime/channel-gateway/src/connectors/telegram.ts#L488"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackmd.io/@hieuPenguinnn/holaos-channel-gateway-allow-all-sender-default"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/holaos-through-2026.822.1-missing-authorization-in-channel-gateway-connectors"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VG5Q-95GG-RQFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-28 18:33 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:33
VLAI
Details

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48927"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-28T17:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg5q-95gg-rqfg",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:33:18Z",
  "published": "2025-05-28T18:33:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48927"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-48927"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/how-the-signal-knock-off-app-telemessage-got-hacked-in-20-minutes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VH92-5F9C-5PJV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:47 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:47
VLAI
Details

vsftpd on TP-Link C2 and C20i devices through firmware 0.9.1 4.2 v0032.0 Build 160706 Rel.37961n has a backdoor admin account with the 1234 password, a backdoor guest account with the guest password, and a backdoor test account with the test password.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-8218"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-04-25T20:59:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "vsftpd on TP-Link C2 and C20i devices through firmware 0.9.1 4.2 v0032.0 Build 160706 Rel.37961n has a backdoor admin account with the 1234 password, a backdoor guest account with the guest password, and a backdoor test account with the test password.",
  "id": "GHSA-vh92-5f9c-5pjv",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:47:22Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:47:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-02-09-tplink-c2-and-c20i-vulnerable.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VQ9P-W6WV-CR25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 20:46 – Updated: 2026-11-12 20:46
VLAI
Summary
pgEdge Control Plane generates pg_hba.conf with trust authentication for local and loopback connections
Details

Summary

Every pg_hba.conf generated by the pgEdge Control Plane begins with a hard-coded block of trust entries covering Unix-socket and loopback connections. Any operating-system account that can reach the Postgres socket or the loopback interface on a database host can authenticate as any Postgres role, including the superuser, without presenting a credential.

Details

The generated file opens with the following six entries:

local   all         all                     trust
host    all         all     127.0.0.1/32    trust
host    all         all     ::1/128         trust
local   replication all                     trust
host    replication all     127.0.0.1/32    trust
host    replication all     ::1/128         trust

Postgres evaluates pg_hba.conf top-down and stops at the first matching rule. Because these entries are emitted at the top of the file, they also pre-empt every rule below them — including entries supplied by an operator through the pg_hba_conf field of a database node specification, which are appended lower in the file and are therefore never reached for local or loopback connections.

Both supported orchestrators emit these entries, but exposure differs by deployment model:

  • systemd — the database runs on a shared multi-user host. Any local account on that host can connect as the Postgres superuser. This is the higher-severity case and the one the CVSS score below reflects.
  • Docker Swarm — the Unix socket and the loopback interface belong to the Postgres container, so reaching these entries requires code execution inside that container. Publishing the Postgres port to the host does not change this: such connections are not seen by Postgres as originating from 127.0.0.1 or ::1, so they do not match the entries above. The practical exposure is correspondingly narrower.

An operator who verifies their own deployment can confirm the issue by inspecting the generated pg_hba.conf on a database node for the entries above.

Impact

An unprivileged local operating-system account on an affected database host obtains full control of every Postgres database on that host: read of all data, modification or destruction of all data, and any action available to a Postgres superuser. Under the systemd orchestrator this converts any local account into a database superuser with no additional prerequisites.

Affected versions

pgEdge Control Plane v0.1.0 through v0.10.1, inclusive.

Patches

Fixed in v0.11.0. Generated pg_hba.conf files no longer contain trust entries, and operator-supplied local authentication rules take effect. Upgrading to v0.11.0 or later is the recommended and, on v0.9.0 and later, the only complete remedy.

Workarounds

The available mitigation differs by version, and no mitigation is complete on current releases.

v0.1.0 – v0.8.1. An operator could take the authentication files out of Patroni's control entirely: copy the generated pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf, edit the copies, and point the hba_file and ident_file settings at them through node-level postgresql_conf. This is effective but must be repeated per instance, including for every node added afterwards.

v0.9.0 – v0.10.1. The above no longer applies. API validation rejects the hba_file and ident_file settings, and entries supplied through the pg_hba_conf specification array are appended below the hard-coded block rather than overriding it, so they do not take effect for local or loopback connections. The only partial mitigation available is to restrict the Unix socket: set unix_socket_permissions to 0700, or to 0770 with the intended accounts placed in the postgres group. This closes the socket path only. No supported configuration closes the loopback path on these versions. Operators on v0.9.0 – v0.10.1 should upgrade to v0.11.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/pgEdge/control-plane"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-125323"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T20:46:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T18:17:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nEvery `pg_hba.conf` generated by the pgEdge Control Plane begins with a hard-coded block of `trust` entries covering Unix-socket and loopback connections. Any operating-system account that can reach the Postgres socket or the loopback interface on a database host can authenticate as any Postgres role, including the superuser, without presenting a credential.\n\n### Details\n\nThe generated file opens with the following six entries:\n\n```\nlocal   all         all                     trust\nhost    all         all     127.0.0.1/32    trust\nhost    all         all     ::1/128         trust\nlocal   replication all                     trust\nhost    replication all     127.0.0.1/32    trust\nhost    replication all     ::1/128         trust\n```\n\nPostgres evaluates `pg_hba.conf` top-down and stops at the first matching rule. Because these entries are emitted at the top of the file, they also pre-empt every rule below them \u2014 including entries supplied by an operator through the `pg_hba_conf` field of a database node specification, which are appended lower in the file and are therefore never reached for local or loopback connections.\n\nBoth supported orchestrators emit these entries, but exposure differs by deployment model:\n\n* **systemd** \u2014 the database runs on a shared multi-user host. Any local account\n  on that host can connect as the Postgres superuser. This is the\n  higher-severity case and the one the CVSS score below reflects.\n* **Docker Swarm** \u2014 the Unix socket and the loopback interface belong to the\n  Postgres container, so reaching these entries requires code execution inside\n  that container. Publishing the Postgres port to the host does not change this:\n  such connections are not seen by Postgres as originating from `127.0.0.1` or\n  `::1`, so they do not match the entries above. The practical exposure is\n  correspondingly narrower.\n\nAn operator who verifies their own deployment can confirm the issue by inspecting the generated `pg_hba.conf` on a database node for the entries above.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unprivileged local operating-system account on an affected database host obtains full control of every Postgres database on that host: read of all data, modification or destruction of all data, and any action available to a Postgres superuser. Under the systemd orchestrator this converts any local account into a database superuser with no additional prerequisites.\n\n### Affected versions\n\npgEdge Control Plane v0.1.0 through v0.10.1, inclusive.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **v0.11.0**. Generated `pg_hba.conf` files no longer contain `trust` entries, and operator-supplied local authentication rules take effect. Upgrading to v0.11.0 or later is the recommended and, on v0.9.0 and later, the only complete remedy.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe available mitigation differs by version, and no mitigation is complete on current releases.\n\n**v0.1.0 \u2013 v0.8.1.** An operator could take the authentication files out of Patroni\u0027s control entirely: copy the generated `pg_hba.conf` and `pg_ident.conf`, edit the copies, and point the `hba_file` and `ident_file` settings at them through node-level `postgresql_conf`. This is effective but must be repeated per instance, including for every node added afterwards.\n\n**v0.9.0 \u2013 v0.10.1.** The above no longer applies. API validation rejects the `hba_file` and `ident_file` settings, and entries supplied through the `pg_hba_conf` specification array are appended below the hard-coded block rather than overriding it, so they do not take effect for local or loopback connections. The only partial mitigation available is to restrict the Unix socket: set `unix_socket_permissions` to `0700`, or to `0770` with the intended accounts placed in the `postgres` group. **This closes the socket path only. No supported configuration closes the loopback path on these versions.** Operators on v0.9.0 \u2013 v0.10.1 should upgrade to v0.11.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-vq9p-w6wv-cr25",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T20:46:03Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T20:46:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/security/advisories/GHSA-vq9p-w6wv-cr25"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125323"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/pull/470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/commit/88659f7388fc6c86125e60475aa83810171145b7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/blob/main/changes/v0.11.0.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/releases/tag/v0.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pgEdge Control Plane generates pg_hba.conf with trust authentication for local and loopback connections"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.